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ABSTRACT
This work explores the connections between Middle English literature and 
transitions occurring within the English legal system. It focuses on the way Chaucer 
and the Gawain-poet negotiate the tension between the legal potency of the written word 
and the spoken word. As the common law contains an ongoing negotiation between 
written and unwritten forms of law, the dissertation discusses the function and 
significance of the tension between the lex scripta and the lex non scripta. It argues 
that the increasing displacement of oral and written language in the legal realm is a 
source o f considerable cultural anxiety, and this anxiety is expressed in the works of 
literature chosen for discussion.
Entering into the current re-evaluation o f the Middle Ages, the dissertation 
addresses historical, cultural, and literary issues of contemporary relevance. The first 
chapter argues that the Wife o f Bath manipulates hidden texts in a rhetorical strategy 
which parodies that of the medieval courtroom, not the pulpit. Chapter two 
demonstrates that the General Prologue’s portrait o f the Sergeant of the Law points to 
the legal profession’s subversive use of its influence over the formation of the lex non 
scripta in the area o f land law, an influence which facilitated profound social changes, 
and subverted the written laws created by parliament. The third chapter presents the 
thesis that Chaucer’s Pardoner is a textual exhibitionist and his Proloeue and Tale 
depict the abuse o f texts, and the fetishization of texts and writing. Chapter four 
demonstrates that the Canon’s Yeoman’s Prologue and Tale expresses the fear of an 
emptiness in texts, and also questions whether written language has, or can have, any
i i i
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authentic source. The final chapter argues that S ir Gawain and the Green Knight 
challenges the thesis o f the certainty o f the oral oath by deprivileging the determinacy 
of oral communication.
i v
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INTRODUCTION
This dissertation explores the connections between Middle English literature and 
transitions occurring within the English legal system during the late medieval period. 
Its central focus is how the legal system’s relationship to writing is conceived of and 
depicted in Middle English poetry. It explores the way Chaucer and the Gawain-poet 
conceive of and describe the tension between the legal potency of the written word and 
that of the spoken word. As the common law contains an ongoing negotiation between 
written and unwritten forms of law (which will be referred to in their technical names 
as the lex scripta and lex non scripta). the dissertation discusses the manifestations and 
significance of this tension in the medieval literary imagination.
Legal questions have particular importance in the latter half of the fourteenth 
century insofar as they are connected with a cultural transition away from the ancient 
legal and social system based on oral contracts and customs and towards a culture 
which is increasingly dependent upon writing. The opposition between two modes of 
discourse, the oral and the written, is reflected in the interlocking network of power 
struggles between classes, sexes, and newly forming professions. Jesse Gellrich has 
described the situation created by the intersection of these two modes o f discourse, the 
oral and the written, as one of "displacement." He writes that in this period: "writing 
is commonly masked as oral, and just as often spoken language is veiled as inscription- 
one channel of language is the guise or disguise of the other" (x). In my interpretation 
o f this situation I see the concept o f mutual "disguise" as deeply problematic in the
1
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legal realm. The document, rather than being seen as a written creation which stands 
on its own, open for interpretation, is frequently seen in this period as a signifier of 
something else, something which went before it. I will argue that the increasing 
displacement o f oral and written in the legal realm is a source of cultural anxiety, and 
this anxiety is expressed in the works of literature chosen for discussion.
M .T. Clanchy notes that in the thirteenth century "documents did not 
immediately inspire trust" (294); however, texts were simultaneously held in extreme 
veneration and turned into quasi-magical objects. However, texts used as legal 
documents seldom inspired the same trust as those texts created and used for other 
purposes. As feudal societies are based on the legal principle of "the word as bond," 
(to use Douglas Canfield’s term) considerable anxiety is likely to arise in a transitional 
period during which members of the society are uncertain of what exactly constitutes 
"the word" that binds them together. The question troubling the medieval common law 
is whether the written word is as binding, or binding in the same wav as the spoken 
word. There is evidence that legal documents inspired a great deal of anxiety amongst 
various strata of society.
Evidence of this anxiety about the increasing and often confusing dependence 
upon written legal documents is evident in the Peasants’ Revolt of 1381 and in the later 
deposition of Richard II. These events represent the culminating moments when pre­
existing tensions led to revolutionary action. Furthermore, from a legal standpoint they 
are very significant and complex "trials" o f the bonds of late medieval society. The 
revolt and deposition test the pecking order of English society and force revelations
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about who holds real power, and how it is held by them. These two events are framed 
in highly legalistic terms by the participants in them, who in both cases primarily wish 
to establish the nature of their legal rights. The participants in the Revolt strive to 
establish what their customary rights are in relationship to the lords and landowners, 
while in the process o f the deposition proceedings both the King and Parliament strive 
to determine the balance of power between themselves. The nature of the lex scripta 
(the written statutes) and the lex non scripta (the laws established by the custom of the 
courts), and the balance of power between these two forms of law are questioned over 
the course o f these events.
At his coronation ceremony Richard "swore on the cross to confirm the laws and 
customs of the people" (Jones 14). However, what exactly constituted "the laws and 
customs" was not easy to determine. For instance, Richard H. Jones notes that in the 
coronation ceremony, "especially noteworthy were the pains taken to remove any doubt 
that the laws which the king swore to confirm were those which had been established 
in the reign of Edward the Confessor, not those which had been ordained by the 
legislation o f Edward I," and further, an alteration was made to the coronation oath 
established in 1308 for Edward II "whereby the king swore to uphold whatever laws 
the people might elect for the glory o f God. For these phrases there was substituted 
in the coronation oath of 1377 an ambiguous reference to the laws of the church" (Jones 
14-15). From the opening of his reign those supporting and surrounding Richard 
intended for him to escape being bound by the laws and customs of the people; 
however, the underlying problem is the uncertainty o f what constituted these laws and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4
customs. Were they established by Parliament’s spoken word, or by the written laws 
it created? Or, was law established by the decisions o f the judges whom Richard 
consulted on his rights and obligations, or by the immemorial usage o f custom filtered 
down from the past, or by the word of the King himself? At the heart of this confusion 
is the common law’s negotiation o f the supposed certainty o f the written law (the lex 
scripta). and the flexibility and apparent uncertainty o f the unwritten law based on 
custom (the lex non scripta).
An examination of the rebels’ actions during the Revolt of 1381 exemplifies a 
crippling legal confusion. While I am in agreement with Steven Justice’s thesis that the 
general populace did have a degree of literacy and legal knowledge, Justice ignores the 
fact that the rebels’ legal demands and ideology reveal evidence of naivete and 
confusion. During the Revolt, the rebels often demanded documents which did not 
exist. As in their belief in the legal value of the Domesday Book, the populace 
subscribed to a mythic belief in ancient texts and documents which could set them free 
from villeinage. Yet, it appears that such documents never existed. The rebels were 
attempting to reform society by returning to a previous, lost order of things; and, I 
would argue, rather than being legally astute, the uprising was motivated by nostalgia 
for an Edenic past where words held true and justice prevailed. The rebels longed for 
a mythic past, "an ‘honest’ England" which predated the legal dependence upon texts 
and writing. But, paradoxically, this past could be reconstructed and validated only by 
reference to ancient texts and documents o f mythical legal status. In their seizure of, 
and demand for, documents the rebels were looking, I propose, for the equivalent of
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what we could call "written oaths." They desired documents which would constitute 
evidence of the oral ties which once bound them to their land. They believed that the 
original documentary evidence surviving from the oral past offered them legal redress, 
when in reality this is extremely unlikely. They saw in their vision o f the past a time 
when the oral word was the bond, and the written document only a recording o f what 
was spoken, not the bond itself, as it was gradually becoming. That spoken promises 
and legal contracts appeared to be two separate and distinct things seems to be at the 
heart o f the rebels’ legal anxieties and confusion.
In this dissertation I explore how Chaucer and the Gawain-poet express their 
understanding of, and interest in, the legal complexities created by the anxiety- 
provoking relationship between the unwritten and the written in the medieval common 
law. There exists within the Canterbury Tales, I argue, an ongoing negotiation of, and 
confrontation with, legal issues, and especially with the relationship between the oral 
and the written. Sir Gawain and the Green Knight depicts an interlocking set o f  "trials" 
in which the bonds of a society are held up to the test. Its plot is predicated on oath- 
making and contractual obligations. That the contracts entered into are both oral and 
ambiguously indeterminate provokes my interest in this poem, as the work in many 
ways presents a counterbalance to the questioning of the proper uses of writing and 
texts which pervades Chaucer’s work. The contrasting attitudes of these authors toward 
oral and written "bonds" reveals a tension which, I believe, was prevelant and 
unresolved in their time and culture.
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This dissertation enters into the current re-evaluation of medieval history which, 
following Foucault’s distinction between ‘total history’ and ‘general history,’ attempts 
not to draw "all phenomena around a single centre," but to "deploy the space o f  a 
dispersion" (10). In other words, it follows a new trend of examining the complexities 
of medieval society rather than attempting to impose a single, unifying focus upon the 
age or its literature. In the process o f this analysis the dissertation addresses medieval 
cultural and literary issues of current academic interest and relevance. The first chapter 
argues that in her Prologue the Wife o f Bath manipulates hidden texts in a rhetorical 
strategy which parodies the medieval courtroom, not the pulpit. Chapter two 
demonstrates that the General Prologue’s portrait o f the Sergeant of the Law points to 
the legal profession’s subversive use o f its influence over the formation of the lex non 
scripta regarding land law, an influence which facilitated profound social changes, and 
subverted the written laws created by parliament. The third chapter presents the thesis 
that the Pardoner’s Prologue and Tale depicts the abuse of written language. The 
Pardoner’s performance is seen as a response to the increasing textualization o f 
contracts and agreements in the late Middle Ages. Chapter four argues that the 
Canon’s Yeoman’s Prologue and Tale expresses the fear of an emptiness in texts, as 
the Yeoman’s performance questions whether written language has, or can have, an 
authentic source. This attitude aligns with the suspicions about, and resistance to, 
codification in the common law, which in theory is based on custom and experience, 
not texts or writing. The final chapter argues that Sir Gawain and the Green Knight 
challenges the thesis of the certainty o f oral oaths by de-privileging the supposed
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determinacy of oral communication. The interlocking trials of the spoken word in Sir 
Gawain ultimately reveal that there is no ideal, oral, legal past to which society can 
strive to return.
The main argument o f this dissertation is that Chaucer and the Gawain-poet are 
intensely concerned with the negotiation of the oral and the written in their poetry, and 
this concern reflects and parallels an underlying cultural anxiety about the relationship 
between the oral and the written in the English legal system. This work focuses on the 
similarity between the authors’ poetic concerns and practices and legal anxieties about 
the use of written language in the construction of social bonds.
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CHAPTER ONE 
The "Buried" Legal Case of the Wife of Bath’s Prologue
In the Prologue to her Tale the Wife of Bath argues that according to Saint Paul,
wives have been given authority over their husbands. She summarizes her argum ent
in the following way:
I have the power durynge al my lyf 
Upon his propre body, and noght he.
Right thus the Apostel tolde it unto me,
And bad oure housbondes for to love us weel.
Al this sentence me liketh every deel (III.158-162)1
There is some ambiguity in the Wife’s reference to Paul’s words as a "sentence," a
term which in Middle English has a number o f meanings, including: "a personal
opinion," "doctrine, authoritative teaching," "a judgement rendered by God, one in
authority, a court," "a punishment imposed by a court," "a statute, law," "a prophecy,"
"the contents of the Bible," and, "a practice, custom" (M .E.D . PT .S.4.438-441). We
see that the word has both legal and religious denotations. Immediately following the
above-quoted lines, the Pardoner responds to the W ife’s remarks by exclaiming: "Now
dame . . .  by God and by Seint John!/ Ye been a noble prechour in this cas" (III. 164-
65). Like "sentence," the word "cas" has a variety of meanings, such as: a "state o f
affairs," "an event, incident," "an action, a deed," "an instance of something,
example," "any civil or criminal question contested before a court of law," "the side
of one party in a trial," or, "an accusation, a charge" (M .E.D . Vol.2.74-76). While
a number of the definitions of "cas" are specifically legal, none are religious.
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Interpretations o f the Wife’s Prologue have assumed from the context that only the 
religious meanings of "sentence" are relevant and that the Wife is giving a mock 
sermon, but it is possible that she is deliberately playing on the disjunction between the 
religious and legal meanings o f the term. The Pardoner refers to the Wife as a 
"prechour"; and yet, he conjoins this label with the statement that the Wife is arguing 
a "cas." The "sentence" of the Wife can also be a legal suit or cause, "a question 
contested before a court of law," as preachers do not argue "cases," but lawyers do. 
The Pardoner’s choice o f words suggests that the Wife may be presenting a legal case 
for the listeners’ judgement, and not a sermon for their edification. Thus, I contend, 
the Wife of Bath presents in her Prologue not a mock sermon, but a mock legal case 
which parodies the rhetoric of the courtroom not the pulpit.
While I agree with Lee Patterson and Charles E. Shain that the Wife is in 
control of her rhetoric rather than powerless before it, and does not suffer from what 
one critic called "a certain mental blindness" (Wood, Country of the Stars 174), I differ 
about what type of rhetoric she is in control of- Patterson argues that the Wife offers 
a sermon ioveux in the Prologue, but he bolsters his argument with some points that 
undermine his assessment of her rhetorical strategy. He claims that the Wife "preempts 
the very language of accusation" in her "mastery of masculine modes o f argument" 
("For the Wyves" 678). However, does a sermon ioveux embody "the language of 
accusation"; or, do Patterson’s words create another disjunction between legal and 
religious terminology? And, what could more embody a masculine mode of argument 
than the rhetoric of the courtroom, stemming as it does from the agonistic tradition of
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the Greeks and Romans? The Wife’s strategy of turning other people’s words against 
them is surely more appropriate to the courtroom than the pulpit.
Like Patterson, Shain is convinced that the W ife’s Prologue results from the fact 
that Chaucer, like all o f his contemporaries, "was steeped in the lore o f pulpit rhetoric"
(235). Shain goes so far as to posit that "Chaucer had inevitably to make use of that 
powerful and pervasive instrument o f medieval culture, the sermon" [italics added]
(236). However, the trial, in both the ecclesiastical and secular courts was becoming 
another "powerful and pervasive instrument of medieval culture," and it is inevitable 
that Chaucer, having performed the functions of magistrate and civil servant, would 
also have been steeped in this powerful cultural form.
Although the W ife’s Prologue has been assumed to mirror pulpit rhetoric, it can 
more logically be seen as mirroring the rhetoric of the courtroom. Furthermore, this 
interpretation can explain the Wife’s use of terminology from the legal lexicon which 
critics in the "sermonist” camp must ignore. In their analyses of her form of 
argumentation, Shain and Patterson overlook the disjunctions between the W ife’s use 
of legal and theological terminology. The form of the Wife o f Bath’s rhetoric follows 
common law practices of presenting a case, and some of the terminology of the 
Prologue can only be fully understood and appreciated from an examination of 
fourteenth-century legal procedure.
Derek Persall has noted that during his lifetime Chaucer saw "the increasing use 
of litigation and the increasing sophistication of legal procedure" (The Life 248). He 
concludes, "the law, which had once functioned and been thought o f as a last resort
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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when all means of reconciling disputes had failed, was now becoming a first resort" 
(The Life 248). It is possible that the Wife is mocking in her Prologue the newly- 
evolving forms of legal procedure and argumentation, and their practitioners. The 
agonism of her discourse may be a comment upon the growing need for disputes to be 
settled in the courtroom, as the twelfth-century legal reforms of Henry II led to the 
increasing litigiousness of late medieval England.
Some legal background and definitions are first necessary to facilitate this 
discussion. Sir Matthew Hale’s History o f the Common Law serves well to define the 
common law:
The Laws of England may aptly enough be divided into two kinds, 
viz. Lex Scripta. the written Law; and Lex non Scripta. the unwritten 
Law: For although . . .  all the Laws of this Kingdom have some 
Monuments or Memorials thereof in Writing, yet all o f them have not 
their Original in Writing; for some of those Laws have obtained their 
Force by immemorial Usage o r Custom, and such Laws are properly 
call’d Leges non Scriptae. or unwritten Laws or Customs. (3)
The common law of England is unique in its use of unwritten law; unlike legal systems
which are derived from the Roman tradition, it is not completely codified. As Henry
Sumner Maine explains, "the theoretical descent of Roman jurisprudence from a code,
the theoretical ascription of English law to immemorial unwritten tradition, were the
chief reasons why the development of their system differed from the development of
ours" (7). The Leges non Scriptae create an indeterminate quality in the English Law,
as well as an instability, which in its positive aspect is an ability to adapt to changing
social and political circumstances. There is, however, a certain tension created by the
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ambiguous differentiation between the written and unwritten aspects o f the law. Maine 
has stated that:
there is no such thing as unwritten law in the world. English caselaw is 
sometimes spoken of as unwritten, and there are some English theorists who 
assure us that if [a] code o f English jurisprudence were prepared, we should be 
turning unwritten law into written . . . .  As soon as the Courts at W estminster 
Hall began to base their judgements on cases recorded, whether in the year 
books or elsewhere, the law which they administered became written law (12- 
13).
Nevertheless, in the Middle Ages the distinction between lex scripta and lex non scripta 
remained valid. M .T. Clanchy holds that "one persistent medieval tradition rejected 
written law" ("Law and Love" 51). He cites as evidence the statement of Bracton, the 
thirteenth century legal writer, who declares: "law comes from nothing written" (1.19).
The lex non scripta is determined, and decisions made, by examining prior cases 
and thereby establishing the "custom o f the courts." A modem legal writer explains:
The idea of looking back to prior cases for guidance is as old as our
professional courts..................During the Middle Ages . . . prior cases
were also inspected, but rarely revered. Law was not found in a single 
case; rather, a group of cases illustrated the true law. Law, in this 
sense, was the total custom of the courts. (Kempin 103)
However, it has been established by legal historians that the citation of cases in
medieval courts took a necessarily vague form. Arthur R. Hogue explains:
In the Middle Ages the courts were unquestionably guided by 
traditions and customs built up in the handling of case after case. But 
there was not the citation o f cases in the modem fashion. Rather, 
citation took the form o f professional memory and ultimately "the only 
authority cognizable by the court was the record of the case" [Allen 
189]. But this record, it must be remembered, might be buried under 
several hundred pounds o f parchment rolls and consequently be very 
difficult to find; to "search the record" was a serious task which the 
court would not lightly assign to anyone. (190)
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While Percy Winfield disagrees with Hogue’s position and has put forth the argument
that the medieval court records do not present "sufficient evidence of the practice of
citing cases" (153), C.K. Allen has demonstrated that the courts in the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries did make their judgements based upon the citation of, and
precedents set by, case law (183-197). He summarizes:
the foundations o f our case-law do most plaintly exist in these medieval 
reports [the Year Books]. Their very raison d ’etre was the instructive 
value o f the decided case, or the arguments and pleadings leading to it. 
The judges were well aware, even from early times, that their decisions 
were shaping the law. (197)
In the early years o f the fourteenth century, for example, a counselor reminds the court
that "the judgement to be by you now given will be hereafter an authority in every
quare non admisit in England" (Year Book 32 Edward I, Rolls Series, 32). In 1327
Judge Scrope reminds counsel that, "the King has commanded us that we do law and
reason according to that which has been done in like case; wherefore consider whether
there is any case like to this matter" (Year Book I Edward III 24, Mich. pi. 21). There
is evidence to be found, as well, to substantiate Hogue’s point that counselors relied on
memory. In the following exchange Judge Stanton challenges counsel to substantiate
his case reference:
Stanton: Where have you seen a guardian vouch on a writ of dower? 
Miggeley: Sir, in Trinity term last past, and of that I vouch the record. 
Stanton: If you find it, I will give you my hat.
(Year Book 4 Edward II, Selden Society vi, 168)
Finding the case record, as the judge must well have known, would have been a nearly
impossible task. Thus, the law is being formed in the late Middle Ages by reference
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to past decisions, but the record of these cases remains "buried" in a number of 
potentially problematic ways.
Legal records existed in three written forms: as writs, plea rolls, and Year 
Books. The writs, by which proceedings were instituted, were filed in a way which 
suggests that "they were always intended to be capable o f being consulted without 
difficulty" (Hector, "Reports" 269). The plea rolls, which Hogue is specifically 
referring to above, give a record of all court proceedings case by case; however, they 
by no means give a complete record of each proceeding, as a modem court record 
would. The rolls "entirely ignore everything in the proceedings they record that can 
be regarded as abortive or irrelevant" (Hector, "Reports" 268). The Year Books, on 
the other hand, are a select compilation of case proceedings, which can provide 
differing information about the cases from the plea rolls. W hile the Year Books were 
not "buried" in the literal sense that the plea rolls most probably were,2 they were still 
a fairly limited source of information about "the record of the case." Hogue explains 
that "the Year Books often present only fragments of the case as it was argued in court" 
(190).
Furthermore, the Year Books bring up other aspects o f the "buried" nature of
the case record. First of all, as T .F .T . Plucknett explains, "the Year Books were never
published annually like modem law reports, nor were they ever published in the year
which they report" (Studies 330). Secondly, the selection o f cases recorded in the Year
Books appears to be profoundly biased. Plucknett notes that there is a:
curious predominance in those books of a very few names—presumably 
of those who were soon to be described as serjeants, and . . . these
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prominent lawyers seemed to conduct practically all the vast litigation of 
the realm . . . .  In short, the Year Books seem to be openly partial to 
the serjeants. (Studies 336)
Thirdly, the Year Books had a very limited circulation. After the reign of Edward II
manuscripts are quite few in number, and Plucknett surmises that "it is obvious that
they all emanate from one source" (Studies 337). In his study o f the history o f the
legal profession, Plucknett concludes that:
The number o f the later Year Book manuscripts surviving seems to 
suggest that they were only destined for use by a very restricted public 
. . . .  at present it seems clear that they did not circulate among the 
profession at large, but were rather a close and intimate manifestation of 
the work of the order of serjeants, being most probably designed for 
their especial, perhaps for their exclusive use. (Studies 337)
As the Order of Serjeants was always very small in number,3 it must be assumed that
the Year Books cannot have been an accessible source o f court records for the legal
profession in general. Thus, despite the publication of the Year Books, the case
records still remained for all practical purposes "buried" in their piles of parchment
rolls. Despite the amount of documentation available, Hogue’s point seems valid, that
memorization of case records was required o f the professional lawyer.
The "buried" nature o f the case record, the incomprehensibility o f the medieval
legal vocabulary, and the extreme formalism of procedure increasingly served to
exclude lay people from direct access to the justice system. G.O. Sayles notes:
It was always open to anyone at any time to plead his own case in court: 
he might even disavow his counsel and continue the action himself. 
Obviously, as law became more complicated, the services of an expert 
became advisable, if not essential, for many a case was lost through lack 
of proper advice, (xxxii)
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Pollock and Maitland describe medieval law as composed of an "intricate mass of 
procedural rules" (229). In W infield’s interpretation of the case records: "procedure 
is so predominant that we wonder at times where the point of substantive law is to be 
found in the web o f writ, declaration, counterplea, double plea, and judgement" (155). 
Thus, pleading one’s own case in court, while potentially possible, is clearly becoming 
an ill-advised course of action.
Winfield claims that a lawyer who was not well versed in procedure and 
pleading "would have lost his client’s case a dozen times over before discussion of the 
point o f substantive law in issue were reached" (156). He summarizes that "formalism 
in procedure is not a disease o f early law, but is the life-blood o f it" (156). The 
monetary aspects of this situation must have been significant as pleading played a large 
part in a medieval lawyer’s business (Allen 185). There are sound business reasons for 
the increasing intricacy of the rules o f  pleading, as the increasing legal formalism 
created and maintained the lawyer’s professional monopoly. Because judges were 
recruited exclusively from the bar, there was little reason for the bench to counteract 
the tendency towards procedural intricacy and thus go against the interests o f the 
profession it inevitably shared with the counselors. This is one o f the ways in which 
the practice of recruiting judges from the bar, which is unique to the common law, had 
a considerable influence on shaping the English legal system.
Possibly due to its increasing monopoly over the courts, the legal profession 
incited suspicion and hostility. May McKisack notes, for instance, that during the 
Peasants’ Revolt on June 13, 1381, "prisons were opened and in Cheapside a number
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of lawyers, Flemings and other unpopular persons . . . were summarily beheaded" 
(410). The movement toward literacy, which created the written case record and the 
mass o f required writs, expanded the role of the counselors. Nevertheless, the 
unpopularity of the profession may be related to the form of oral argumentation it uses 
and thus to the profession’s alignment with rhetoric, not, as is the most obvious 
assumption to be drawn, to its alignment with writing and literacy.
The considerable amount o f legal documentation available from the fourteenth 
century gives us an understanding o f the procedural rules followed in the courts. Legal 
records from the reigns of Edward II, Edward in , and Richard II are accessible to 
modem scholars in the printed volumes of the Selden Society and the Ames Foundation. 
The information the reports give about fourteenth-century legal practice has, however, 
particular strengths and weaknesses. The early reports show patterns of pleading and 
argument, say little about rules o f process or substantive law, and give very little idea 
o f how trials were actually conducted. Nevertheless, the arguments and pleadings used 
are shown "in nearly pure dramatic form" so that it is possible to decipher the system 
of pleading and the patterns of reasoning used (Sutherland 182). The vocabulary used 
in the pleadings is difficult for a modem reader to follow; however, Donald Sutherland 
has surmised from his examination o f them that "the logic of argument in the fourteenth 
century was not essentially different from ours" (182).
Legal reasoning, both modem and medieval, depends upon a balancing of 
findings on both the law which applies in a case, and the facts which apply (or can be 
proven). As a result, legal reasoning has always been problematic for logicians.
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Duncan Kennedy describes one o f the logical problems inherent in the conventions of 
legal argumentation:
From the great mass o f facts, the lawyer selects those that he or she 
thinks can be cast as "relevant" to one of the preexisting rule formulae 
that together compose the corpus juris. Then the lawyer works to recast 
both facts and formula so that the desired outcome will appear compelled 
by mere rule application. (184)
A further convention is that "argument and counterargument are presented as simply
’correct’ as applied to the general question, without this presentation binding the arguer
in any way on the nested sub-question" (Kennedy 190). Kennedy concludes his
dissection of legal reasoning by asserting:
Legal argument has a certain mechanical quality, once one begins to 
identify its characteristic operations. Language seems to be "speaking 
the subject," rather than the reverse. It is hard to imagine that an 
argument so firmly channelled into bites could reflect the full complexity 
either o f the fact situation or the decision-maker’s ethical stance toward 
it. It is hard to imagine doing this kind of argument in utter good faith, 
that is, to imagine doing it without some cynical strategy in fitting foot 
to shoe. (192)
The problem with legal reasoning stems from the fact that it depends upon characteristic 
manouvers which often result in the adoption o f logical fallacies. Lawyers’ cases tend 
to be formulated in an illogical and deceptive manner, as the Wife o f Bath’s case is.
The Wife uses argumentative strategies similar to those used in legal proceedings 
in order to make a case about the status o f the wife in the marriage partnership. The 
same vagueness of citation necessitated by the "buried" nature of the case record in the 
judicial system is notable in reference to the W ife’s use of citation in the first part of 
the Prologue. The case she argues is founded upon doctrine which is proven by 
reference to the writings of St. Paul, but typically the Wife cites only one half of a
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"sentence" and ignores the other. She deliberately leaves the other half "buried" in the 
text which contains it. For instance, in lines 158-162, quoted at the opening of this 
chapter, the Wife uses two statements of Paul as her authority. The first reads, "The 
wife has not the power o f her own body, but the husband; and likewise also he hath not 
power of his own body, but the wife" (I Cor 7.4). She uses this passage to affirm her 
"sentence:" "I have the power duryinge al my lyf/ Upon his propre body, and noght 
he" (III. 158-9), while ignoring the corollary statement. Similarly, she makes use o f 
Paul’s commandment, "Husbands, love your wives" (Eph 5.25), while suppressing the 
fact that this "sentence" is embedded in a text which also commands, "Wives, submit 
yourselves unto your own husbands, as unto the Lord" (Eph 5.22). The Wife exploits 
the "buried" nature of the Scriptural case record she cites in an effort to establish her 
own laws of marriage—laws which are based upon "custom," not the written "laws" of 
the New Testament. By doing this she pleads for the an interpretation o f marriage 
based on the lex non scripta. rather than the lex scripta of Paul. From the point o f 
view of English jurisprudence, this is proper procedure.
The Wife mediates between the written laws of marriage found in the New 
Testament and the "customs" o f marriage established by experience. Just as the 
"custom of the courts" is determined by examining the record of past cases, the Wife 
of Bath finds the "custom of marriage" by examining a group o f "cases"--her own five 
marriages. We can make an alignment between her use of "experience" and the legal 
use of "custom." In common law, "custom" is determined by the study of past usage; 
in other words, custom is derived from the experience of the courts in the application
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of the law. In the Prologue the Wife creates a common law case for following the 
dictates of custom (her experience) rather than of written law (the writings o f Paul, 
Jerome, and other anti-female writers).
The Wife presents her argument without addressing the counterargument, 
thereby following another standard practice of legal argumentation. "I quitte hem word 
for word" (1.422) she says, proclaiming that she is presenting one side o f a battle of 
words, not dialectically balancing the sides of a logical argument. Like a counselor 
pleading a case, she engages in a verbal contest which has distinctly well-drawn lines 
of demarcation. Verbal ammunition, and not fairness, is the primary consideration in 
the formulation of her argument. As a sermon, the Wife’s speech would be absurd; 
however, as an example o f legal reasoning it is quite typical.
The Wife’s use o f Paul involves channelling him into "bites" that automatically 
become rules, which are then presented as simply "correct" as applied to the general 
question of a wife’s authority over her husband. The other halves of the quotations do 
not have to be addressed, as her assertions do not have to be binding on "the nested 
sub-questions." The Wife applies her bites of law to her facts, which are taken from 
the history o f her marriages, and she thereby proves that her definition o f the custom 
of marriage is correct. However, she recounts the stories of her marriages so that her 
authority over her husbands is proven, as her rule has been cast in such a way that her 
stories will prove it. Furtherm ore, the facts presented in the narratives are limited to 
those that prove her rule. This again is standard practice in legal argumentation.
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W hether or not the Wife is found to be "misquoting" or "misusing" Scripture 
depends upon whether one considers her to be using a dialectical strategy or a rhetorical 
one. The agonistic form of trial law, by this period fully established, does not compel 
counselors to give a fair and balanced description of the other side’s position; in fact, 
procedure compels them to do the opposite. The lawyer is compelled to discredit the 
other side’s case in order to build his own. Lawyers, like all rhetoricians, must play 
to an audience, and cannot follow the motive of fair play. As J. A. Alford states: "To 
achieve ’the maistre’, to manipulate other people into believing or behaving according 
to one’s own wishes is ’what orators most desire’" ("The Wife" 124).
The Wife is masterful at turning her husbands’ (the opposition’s) words against 
them. One instance is found in her description of how she argued with her "olde 
housbondes" that "Oon of us two moste bowen, douteleess,/ And sith a man is moore 
resonable/ Than womman is, ye moste been suffrable (III.440-442). The Wife turns 
a rule which comes from man’s domination of written language (i.e. that man is more 
reasonable than woman) against her husbands through a twist o f oral argumentation. 
Written language loses its privilege in the Wife’s use of it. She demonstrates the 
privilege and authority of the oral over the written throughout her Prologue by showing 
how treacherous textual "bites" can be in the mouth of a skilled orator.
"The language of accusation" most directly appears in the Prologue in the long 
section containing the "Thou seist" passsages. At the conclusion of this section the 
Wife explains, as if in summary, "Under that colour hadde I many a myrthe" (III.399). 
While "colour" contains the general meaning of "a specious reason or argument," "a
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pretext" (M .E .D . V.2.395-398), it also refers to a procedure invented in the fourteenth
century.4 This practice is embodied in another Middle English denotation o f the term:
"a reason or argument advanced by way of justifying, explaining, or excusing an
action; grounds for an action" (M .E .D . V .2 .395-398). D .W . Sutherland explains the
practice o f "pleading colour":
It is odd that the defendant should have to describe not only his own 
claim but also the plaintiffs . . . .  But this description of the plaintiffs 
claim by the defendant was the specific element of "color," and the law 
insisted that the defendant include it if he wanted any discussion of the 
parties’ rights in court before the case went to a jury. And if this seems 
strange, it is surely much stranger that what the defendant said about the 
plaintiffs claim was not true and not expected to be true, but pure sham, 
pure fiction. (184)
Sutherland claims that colour was "a product of the early fourteenth century" that 
became the rule by the end of the century (186). Due to the formalistic nature o f the 
rules of pleading, it became necessary to ascribe false claims to one’s legal opponents 
in order to facilitate judgement and mediation of a case. These allegations were 
inserted into the suits to create a stronger claim, and thus get the case into the 
courtroom.
The "Thou seist" passages in the Prologue are clearly instances of pleading 
colour, for not only does the Wife specifically refer to her argumentative strategy as 
"colour," she concludes this section of the poem by saying:
Lordynges, right thus, as ye have understonde,
Baar I stifly myne olde housbondes on honde 
That thus they seyden in hir dronkenesse;
And al was fals, but that I took witnesse 
On Janekyn, and on my nece also. (III.379-383)
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In this passage the Wife openly admits that she ascribed false arguments to her 
husbands, and invented fictional claims to use against them. It seems that in the W ife’s 
use of "colour" there is a reference to a developing legal practice, one whose ironies 
and, perhaps we could say, moral subversiveness, Chaucer, the magistrate, could not 
have failed to notice.
The inconsistency of "pleading colour" stems from the agonistic nature of 
bureaucratic procedures. The battles of words and the W ife’s actual physical battle 
with her fifth husband described in the Prologue point to the nature o f legal procedure: 
fairness is supposedly imposed by a strict set of rules, and yet fairness never extends 
to fairness to one’s opponent. In trial by battle, which is what an oral trial still 
essentially remains, the necessity is winning. The two sides do not co-operate to 
discover the truth, nor to agree upon an outcome that is just; they are merely concerned 
with convincing the judge and jurors o f their own particular interpretation of the law, 
the facts, and the way the one should be applied to the other. The law yer’s rhetoric 
is inevitably to some degree false, as he or she cannot admit to the possibility o f a 
client’s guilt, nor to the truth o f  the other side’s argument.
John Manly has pointed out how highly rhetorical the Wife of Bath’s Prologue 
and Tale are.5 In Alford’s view, the rhetorical Wife is the philosophical C lerk’s direct 
counterpart; he claims that the conflict between the Wife and the Clerk "is rooted in 
the recurrent tension between two modes of discourse, rhetorical and philosophical" 
("The Wife" 109). We see in this opposition a tension between the oral tradition of 
rhetoric and the written tradition o f philosophy. Although Alford does not discuss the
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oral/written dichotomy, the Wife obviously aligns herself throughout the Prologue with 
the oral tradition of rhetoric, in order to use it against the written one o f philosphy.
In Platonic thought the opposition between rhetoric and logic/dialectic is
essentially a moral one. As Alford explains:
In contrast to dialectic, whose object is truth, rhetoric is morally 
indifferent. Its only guide is self-interest. Its practitioners may side with 
the true but they may just as easily side with the false—to deceive, to 
have the guilty judged innocent, to make the worse cause seem the better 
. . . .  Their object, in a word, is not truth but power. ("The Wife" 110)
We can see from the example Alford uses to make his point the obvious connection
between rhetoric and the legal profession, and by an extension which Alford does not
make, between the Wife o f Bath and the lawyer. The objections to, and anxiety caused
by, the legal profession seem to be related to its professional practice o f undermining
what Douglas Canfield has termed "the chivalric code of the word as bond."
It is the rhetorical performance of the lawyer which poses a threat to the "word 
as bond." Jody Enders explains:
According to rhetorical theory and practice, law had always been a 
kind of microcosmic drama that was "staged" at the time o f delivery. 
Ever since Plato, the lawmaker was thought to be engaged in a theatrical 
enterprise . . . .  Eventually, however, forensic delivery became so 
theatrical that law was more than similar to drama . . .  it was a 
protodrama characterized by conflict, spectacle, impersonation, staging, 
costume, and audience participation. (19-20)
We can only conjecture the dramatic flair with which the Wife would have delivered
the rhetorical tour de force of her Prologue. Perhaps in her oral performance we can
see Helene Cixous’ image o f the speaking female: "She doesn’t ’speak,’ she throws
her trembling body forward; she lets go of herself, she flies; all of her passes into her
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voice, and it’s with her body that she vitally supports the "logic" o f her speech" (881). 
The dramatic rhetoric o f the Wife makes her a dangerous opponent. While Canfield 
claims that it is with "her tongue" that the Wife of Bath "subverts not only Scripture, 
. . .  but the entire Code" (122), the truly feminine rhetorician, in Cixous’ conception, 
"physically materializes what she’s thinking; she signifies it with her body" (881). Like 
the theatricality of forsensic delivery, the W ife’s "performance" collapses the border 
between "masculine" and "feminine" modes o f discourse.
Essentially, for the medievals as for the ancient Greeks, the lawyer is aligned 
with rhetorical and dramatic speech, not with written language. It is what lawyers 
orally do to texts which causes suspicion and anxiety, just as what the Wife of Bath 
does to texts in her narrative arouses suspicions about, and objections to, her. The 
W ife wields rhetorical power over the written word which lies "buried" in her argument 
just as the case records do in their heaps of parchment scrolls. It is not easy to "search 
the record" in the W ife’s case either; one must have considerable memory of Scripture 
to be able to recall extemporaneously the "buried" halves of her Scriptural quotations.
In her somewhat illogical and deceptive formulation of a case the Wife of Bath 
may embody a covert representation of cultural anxiety about legal procedures. The 
rhetorical practices of the legal profession may have led to its extreme unpopularity, 
as what lawyers orally did to a frequently "buried" case record allowed them to abuse 
their powers. It may not have been their function as writers o f documents that caused 
lawyers to be targeted by the peasants, but their role as speakers about "hidden" 
documents. It is "hidden writing" and those who have control and mastery over it
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which poses the greatest threat to the "word as bond," and to the fair trial o f a case in 
the courtroom.
By her appropriation of the lawyer’s rhetoric the Wife poses a serious threat to 
the "code." Michael Clanchy has noted that the increased dependance upon litigation 
and the increasing sophistication o f legal procedures toward the end o f  the medieval 
period had the effect of "weakening and straining the bonds of affection in feudal 
lordship" ("Law and Love" 62). The courtroom undermined the code o f the oral oath 
as much as any other force at work to bring about the demise of feudal society. As a 
"mock lawyer" the Wife is more dangerous to the code than she is as a "resistant 
woman" (to use Thomas Hahn’s label for her). In the face of a growing bureaucracy, 
the personal, feudal ties o f the oral oath were fast disappearing. The agonistic approach 
of trial procedure was antithetical to the idea of personal allegiance contained in feudal 
bonds.
The bureaucratic system in place by the fourteenth century was devoid of the
personal attention of the king as arbitrator, and bargaining was increasingly replaced
by hostile litigation. Clanchy explains:
Henry II devised an automated system of justice emphasizing speed and 
decisiveness. The plaintiff obtained a writ in standardized form . . . 
instructing a jury to be summoned, the jury gave a verdict o f ’Yes’ or 
’N o,’ and judgement and execution then followed. The system stopped 
people rambling on about their grievances by compelling them to confine 
their statements within prescribed forms . . . .  Like Frederick II’s 
system, the common law penalized people for making agreements. To 
compromise with the defendant was to insult the king, whose aid had 
been given to the plaintiff to prosecute a wrongdoer . . . .  Henry II’s 
automated system of law made it easier—and more necessary-for 
neighbors to sue each other in the king’s court. ("Law and Love" 62)
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In Clanchy’s assessment the standardized nature o f bureaucratic procedure led to 
increasing agonism. The bureaucratic system disintegrated feudal ties and replaced 
them with increasingly necessary disputes ("Law and Love" passim).
Carolyn Dinshaw has said, "the Wife is everything the Man of Law can’t say" 
(115). She argues that the Wife is exposing the techniques of the "clerkly glossatores." 
"exposing techniques that they would rather keep invisible" (120). Yet, it seems that 
the W ife’s rhetorical techniques go far beyond mere glossing. She is herself a product 
o f uncertainty; her contradictions and agonism are an embodied depiction of the new 
bureaucratic system itself. As Dame Counselor, the Wife represents the disputational 
spirit and contorted logic of the new bureaucratic order of society.
From an historical perspective there are a number of significant factors 
underlying the W ife’s appropriation o f legal rhetoric and her attitude towards texts and 
documents. She uses texts in a manipulative fashion and also attacks them, tearing 
"thre leves" (III.790) out o f one text and causing another to be tossed in the fire 
(III.816). The dependence of the bureaucracy upon documents obviously caused 
widespread concern about their proper use and faction, and about the nature of what 
constitutes a "valid" legal document. Clanchy notes of the thirteenth century that 
"documents did not immediately inspire trust" (From Memory 294). Furthermore, the 
forgery of legal documents was rampant in the early Middle Ages, so that many titles 
and privileges rested upon the tenuous foundations o f forged charters. Even one of the 
later Year Books is considered to be a forgery (Plucknett, Studies 337).
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Clanchy has demonstrated that "lay literacy grew out o f bureaucracy" (From 
Memory 19) and in this sense literacy and bureaucracy worked together to block the 
peasants and commons from obtaining the mediating function of their king as feudal 
lord. If the commons were opposed to literacy it was in this context that it appeared 
most hostile to their customary rights: law now equalled bureaucracy. Feudal law was 
personal and based upon oral oaths which required no intermediaries; but, the new 
"automated system of justice" was embodied by a complex bureaucratic system. Justice 
was turning into the modem definition o f "law": "everything to do with the
administration of justice in a society, such as the law or laws, the lawyers, the judges, 
and every system, office, and functionary concerned with the enactment, application, 
determination, and enforcement of the laws" (Gale 6).
Bruce Lyon explains:
the last two centuries of medieval England witnessed the elaboration of 
the machinery of process and of the rules of pleadings and a refinement 
of legal principles previously established. No longer was the law 
dominated and molded by legislation but by a skilled, learned, proud, 
and jealous legal profession. (613)
While in the late 1300s, king and parliament are battling for control of the law, the war
is about to be won by the legal profession. This profession was instrumental in
bringing about the ascendancy of a bureaucratic system over a feudal one. The
lawyers’ powers lay in the indeterminacy of the unwritten rules and customs which
controlled the application and interpretation of the written laws. In the fourteenth
century, the lawyers’ power lay also in the occulted nature of the buried case record.
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The W ife’s argument in the Prologue is ostensibly about the authority o f the 
wife over the husband in marriage; however, her "buried" case is about the legal 
authority of the lex non scripta over the lex scripta. This aspect o f the Prologue 
reflects the social tensions in the background of the literary performance. There is, in 
fact, a battle going on outside the poem for control o f the law, a battle which will be 
won by "a skilled, learned, proud, and jealous legal profession" (Lyon 613) with which 
the Wife is subtly aligned through her appropriation o f legal rhetoric. There is also a 
"buried" accusation against the misuse of documents by those in power, including both 
king and parliament. The Wife covertly exposes the contorted logic by which the 
courts are making their rulings, bringing up the question of who is ruling whom, or 
what is being ruled by what. Is law ruling or is rhetoric? And what form of law has 
precedence, if law indeed is ru ling-the written or the unwritten?
The authority of the lex non scripta over the lex scripta forms not only a 
backdrop to the Wife’s Prologue, it is her Prologue. The W ife’s fifth husband reads 
her a case history of wicked wives, and she quites him by tearing "thre leves" (III.790) 
out o f  the book and making him "brenne his book" (III.816), an action which echoes 
the defiant peasant Margery Starre crying, "Away with the learning of clerks, away 
with it!" (McKisack 417) However, unlike the rebel peasant, the Wife of Bath asks not 
for a new lex scripta. but formulates a lex non scripta. Her "law" of marriage is 
embodied in an oral argument which quites the written word. She proves through wily 
argumentation that wives were given authority over their husbands, and that she had 
authority over her own, setting thereby a customary precedent. Doubtless, her
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argumentation throughout makes the foot fit the shoe; however, the practicioners o f this 
type o f rhetoric are now a powerful force in fourteenth century society. Furthermore, 
the W ife’s Prologue leads to a tale about a legal case, its sentencing, and the 
commuting of that sentence, giving further justification for the legal undertones of the 
Prologue.
Chaucer aligns the Wife o f Bath with the practitioners of a form o f oral 
argumentation that uses a particular form of logic and rule application. In the tension 
between lex scripta and lex non scripta. the Wife is on the side of the unwritten law. 
The Wife assumes the power of oral interpretation over the written texts o f Paul, and 
sets forth a "cas" which is written down in Chaucer’s record as a precedent for future 
readers to follow. There is buried in her Prologue an alignment between the hatred 
toward lawyers (and their power of interpretation) demonstrated by the peasants’ attack 
upon them, and the hatred toward women (whose rhetoric is necessarily oral) in written 
texts of the period. The Wife is aligned in her Prologue with interpretation, the 
unwritten law, legal rhetoric, and most significantly, with the mediation between the 
written and the unwritten.
The Wife of Bath reinforces rule by law (a written/oral negotiation) rather than 
by oath and sovereignty. She is aligned with the new order of things which will not 
be bound by the sovereignty of the king, but takes the power of interpretation and 
negotiation unto itself. Neither written law nor sovereign oath rule; what now rules is 
the professional, bureaucratic negotiation between lex scripta and lex non scripta. The 
"buried" legal case of the Wife’s Prologue is that those who are professionally
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assuming the power of legal interpretation are an emerging political force destined to 
become "the supreme master, above both king and parliament" (Lyon 625).
ENDNOTES
‘Quotations from The Canterbury Tales are taken from Larry D. Benson, ed., 
The Riverside Chaucer, and will be cited as line references within the text.
2Evidence of the inaccessibility o f the plea rolls can be surmised from the fact 
that only a very eminent judge such as Bracton seems to have had access to any 
substantial number of them for use in compiling a legal textbook. Hogue explains that: 
"Bracton’s use of the plea roils was extraordinary. Other justices may not have been 
able to secure custody of royal plea rolls for the purpose of compiling anything 
comparable to Bracton’s Note Book, which consisted of about two thousand cases 
selected to illustrate the law at its best. The author of Fleta. writing about forty years 
after Bracton, refers to one case; Britton, who wrote an epitome of Bracton soon after 
1290, refers to none; Littleton in his authoritative work on Tenures (ca. 1481?) refers 
to eleven cases" (189).
3G. O. Sayles estimates that there were only three or four practicing at any one 
time (Select Cases xxx).
4Although "colour" only comes into the common law in the fourteenth century, 
it is clearly similar to the use of fictio in Roman jurisprudence. As Maine explains: 
"Fictio, in old Roman Law, is properly a term of pleading, and signifies a false 
averment on the part of the plaintiff which the defendant was not allowed to traverse; 
such, for example, as an averment that the plaintiff was a Roman citizen when in truth 
he was a foreigner. The object o f these "fictiones" was, of course, to give jurisdiction" 
(24-5).
sJohn Manly in "Chaucer and the Rhetoricians" claims that about fifty percent 
of the content of the Wife of Bath’s Prologue and Tale consists of rhetorical devices, 
with only the Monk’s Tale and the Manciple’s Tale showing a higher incidence.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Legal Implications of the 
General Prologue’s Portrait of the Sergeant of the Lawe
Derek Pearsall writes: "In The Canterbury Tales generally, vows and promises 
are made to be broken, once the exchange rate has changed" (The Life 248). These 
words take on an interesting resonance with regard to the portrait of the Sergeant o f the 
Law in the General Prologue. In lines that have drawn much critical discussion, the 
narrator says o f the Sergeant: "So greet a purchasour was nowhere noon:/ A1 was fee 
symple to him in effect;/ His purchasyng myghte nat been infect" (1.318-20). R .F. 
Green has noted the reference made in these lines to a legal procedure for removing 
entailments (usually the claims of heirs) from property ownership. For this strategy 
Green uses the label "collusive recovery." G reen’s insight into this issue offers a new 
perspective on the Sergeant which I will use to clarify some unresolved questions about 
the meaning and implications of the legal terminology Chaucer uses in this portrait.
Edwin A. Greenlaw notes of the contrast between "purchas" and "rent" in the
portrait of the Friar that, "rent" "always had the sense of legal income, as contrasted
with ’purchas,’ which generally connotes practices of doubtful propriety" (144). Pauli
F. Baum agrees that in the Friar’s portrait, "purchas stands for illegal gains and rente
for legal income"; however, he holds that in the Sergeant’s portrait, which occurs a few
lines after the F riar’s:
purchasour. purchasyng have the other and more modem meaning, not 
however without the sinister implication. The Man of Law was very 
successful in negotiating puchases, and always to his own advantage; his
32
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purchases could not be infect, i.e ., they could not be proved to be other 
than legal. (242-3)
There must be something sinister about the method the Sergeant uses in negotiating 
purchases, for, I will argue, in the fourteenth century all land was not held in "fee 
symple." In order for "Al" to be "fee symple to him in effect" (1.319) the Sergeant 
must be practicing a means of disentailing properties. The conveyancing practice called 
"collusive recovery" may have led to the sinister meaning of "purchas"; for, to 
purchase land in the fourteenth century was frequently "to contrive, plot," (M .E .D . 
P .8.1467) and in the end, to "appropriate (land) to one’s use without legal title" 
(M .E.D. P.8.1466).
The word "purchas" also expresses medieval Christian resistance to the
economic freedom of the individual. P .S . Atiyah explains that in the medieval societies
of Western Europe:
economic ideas and ethical ideas were closely related . . . .  the element 
o f freedom was severely constrained by ethical ideas. Men were not, 
nor were they thought to be, free to do what they chose. Even their 
own property-as it came to be thought of in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries-did not ’belong’ to them. Land, the most important 
source of property, was not owned, but ’held’ . . . .  And if a m an did 
not own his property to do what he chose with it, neither did he own his 
person absolutely. Medieval man was involved, whether he liked it or 
not, in an intricate network of relationships with his fellow men. 
(Freedom of Contract 61-2)
In regard to contractual relationships, the medievals held that, "Justice was more
important than freedom of choice" (Atiyah, Freedom of Contract 62). By introducing
freedom of choice into land law, and altering the "network of relationships" involved
in traditional land tenure, the movement to free land up for inclusion in a commodity
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market led to profound changes in the social structure. By making freedom of choice 
more important that justice, land law broke down the customary ties between men and 
the land, and among men. This social and legal shift, with roots in land conveyancing 
practice, must have been greeted with apprehension and unease by those with an 
understanding of what was going on. It appears from the portrait of the Sergeant that 
Chaucer had an insider’s knowledge of the workings o f the legal system, and the 
professional appointments he held would attest to this.
The concept of the free alienability of land was a fairly recent phenomenon in 
the fourteeenth century. In the thirteenth century even a tenant in fee simple (the most 
unrestricted form of ownership) could not freely alienate his land. Medieval restrictions 
upon the alienation of property were the result of both the imposition of feudalism (after 
the reign of Henry II) and ancient English customs which predated feudal ideas. The 
customs which originally restricted alienation were based on the belief that a tenant had 
no right to sell the inheritance o f his family. Anglo-Saxon custom held that the sale o f 
land cheated future heirs, as well as ancestors, out of what rightfully belonged to them. 
Land did not "belong to" the fleeting current owner, but was "held by" him. After the 
reign of Henry II, restrictions upon alienation were based primarily on the belief that 
the tenant had no right to transfer the obligations he owed to his immediate lord to 
another tenant, as the relationship between lord and tenant was based on a personal 
covenant. Feudal ideology maintained that alienation broke the bond of fealty with the 
lord. Thus, in both customary and feudal systems of thought, there were ethical 
objections to the freedom to alienate real property. Nevertheless, land was being
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alienated in Chaucer’s time, and even much earlier, by means which undermined this 
ideology about landholding as well as more recent legislation regarding alienation.
K.E. Digby explains:
a practice prevailed as early as the reign of Henry II o f conveyancing 
lands by means o f a fictitious or collusive suit, commenced by 
arrangement by the intended alienee against the alienor, and then 
compromised with permission of the court by the defendant making his 
peace with the claimant and abandoning his defence. (Real Property 
105-6)
Digby places this practice under the rubric o f "the doctrine of fines," which he claims 
"was formally one o f the most intricate branches o f the law of real property" (Real 
Property 106). The "doctrine of fines" (which will be referred to hereafter as the 
"collusive recovery") was abolished in 1834 by the Act for the Abolition of Fines and 
Recoveries (3 and 4 Will. IV, c.74); however, by this time free alienation of property 
had become such an accepted doctrine that the abolition of the practice was redundant. 
The power of "collusive recovery" was that it made the doctrine of free alienability 
seem to be a sanctioned and acceptable practice, even though it was proscribed by both 
custom and legislation. Collusive recovery gave the appearance of legitimacy to the 
practice of selling land which had been given under the condition that it was not to be 
sold. The influence o f the collusive recovery is significant enough for it to deserve 
more attention in the history of the common law than it has hitherto received.
The fact that the oath of the fictitious suit "was compromised with permission 
of the court" is an aspect of the doctrines of fines which may have inspired Chaucer’s 
allusion to the practice. This was a situation in which the courts of law were 
undermining the value of both oaths and written laws. This chapter argues that
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Chaucer’s portrait o f the Sergeant points to the key culprits behind this compromising 
situation: the Order o f Sergeants, who had a subversive relationship to both oral and 
written forms of law. The lex scripta. I argue, is undermined in the area o f land 
conveyancing through customs established in the courts (i.e. the lex non scripta): and, 
in this area of the law, the courts were controlled by the Sergeants. In "collusive 
recovery" we see a specific example o f the lex non scripta "overwriting" the lex 
scripta. the written Statutes created by King and Parliament.
In order to alienate or sell land a seller has to have an unencumbered ownership 
o f it, one that gives the right to alienate the property from one’s heirs and/or the heirs 
o f the original donor. Unencumbered ownership of property is referred to as holding 
in "fee simple." A great deal of land in the Middle Ages was held in "fee tail," and 
thus could not be alienated. The proliferation of "fee tail" estates generally resulted 
from the problems created by male primogeniture. This system of inheritance (in which 
all real property goes to the eldest son) was not completely workable due to "the almost 
inescapable duty o f fathers to make some sort o f provision for their daughters and 
younger sons" (Miller 119). Commonly, a conditional gift o f land was given to these 
family members; this gift did not give them the freedom to sell the land (and thus 
permanently break up the family holding) for three or four generations. In the interval, 
any failure of heirs (often o f a particular type stipulated by the will) meant that the 
property would revert to the donor and/or his heirs (Miller 119). Daughters and 
younger sons were apparently unhappy about this restriction on their ownership, and 
in the thirteenth century "the common law courts apparently showed some sympathy for
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their endeavours to turn these imperfect gifts at the earliest possible moment into 
holdings over which they had free disposition" (Miller 119).
The method by which entailments were escaped from eventually became a 
legally sanctioned procedure referred to as the "common recovery." J.H. Baker 
explains the origins o f it:
The basis of the family settlement was still, and would always remain, 
the entail. Bedevilled as early as Henry VII’s time by an accretion o f 
abstruse erudition, the entail in practice represented a compromise 
between the interests of the living and the dead: landowners wanted 
maximum freedom for themselves with which to limit the freedom of 
their descendants. The balance between these irreconcilable freedoms 
was ever shifting, but well before 1500 the demand for freedom of 
alienation had achieved a substantial victory over vanity and ancestral 
pride, through the use of the fine and the feigned or "common" 
recovery. (11.204)
A.W.B. Simpson has noted that an air of mystery surrounds the practice of common 
recovery. He relates, "in the first place we do not really know when it was evolved, 
and in the second place there is no real understanding of the theoretical justification 
which allowed its entrance into the law" (Land Law 130). Similarly, T .F .T . Plucknett 
has noted that "if the theory of the recovery is obscure, its history is even more so" 
(Concise History 621).
The first clear indication in the records of the acceptance o f  the device which 
came to be known as the common recovery appears in Taltarum’s Case in 1472;1 
however, there is evidence that the procedure had already been in use for some time, 
as Edward I ’s Second Statute o f Westminster attempted to make it more difficult for 
people to alienate property held in fee tail. Chapter one of the Statute "concerning
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lands that are many times given upon condition" is generally referred to as De Donis.- 
R.F. Green explains the Statute’s intent:
There is no doubt that many tenants in fee tail in the middle ages, as 
later, were dissatisfied with their lot, and that a great deal o f legal 
ingenuity went into helping them circumvent the wishes o f their 
ancestors. De Donis . . . offered those who had been disadvantaged by 
the breaking of an entail a legal remedy (known as a w rit o f formedon) 
which made the buying or selling o f entailed estates a very much more 
risky business. (304)
The conveyancing of property became a "risky business" after the passing of De Donis 
because when property was sold, the seller had to warrant that it was free of any 
possible claim. If, after the sale, a claim was made, the buyer could summon the seller 
(in a process called "vouching to warranty") to answer the claim (thus making the seller 
replace the buyer’s role as defendant). If the original seller won, the buyer remained 
in possession. But, if he lost, the land went to the new claimant and the buyer would 
expect compensation. Thus, both buyer and seller were put at risk if  any claims were 
made after the sale was transacted.
This same procedure of "vouching to warranty" was used deceptively in the 
"collusive recovery" to get around entailments (allowing people to do precisely what 
the Statute meant to prevent them from doing). R.F. Green offers the most detailed 
explanation of how the "switch" in the process o f "vouching to warranty" was done. 
He writes:
a tenant in fee tail would privately agree to a price with a purchaser who 
would then sue him for ownership; thereupon, the tenant would vouch 
to warranty a third party whose interest in the estate was purely 
fictional, and who after acknowledging this obligation in court would 
request an adjournment and disappear from view. The purchaser would 
thus win the case against the vouchee by default and take formal
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possession of the estate. The advantage of this process for both 
purchaser and vendor was that any legitimate heirs disinherited by the 
transaction were left without legal grounds for complaint against either 
of them. Only the vouchee, as loser of the case, was liable, and in 
theory he was obliged to provide such heirs with an estate o f equal value 
to the one they had lost. Since, however, the vouchee was a straw man, 
deliberately chosen because, as Plucknett puts it, he had "carefully 
refrained from land ownership" the heirs were effectively left without 
any legal remedy. (304)
A.W .B Simpson has commented on the questionable ethics involved in this procedure.
He notes that, "the court’s view is that it has done its best, and cannot be blamed if
Brown [the vouchee] is a man of straw . . . .  a blind eye is turned to the fact that the
whole procedure is an obvious fraud, and neither the issue nor the remaindermen are
allowed to do anything about it" (Land Law 130). Why this situation was tacitly
sanctioned by the courts has not been adequately explained by legal historians. The
procedure involves a subversive use of the oral oath; furthermore, it turns oath-making
itself into a commodity, as the "third party" was likely compensated for his efforts.
The tacit approval of this fiction leads one to question what the "value" o f  an oral oath
was in the fourteenth-century courtroom.
The "common recovery" became an officially sanctioned conveyancing practice
by the end of the fifteenth century. From  this, R.F. Green proposes that, "collusive
recovery (that is, an under-the-counter version of the same thing) probably goes back
much further" (304). He points to a case in the Year Book of 1340 as evidence of
earlier use of the procedure.3 On the dating of the use of this procedure H.W.
Elphinstone explains:
it is often said that common recoveries were first made use o f after the 
decision in Taltarum’s case . . . .  If it were allowable to make a guess
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on a matter o f such historical importance, I should surmise that 
Taltarum’s case renders it probable that recoveries with single voucher 
were already in use. (287)
Glanvill’s work demonstrates that the practice of conveying lands by means o f a
fictitious or collusive suit was in use as early as the reign of Henry II (Book viii,
ch. 1,2).
Blackstone holds that "common recoveries were invented by the ecclesiastics to
elude the statutes of mortmain" (11.357), and Glanvill (Book vii, ch.2) provides
evidence for this conclusion. As corporations, religious houses purchased land in
mortmain (i.e. in mortua m anu). and this required "a licence of mortmain from the
crown . . .  for as the king is the ultimate lord of every fee, he ought not, unless by his
own consent, to lose his privilege of escheats and other feodal profits, by the vesting
of lands in tenants that can never be attainted or die" (Blackstone 11.269). The custom
of requiring licences of mortmain goes back to Saxon times. Blackstone dates the
custom "above fifty years before the Norman conquest" (11.269). The necessity o f the
licence was acknowleged by the Constitutions of Clarendon (A.D.1164); however, as
Blackstone claims:
such were the influence and ingenuity o f the clergy that (notwithstanding 
the fundamental principle) we find that the largest and most considerable 
dotations [i.e. endowments] of religious houses happened within less than 
two centuries after the conquest. And (when a licence could not be 
obtained) their contrivance seems to have been this: that, as the
forfeiture for such alienations accrued in the first place to the immediate 
lord of the fee, the tenant who meant to alienate first conveyed his lands 
to the religious house, and instantly took them back again, to hold as 
tenant to the monestary; which kind of instantaneous seisin was probably 
held not to occasion any forfeiture: and then, by pretext o f some other 
forfeiture, surrender, or escheat, the society entered into those lands in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
41
right o f such their newly acquired signiory, as immediate lords o f the 
fee. (11.269)
The second of Henry H i’s great charters (A .D .1217, cap 43) attempted to put an end
to this practice. However, as Blackstone notes, "the aggregate ecclesiastical bodies
(who, Sir Edward Coke observes, in this were to be commended, that they ever had of
their counsel the best learned men that they could get) found many means to creep out
o f this statute" (11.270). Of the later statutes which tried to prevent ecclesiastics from
acquiring property in mortmain without licence, Blackstone comments:
Yet still it was found difficult to set bounds to ecclesiastical ingenuity: 
for when they were driven out o f all their former holds, they devised a 
new method of conveyance, by which the lands were granted, not to 
themselves directly, but to nominal feoffees to the use o f the religious 
houses. (II.271-2)
According to Blackstone, religious houses and their legal counsel devised strategies to 
escape bars on free alienation and on corporate ownership of property in order to allow 
the religious houses to acquire freely properties by donation. Corporate ownership 
(mortmain) was also advantageous, if it could be obtained, for it eluded feudal fees, 
duties, and possible seizure, as the corporation held "in a dead hand" which could not 
be held accountable for the feudal obligations which involved personal performance.4
"Collusive recovery" became an essential element in the movement away from 
both the customary Anglo-Saxon and the feudal systems of land ownership and their 
"networks of obligations." The free alienation o f property dissolved these obligations, 
and the "traffic in land" ultimately dissolved the traditional land-holding structures. 
Through the use o f collusive recoveries land came to be treated as "property" to be 
freely exchanged. The concept of land as commodity seems to be related to the idea
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of the oath itself as a commodity item which can be bought or sold in o r outside the 
courtroom. "Vouching to warranty," that is, swearing a legally binding oath, becomes 
in the "collusive recovery" a commodity exchange tool. It seems significant that the 
oath (which tied feudal and pre-feudal society together) was used subversively in a 
procedure whose usefulness was to mm land from a feudal and ancestral "holding" into 
a market "commodity."
Pearsall has summarized that during Chaucer’s lifetime, "the unwritten 
allegiances of feudal society were being written as indentures . . . and the fixed 
hierarchies of the past, based on land-tenure and service, were giving way to ’a 
complex network of marketable privileges and duties’" (The Life 248). Once land 
moves into the marketplace, the meaning o f ownership changes. That this change was 
expedited by a legally subversive strategy, one almost certainly perpetuated by the 
Order o f Sergeants, gives a darker tone to the General Prologue’s portrait of the 
Sergeant than is generally seen. The veiled accusation against the Sergeant in the 
portrait runs deeper into the political framework of fourteenth century England than is 
suggested by viewing the portrait merely as an attack upon a particular Sergeant who 
was a personal enemy of the author.5 We also begin to see how "purchas" can mean 
two things at the same time: both the legal and illegal acquisition o f property. Legal 
and illegal means were essentially the same, as collusive recoveries can be seen as a 
sanctioned fraud which cheated rightful heirs out o f their prospects, and in some cases 
the lord out of his rightful due. How one felt about the process used in "recoveries" 
depended upon whether one was profitting by it, or losing out. The "collusive
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recovery" explains why in Middle English "purchas" can mean to contrive and plot as 
well as to buy.
There is a strong suggestion, one could even say a blatant accusation, in the 
General Prologue that the Sergeant is a master o f the collusive recovery. If  "A1 was 
fee symple to him in effect," (1.319) the Sergeant had to have been conveyancing land 
through "collusive recovery" actions. The Order o f Sergeants was very actively 
involved in land law and conveyancing in the fourteenth century. It is irrelevant to 
debate whether the Sergeant is purchasing land for himself or for his clients (c.f. F.M. 
Manly and Jill Mann), as land conveyancing formed a substantial part o f medieval legal 
practice, and conveyancing by this time was closely connected with the Order of
Sergeants. Furthermore, wealthy lawyers were often acquisitive purchasers of land.
Thus, the Sergeant undoubtedly would have both personal and professional interests in 
the performance of real estate transactions.
Interpretations o f the Sergeant’s portrait sometimes fail to take the details of
fourteenth-century legal history into account. For instance, a lawyer who attempts to
clarify the issues addressed in the Sergeant’s portrait fails to consider the changes which
have occurred over the course of the last six hundred years, and assumes that Chaucer’s
legal system is the same as England’s current one. H. Munro relates:
While there is no reason to dissent from the generally held opinion that 
Chaucer was attacking the Serjeant, it is not obvious that there was 
anything to attack in buying land, nor is it clear what would be meant
by the suggestion that somehow or other the Sergeant could turn inferior
titles into freehold. This is an exercise as difficult today as it must have 
been in Chaucer’s epoch. Further, it is hard to believe that Serjeants 
with busy court practices ever did conveyancing. Probably their 
situation was similar in that respect to that o f a modem Q.C. (1189)
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Contrary to M unro's opinion, 1) there were things "to attack in the buying of land,"
2) "inferior titles" could be turned into freehold; and, furthermore, 3) the Sergeants not 
only did land conveyancing, they had an exclusive right to appear as counsel in all real 
estate actions.
In the course o f the fourteenth century a rule was established that only Sergeants 
could become judges. Furthermore, Sergeants became officers of the Court o f 
Common Pleas, and had exclusive right of audience there (Plucknett, Studies 334). 
The Court o f Common Pleas’ jurisdiction covered "the real actions and the actions o f 
debt, detinue and covenant" (Potter 62). "Real actions" involved suits which were "the 
most lucrative and most important since they were related to real property" (Holdsworth 
I, 198). Even though the actions of debt, detinue and covenant became obsolete and 
eventually moved to other courts whose procedures were more advantageous, real 
actions remained throughout the Middle Ages the exclusive jurisdiction o f the Court o f 
Common Pleas (Potter 62). Thus, it turned out that members o f the Order o f  Sergeants 
were exclusively privileged to appear as counsel and sit on the bench for all land 
conveyancing actions. Therefore, the only group of lawyers who, ostensibly, could 
have been involved in "collusive recoveries" during the later fourteenth century were 
the Sergeants.6
Although I would give the quote a more ironic cast than I suspect McKenna
intends, I agree with her paraphrase o f the three lines in question from the Sergeant’s
portrait. She writes:
The Serjeant has knowledge and a high reputation which have brought 
him many fees and robes. He is expert in handling problems of land
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ownership, a talent then particularly admired, since it involved 
complicated and difficult procedures, especially when a clear title in fee 
simple was so highly prized. (262)
There is no doubt that "a clear title in fee simple" was "highly prized," as there were
few things as potentially lucrative as the sale o f land and the titles connected to it.
M.D. Lambkin notes:
During the increasing subinfeudation and the eventual disintegration of 
the feudal system in the Middle Ages freely alienable land presented 
opportunities for trafficking in titles, especially by the king’s officers and
all sorts of legal officials. Repeated statutes from  Edward I (statute of
1275) to Henry VIH (statute o f 1540) could not prevent these officials
from stirring up litigation, maintaining others’ suits, and subverting
impartial legal processes in order to share in the proceeds o f land. (82-
3)
It is important to note here that the Sergeants are by this period officers o f the King 
(Plucknett, Studies 334), and thus are implicated by Potter in "trafficking in titles."
Edward Miller has noted of the thirteenth century: "as land began to be looked 
upon as an investment, traffic in it became keener, and the creation of new wealth 
brought new classes of men into the investor’s market" (121). One particular group
known for its eagerness to purchase property holdings was the legal profession. The
now notorious Thomas Pynchbek, along with fellow Sergeant Henry Greene, rose from 
landless, presumably peasant, origins to found "families which would be secure among 
the landed gentry for generations" (Eliason 523).
As common law judges were, and still are, recruited exclusively from the bar, 
and in the fourteenth century from "a particular branch of the bar, that is to say, from 
the serjeants" (Plucknett, Studies 333), the professional interests of the judiciary and 
the lawyers were essentially the same. The Sergeants were, therefore, doing real estate
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conveyancing as counsel, conveyancing as purchasors themselves, and also sitting in 
judgement on any cases involving "real actions." The all-encompassing involvement 
of the Sergeants in land transactions gives a completely new cast to the meaning of the 
word "collusive" in the appellation "collusive recovery."
The fourteenth-century legal system appears all around to have a "collusive" 
quality about it, with the Order o f Sergeants at the very heart o f it all. As T .F .T . 
Plucknett comments: "it rather seems that the serjeants had strong monopolistic
instincts" (Studies 334). First of all, the sergeants managed to have all real actions 
made their exclusive province through the Order’s connection with the Court of 
Common Pleas, thereby cornering the most lucrative and politically important facet of 
the legal business.7 Having somehow established this monopoly, the Sergeants found 
ways to exploit it by refining the earlier strategies devised by the religious houses to 
acquire property. The judges did not, o f course, object to the subversive nature o f the 
procedures involved, as they were themselves members of the Order. The judiciary in 
the Court o f Common Pleas was unlikely to have opposed practices which were in the 
best interests of its own elite group. Thus, the collusion in "collusive" recovery is as 
much between the bench and the bar as it is between the parties involved in the suit. 
That this under-the-counter procedure came to be sanctioned as a standard conveyancing 
practice (with actual officers of the court standing in as straw men by the fifteenth 
century),8 demonstrates how powerful the Sergeants were at creating a legal system 
which worked for their own benefit.
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The Year Books in which legal cases were reported were apparently created for
the exclusive use o f the Order of Sergeants. T .F.T. Plucknett suggests that there is
something vaguely suspicious about the Sergeants’ control over these legal records. He
comments that "disagreeable suspicions may be aroused when a historical source is too
intimately connected with a small and close professional group" (Studies 337-338).
J.H. Baker notes one particular and important effect o f the connection between the
Sergeants and the Year Books:
the origin of the common recovery has been regarded as a ’great 
m ystery,’ mainly because the year-book cases do not draw a distinction 
between recoveries and common recoveries. The success of the device 
lay, of course, in the legal impossibility of making such a distinction: the 
validity of the recoveror’s title could not be impugned by anything on 
the face of the record. (11.204)
It appears that the records of these cases conceal as much as they reveal about land
conveyances. "Collusive recoveries" were effectively buried in the Year Books
amongst legitimate recoveries. Thus, a seemingly innocuous and irrelevant fact, that
the Sergeants created the Year Books for their own exclusive use, helps to explain how
a device which greatly affected land law, and had substantial effects upon the entire
social structure, was allowed to continue without comment or opposition, despite its
fraudulent nature and its unfairness to the vast number of people cheated out of their
right of inheritance.
The excessive insularity o f the legal profession led to its virtual autonomy over
the creation and dispensation o f the Common Law. G.O. Sayles explains:
Before the middle of the fourteenth century the Bench and the Bar had 
joined themselves together in an intimate and inseparable association. .
. No one could become a justice of the central courts o f law, that is the
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king’s bench and the common bench, unless he had previously been a 
serjeant-at-law. The fact we know: but by what means it became a 
reality is very much a mystery. The reason seems to be that the legal 
profession was allowed to look after its own affairs, make its own 
decisions, exercise its own discipline, and what it did was set down in 
its own private and domestic records, (xxvii-xxix)
The collusive nature of the legal profession allowed it to operate pretty much as it
liked, and gave it a monopoly over the creation of legal procedure. That this power
must have incited resentment almost goes without saying. Within medieval England,
even the system of legal education benefitted the interests o f the profession. The order
of apprentices "undertook the heavy burden of legal teaching" at the inns of court
(Plucknett, Studies 338). This meant that the profession was not split, as it was on the
continent, between academics and practicioners (Plucknett, Studies 339). Opposition
to the "practices" of the lawyers was virtually ruled out, as there was no real venue
from which direct opposition to their development o f procedure could come.
It appears, however, that the common people did occasionally and apparently
with some vindictiveness vent their frustration with the legal system upon both lawyers
and judges. Allan Harding relates:
the aims which the chroniclers attribute to Wat Tyler [during the Revolt 
o f 1381] are evidence of a general hatred o f lawyers as such. According 
to Walsingham, Tyler wanted a commission from the king ’to behead all 
lawyers (iuridicos). escheators and others who had been trained in the 
law or dealt in the law by reason of their office’ . . . .  The Anonimalle 
Chronicle takes further the suggestion that the people had their own 
vision of the proper working o f the law: Tyler is said to have put at the 
head of his demands at Smithfield, that there should be ’no law but the 
law of Winchester and that henceforward there should be no outlawry in 
any process o f law.’ (165-166)
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We note that Tyler specifically mentions the commons’ opposition to "outlawry in any 
process of law." Here the people openly state their indignation with the procedures 
created and perpetuated by the Order o f Sergeants.
The increasing formalism and intricacy of procedure in the medieval legal 
system maintained the lawyers’ monopoly and essentially drew a veil over what was 
going on in the courts. As legal historians have noted, substantive law (the actual point 
of law in question), is virtually impossible to determine from the court records, as it 
is deeply buried beneath the complex, formulaic character of the writs and pleadings. 
Outlawry in the process o f law perpetuated itself because it was nearly impossible to 
determine on the face of the record what precedents (i.e. leges non scriptae) were 
actually being set down for the courts to follow. The "Collusive recovery" (a 
fraudulent procedure) became the "common recovery" precisely because it had been 
established as a precedent for probably well over a hundred years; we recall, however, 
that on the face of the record collusive recovery did not even exist. The lawyers 
employed their monopoly over the establishment o f procedure to create a "custom" 
which subverted the lex scripta. the express will o f King and Parliament in De Donis. 
and in the other Statutes forbidding forms of maintenance (i.e. collusion). As the 
powerful core of the profession, the Order of Sergeants is the most culpable g ro u p - 
only the assent of the judiciary in the higher courts (the Courts o f King’s Bench and 
Common Pleas) could have allowed collusive actions to become engrained in the legal 
system.
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Harding notes that it is not certain whether by "the law of Winchester" Tyler 
meant Edward I’s Statute of Winchester or the Domesday Book which "very 
occasionally is call’d the book o f Winchester’" (166). He holds that the former is 
meant, maintaining that the peasants were referring to the "regulations for policing" laid 
down in the Statute, not to the "privileged status of villeins on ancient demesne" 
attributed to Domesday (166). While I fully agree with Harding that Tyler probably 
meant the Statute, the issue of the Domesday Book raises another, possibly volatile 
cause o f resentment against the legal profession. The series o f trials, occurring in 
1377, which were based on attempts to establish ancient demesne from the record of 
the Domesday Book were undertaken on the advice of councillors at great expense to 
the tenants, despite the flimsy legal value of the concept of ancient demesne (Faith 43- 
70). Virtually all the cases were lost, even when demesne was actually established 
from Domesday (Barg 213-37). Thus, it appears that the only ones who profitted from 
the Great Rumour were the councillors and the bureaucracy, both of whom collected 
substantial fees from these court cases. The professional ethics o f the councillors is 
questionable, considering the abject failure o f this legal challenge.
On the other hand, the Domesday trials were resented by the upper classes as
much as they most certainly were, after the fact, by those below. The House of
Commons, Mary Eliason writes, "protested that the villeins by the help o f the
Domesday Book and conniving lawyers were trying to escape the duties and customs
of villeinage" (517). Commons complained to the King that:
In many parts of England the villeins and tenants o f land in villeinage .
. . have by the advice, procurement, and maintenance and abetting of
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certain persons, for profit taken from the said villeins and tenants, 
purchased in the King’s court exemplifications from the Book o f 
Domesday, o f the manors and townships wherein they dwell. And by 
colour of these, and through misunderstanding of them, by the evil 
interpretation o f said counsellors they have withdrawn and are witholding 
the customs and services due to their lords, holding that they are fully 
discharged of all manner o f services due both from their body and their 
holdings . . . .  And to maintain these errors and rebellions they have 
collected among themselves a great sum of money, to pay their costs and 
expenses. (Rolls of Parliament 1377, iii, 21, reprinted and translated in 
D. Hughes 229-30)
It is the councillors themselves who are the most harshly indicted in the above record. 
It is claimed that they use "procurement" and "maintenance" (both with collusive legal 
implications) to "aid and abet" (i.e. collude with) the peasants. The Rolls indict the 
legal profession, not those who are obviously paying dearly for their services. 
However, the courts were not at all lenient in their interpretation o f the freedoms 
established by ancient demesne. In this case, the councillors may have gone too far in 
advocating personal freedom over Justice. It is unlikely, though, that the peasants 
could have afforded the fees of members of the Order of Sergeants. Thus, the failure 
of the ancient demesne actions may be due to the fact that the Sergeants (on the bench) 
wished to keep the apprentices (at the bar) in their place, which was out o f the area of 
real property law.
On the other hand, over and over again historians of land law note how 
unusually lenient the courts o f medieval England were in favouring the free alienability 
of land (see: Miller). This could be interpreted as a socially sympathetic stance on the 
courts’ part, as it effectively reduced the power of the lords and allowed for social 
mobility. It is likely, however, that the courts’ sympathetic leanings toward free
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alienation were largely self-serving. The legal profession wanted land to be freely 
alienable because this served its own interests, which were, potentially, for its members 
to: 1) acquire substantial fees, 2) acquire for themselves large tracts o f land, 3) make 
the profession as powerful as the great lords in being able to "grant" property to whom 
it chose, and 4) make themselves "lords." In terms of the last point, it has been noted 
that the Sergeant is the most socially prominent member o f the Canterbury group. 
Bolton states: "technically, a serjeant of the law ranked with a knight, but serjeants 
were so much more select than knights that Chaucer’s Sergeant is socially the highest 
figure among the pilgrims, higher than the Knight or even the Prioress" (403). The 
Sergeant is probably also the wealthiest member o f the entourage (see: Manly). 
Furthermore, voracious purchasers of large tracts of land were also purchasing the titles 
connected to them.
There has been a lengthy debate on the appropriateness o f The Man of Lawe’s 
Tale to his profession. It is my position that Chaucer occludes any significant 
discussion o f legal or political issues in The Man of Lawe’s Prologue and Tale, and this 
may be the best explanation for why the name of the character changes from a Sergeant 
o f the Law (an exclusive label) to the Man o f Law (a rather vague one). Authors who 
make a case for the legal significance of the Tale tend to base their conclusions on 
broad generalizations about both the legal profession and fourteenth-century legal 
procedure.9 The conclusion of Arthur Norman seems the most reasonable. He claims 
that the Tale is not concerned with law and that by themselves neither "rhetoric [n]or 
rant shows a lawyer at work" (322 n.9). Thomas Lounsbury has surmised that the Man
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of Lawe’s Tale "is the one instance of absolute incongruity found in this work between 
the character o f the narrator and that of the narrative" (436).
What sort of tale to place in the mouth of the Sergeant may have posed a 
difficult problem for Chaucer. While the portrait appears to contain a slight directed 
at Thomas Pynchbek, Chaucer might not have wanted to extend the attack any further. 
An extended indictment of a member of, or all members of, so small and powerful a 
group as the Sergeants, was likely to have been problematic. Chaucer could not do to 
the Sergeant (a label which Bolton and Manly claim referred to about twenty people in 
Chaucer’s lifetime) what he does to the Merchant (a generic label). Therefore, he puts 
aside the character drawn in the portrait and creates a substitute to stand in his place: 
the Man of Law, who, as Muriel Bowden comments, "could be any insignificant 
lawyer" (165). Even then, there is evidence in the Prologue of The Man of Lawe’s 
Tale that Chaucer was uncertain about what tale to give the Man of Law, as he sets up 
the expectation that he will speak in prose, but gives him verse instead. While the 
General Prologue portrays the Sergeant as a powerful and somewhat menacing 
character, this menace is veiled in the Tale. The Tale o f Constance is a narrative as 
morally upright and unimpeachable as the Sergeant and his conveyancing procedures 
seem to be. Like the Sergeant’s conveyances, the story o f Constance "myghte not been 
infect" (1.320).
Perhaps Chaucer felt that the General Prologue’s portrait o f the Sergeant says 
enough by itself about the Order of Sergeants. John Gower writes a much more 
pointed indictment of the Sergeants in the Mirour de l’omme. where he proclaims:
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Et puis apres quant l’apprentis 
Un certain temps ara complis,
Dont au pleder soit sufficant,
Lors quiert q ’il ait la coife assis 
Dessur le chief, et pur son pris 
Le noun voet porter de sergant.
Mais s ’il ad este pardevant 
En une chose covoitant,
Des Mill lors serra plus espris;
Car lors devient si fameillant,
Ne luy souffist un remenant,
Aniz tout devour le paiis. (11.24373-24384)
[And after the apprentice has fulfilled a certain time that is sufficient for 
pleading, he wishes to have the coif placed upon his head, and for his 
own honor wishes to bear the name of Sergeant. But if before this time 
in one thing he is greedy, now he is a thousand times inflamed; for he 
becomes so ravenous that part is not enough for him, he must devour all 
the land.]
Gower blatantly accuses the Sergeants o f devouring land. Like Chaucer, Gower makes 
a connection between the Order o f Sergeants and the voracious acquisition o f property. 
The implications in the direct accusation of Gower and the somewhat veiled one of 
Chaucer seem to be tied to abuses of both legal procedure and oral oaths in land 
conveyancing practices. These procedures have far-reaching implications as they 
challenge traditional medieval ideas about contract and bargaining. By privileging free 
choice over the abstract idea of Justice, these land conveyancing practices promote the 
freedom of the individual, and thus oppose traditional medieval social and economic 
ideologies. By altering the relationship between men and land to one of "belonging to" 
rather than "holding for," these practices subvert the ethical basis of medieval economic 
thought and the Christian bias against the economic and social freedom of the individual 
(represented by the exchange of money in cash transactions).
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The procedure of "collusive recovery" also subverted the ideal o f the "oath": the 
personal bond of agreement which created the crucial network of relationships in feudal 
and pre-feudal society. By turning the oath into a commodity exhange tool, "collusive 
recovery" stripped oath-making, and thus the personal bond, of its legal and ethical 
value. The "recoveries" which led to the free alienation of property were alienating in 
another sense as well. "Recoveries" led to the free alienation of oaths, as the spoken 
word, vowed before the court, was alienated from the true will o f the speaker, the 
fictitious third party who alienated his oath for cash.
The political and legal implications of "collusive recoveries" run far deeper than 
might be supposed, for land law was at the heart of the medieval legal system. The 
privileges connected with being a landholder were immensely important ones. Thus, 
it is no wonder that the Order of the Coif managed to make land law its exclusive 
domain. That the Order was allowed such a powerful freedom in this area of the law 
is an unusual, and as yet almost unexplored, facet of English legal history. Like the 
religious houses, whose legal ingenuity was the equal of theirs, the Sergeants had 
considerable political influence, and thus a certain amount of immunity. From  this 
perspective the three seemingly innocuous lines in the portrait, "So greet a purchasour 
was nowhere noon:/Al was fee symple to him in effect;/ His purchasying myghte not 
been infect" (1.318-20), take on a more ominious and pointed tone than can be surmised 
without taking the Order’s monopolistic role in land conveyancing practices into 
consideration.
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‘Year Book 12 Edw. IV M ich., f.14, pi. 16., f. 19, p i.25, 13 Edw. IV Mich., 
f . l ,  p l.l . Blackstone claims that the reason Taltarum’s case was finally allowed to 
enscribe openly the common recovery into the case record is that, "Edward IV 
observing (in the disputes between the houses of York and Lancaster) how little effect 
attainders for treason had on families, whose estates were protected by the sanctuary 
of entails, gave his countenance to the proceeding" (11.117) The procedure was finally 
made "law" because Edward felt that estates in fee tail encouraged treason, as they 
"were not liable to forfeiture, longer than for the tenant’s life" (11.116).
2A reprint and translation o f the Statute of Westminster II, 13 Edward I, ch.i, 
can be found in K.E. Digby, An Introduction to the History of the Law of Real 
Property. 226-230.
3Year Book Rec. Pub. 14 Edw.III, pl.43.
4For a full discussion of the laws of mortmain see Sandra Raban, Mortmain 
Legislation and the English Church: 1279-1500. Cambridge U .P ., 1982.
sOn the punning reference to Thomas Pynchbeck in the portrait o f the Sergeant 
see: F.M. Manly, Some New Light on Chaucer: and W .F. Bolton, "Pinchbeck and the 
Chaucer Circle in the Law Reports and Records o f 11-13 Richard II."
6However, as T .F .T . Plucknett notes, "the mysterious order of apprentices" 
must have done a good portion of the work as, "alone [the Serjeants] could never have 
conducted the vast amount o f business recorded on the rolls o f the Court o f Common 
Pleas" (Studies 335). Plucknett summarizes that, "it would be hazardous to say that an 
apprentice . . . could not address the Court of Common Pleas" (Studies 336).
7How or why the exclusive connection o f the Serjeants with the Court of 
Common Pleas came about has not been fully explained or investigated. Plucknett 
notes that "it must be admitted that the stages in the history of the seijeants can hardly 
yet be traced in any detail" (Studies 334).
8See: J.H . Baker (II, 204-5).
‘’Those who take this position on the Man of Law’s Tale include: Walter 
Scheps, "Chaucer’s Man of Law and the Tale of Constance"; Marie P. Hamilton, "The 
Dramatic Suitability of ’The Man of Law’s Tale’"; William E. Browne, "Notes on 
Chaucer’s Astrology"; Edgar C. Knowlton, "Chaucer’s Man o f Law”; Paul E. 
Beichner, "Chaucer’s Man of Law and Disparitas Cultus": and, Chauncey Wood, 
"Chaucer’s Man of Law as Interpreter."
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CHAPTER THREE
Textual Exhibitionism:
The Pardoner’s Affirmation of Text Over Context
O f the two Iawyerly figures in the Canterbury Tales, one, the Wife o f Bath, 
persuades us to condone her vice, while the other, the Man of Lawe, cloaks his vice. 
The Pardoner, however, throughout his Prologue and Tale, neither persuades us o f the 
rightness of what he does, nor hides what he does. Ellen Schauber and Ellen Spolsky 
note that despite his blatant confessions of vice, the Pardoner "refuses to justify himself 
to his supposed confidants. His Prologue is almost entirely free of the argument he 
himself leads us to expect" (255). They conclude that this is because he is "a man too 
arrogant to argue when common conversational decency requires it" (255). He "sets 
himself outside of the communicative circle" by both boasting and confiding in his 
listeners, thereby speaking at cross-purposes. Since "the first [speech act] expects 
approval and the second mitigated disproval" (Schauber and Spolsky 251), the Pardoner 
succeeds in alienating and confusing his audience.
Entering into the debate over the Pardoner’s rhetorical strategy, Carolyn 
Dinshaw claims that the Pardoner’s "documents and bulls, placed conspicuously in his 
bulging ‘m ale,’ present an iconographic substitute for his own lacking masculinity" 
(164). In her interpretation, the Pardoner’s "pardouns," "bulles," and "patente" stand 
in the place of the Pardoner’s apparently absent genitals. Dinshaw notes: "the
Pardoner is, after all, a ‘geldyng or a mare’; he is identified, that is, in terms o f an 
absence o f something" (157). She surmises that "the Pardoner surrounds himself with
57
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objects—relics; sealed documents; even words, regarded as objects—which he substitutes 
for his own lacking wholeness" (159). Dinshaw argues that the Pardoner’s "sense of 
his own lack informs his social behavior, his interactions with o thers," and this sense 
of lack is related to his "view of the nature of language itself," which she sees as 
"radically fragmentary" (158).
This chapter argues, in contrast to Dinshaw’s interpretation, that the alienating 
arrogance of the Pardoner’s conversational strategies is related to what I will term his 
"textual exhibitionism." The Pardoner exhibits or exposes texts for the same 
compulsive reasons that sexual exhibitionists expose themselves. While the rolled 
documents with their dangling seals function as displacements for the Pardoner’s sense 
of masculine lack, the seals also specifically mark them as legally potent pieces of 
writing.1 These potent things (the "bulles," a label which can mean both the seals and 
the documents) take the place of other, possibly less potent, things (such as the 
Pardoner’s genitals). This displacement is highlighted by the juxtaposition in the 
General Prologue’s description of the Pardoner. The description o f the placement of 
the documents, which are "bifom him in his lappe," is immediately followed by the 
description of the Pardoner’s apparent "lack," when the narrator comments, "I trowe 
he were a geldyng or a mare" (VI.686-91). The sealed "bulles" are directly juxtaposed 
with statement about the Pardoner’s sexual "lack" in order to suggest that the 
"pardouns" stand in the place of the anxiety about masculine potency on the Pardoner’s 
person. I will argue that this sexual anxiety is connected to an anxiety about the 
potency of language in documents.
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The Pardoner has a conversational immunity because his professional privileges 
are firmly established by the texts of the "bulles," "pardouns," and "patentes" which 
he conspicuously displays. These legal documents establish the Pardoner’s right to 
solicit alms in spite o f  anything he might say about his performance o f his duties. In 
the Pardoner’s Prologue and Tale the fictional "oral context" of the Pardoner’s 
performance is juxtaposed with the texts and textual references with which he surrounds 
himself. In his defiantly anti-rhetorical "oral" performance the Pardoner affirms the 
power o f written texts over oral contexts. His texts are a locus of displacement for his 
own sense of lack and for medieval anxiety about a potential lack in documents and 
writing.
Eric Jager explains that for the medievals, "typically speech was associated with 
nature, life, spirit, and presence, whereas writing was linked with artifice, death, matter 
and absence" (63-4). The Pardoner’s displacment o f sexual anxiety about absence onto 
texts is an attempt to deny or supercede the idea of oral context, which encompasses 
the sense o f "nature, life, spirit," and most importantly, "presence." The focus on 
displacement between text and context in The Pardoner’s Prologue and Tale can be 
connected to the increasing importance o f written documents, a textualization of legally 
valid agreements, within the common law.
The history of the common law regarding covenant2 expresses the increasing 
actualization of the potency of the written word in contrast to that of the spoken in the 
medieval legal system. A.W.B. Simpson writes that the medieval common law had a 
"restrictive attitude to parole agreements" (Law of Contract 599). He explains:
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In the developed common law the writ [of covenant] could only be 
used by a plaintiff who could produce a sealed instrument (a "specialty") 
to witness the covenant; failure to produce ("make profert") the specialty 
had the consequence that the action failed in limine. In the thirteenth 
and early fourteenth centuries this rule was not clearly settled; indeed as 
late as 1346 there must have been some doubt on the point. This 
suggests that originally the action lay on mere parole covenants, and that 
a new and restrictive rule was introduced into the law in Edward I’s 
reign, or thereabouts. But I doubt if this would be a justifiable 
interpretation, for there never seems to have been a tim e when the royal 
courts regularly allowed actions to be taken on parole covenants; indeed 
there is a case in the Curia Regis Rolls as early as 1234 where it seems 
that an action of covenant failed because the plaintiff had no charter or 
chyrograph. (Law of Contract 10-11)
By the fourteenth century the interiorized word (that of the mutual, spoken oath) had
virtually lost its power to affect a binding agreement between parties. While originally
the written deed was regarded as mere evidence of an agreement, and the act of
producing it a ‘proof,’ a document eventually became the only legally actionable form
of agreement (Simpson, Law of Contract 15). This meant that the document came to
be seen as the agreement itself.
In earlier Anglo-Saxon and Germanic law the opposite view had been held: a
document merely witnessed an oral agreement. The example of wills can be used to
illustrate how the idea o f contract became "textualized." A.W .B. Simpson explains:
Today a properly executed and witnessed will is a clear example of a 
dispositive instrument, and the way in which we view the matter is 
clearly illustrated by the fact that when we use the w ord "will" we mean 
the actual and tangible document, not the wishes it expresses. Thus to 
destroy a "will" means to destroy a piece of paper. Once upon a time 
(before writing was essential) a "will" just meant the wishes or desires 
of a person; hence a document was not itself a will, but merely proof of 
what the testator’s will was. In those days to talk o f  destroying a will 
would have made no sense except as a reference to brain-washing. (Law 
of Contract 15-16)
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In the Preface to Whitelock’s Anglo-Saxon Wills H.D. Hazeltine explains o f these 
documents that, "the writings are only the evidence, the documentation, of these gifts; 
they are not the gifts themselves" (viii). In Anglo-Saxon England a "will" is an oral 
act performed before witnesses and needs no documentation to make it valid. The most 
necessary requirement was not written documentation, but that the transaction of the gift 
"be actually heard and seen" (Hazeltine ix).
During the eighth century the written will was still fairly unusual in England. 
The textualization of the idea o f a "will" appears to have been "ecclesiastical in origin," 
as:
it was not only developed under clerical influence for the material 
benefit of Anglo-Saxon churches and convents, but it was ultimately 
brought in a later age within the scope of the jurisdiction o f ecclesiastical 
courts. At least from the beginning of the eighth century onwards 
ecclesiastical policy furthered the idea that spoken words were sufficient 
for gifts and contracts. Lest, however, spoken words fade from the 
memory, declare ecclesiastical draftsmen in the preambles to eighth- 
century Anglo-Saxon charters, it is best to have evidence of these words 
in writing. To the proof of oral acts furnished by transactions-witnesses, 
which was already a feature of Anglo-Saxon law, there was now the 
added evidence of writings; and, so far as one can see, it is this new 
species o f proof introduced by the ecclesiastics which helps us more than 
perhaps anything else to understand the legal nature and purpose of the 
documents that are now known as Anglo-Saxon ’wills’. (Hazeltine xii)
Again, a strong influence by the church and religious houses on the development o f the
lex non scripta is evident. Through the influence o f the ecclesiastics custom changed
so that the evidentiary document (a text) superceded the oral agreement (a context
which the text originally witnessed). The context, the act of speaking before witnesses,
dropped out o f the process of will-making; instead, the text became legally potent in
and of itself, free of a context that was now insignificant.
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In the medieval common law there is an irrevocable movement to uphold the 
potency of the written, exteriorized word (a will as a text) at the expense o f the spoken, 
interiorized word (a will as a spoken desire). The text, which as Eric Jager points out 
is "written on dead animal hides" (70), and is essentially skin, or fleshly covering (and 
thus fit to represent "death, matter, and absence") takes the place o f the spoken 
agreement, whose orality represents "life, spirit, and presence" (Jager 63-4). Later 
anxieties about the use of legal documents are surely linked with this lack of 
"presence," and the sense of an absence or lack in texts. Documents seem to provide 
certainty, but, the question becomes, what do they provide certainty of? Legally, the 
written word, the document as "will" or "desire," is increasingly divorced from the 
voice, the oral expression of will or desire. This displacement o f written text and oral 
context is what the Pardoner’s exposes in his performance to the pilgrims.
In the Prologue and Tale, the Pardoner is exhibiting, both verbally and 
physically, his charters to the other pilgrims. We are told in the General Prologue that 
the Pardoner has a "walet, bifom hym in his lappe,/ Bretful o f pardoun comen from 
Rome al hoot" (V I.686-7). This wallet full of "pardouns" is displayed conspicuously 
on his body (in his lap)3 along with other potent symbols (the relics) which dangle 
freely from his person. The texts, as symbols o f his potency, must be displayed, as the 
Pardoner claims: "I asoille . . .  by the auctoritee/ Which that by bulle ygraunted was 
to me" (VI.387-8). Over and over in the Prologue and Tale the readers’ attention will 
be drawn to texts, as textual display is the theme of the Pardoner’s performance Oust 
as oral display is the Wife o f Bath’s, and a refusal to display is the Man of Law ’s).
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Early on in the Prologue the Pardoner tells the pilgrims that he begins his
normal professional routine by exposing texts to his "lewed" listeners. He relates that
when he arrives in a town:
First I pronounce whennes that I come,
And thanne my bulles shewe I, alle and some.
Oure lige lordes seel on my patente,
That shewe I first, my body to warente,
That no man be so boold, ne preest ne clerk,
Me to destourbe of Cristes hooly w erk ." (V I.335-340)
The Pardoner claims that the "shewe-ing" of his "bulles," and especially o f "Oure lige
lordes seel" on his "patente," serves to "warente" his body. These lines are
exhibitionistically suggestive. No one, "ne preest ne clerk," can prevent the Pardoner
from doing his work because o f the symbolic potency o f  the "bulled" documents which
he displays as his first rhetorical move. According to clinical psychologists, acts of
exhibitionism frequently occur "when the man is experiencing a particular threat to his
already weak sense of masculinity" (Altrocchi 491); so too, in the Pardoner’s case,
exhibitionism is tied to an apparent sense of threat against his person when he enters
a town.
The Pardoner upholds, exhibits, and flaunts the potency of the "bulles," 
agreements conspicuously "under seal," to mask the questionable nature of his own oral 
and sexual potency. His oral impotence reflects the growing impotence not of 
documents, but of the spoken word (i.e. of the oath) in the common law. Harry 
Bailly’s violent response to the Pardoner’s offer o f pardon to the pilgrims represents 
their collective frustration at the potency of the texts (the "pardouns," "bulles," and
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"patente"). The validity of these documents should be destroyed by the dissonance 
between them and their holder’s will, expressed in his voice, but is not.
Throughout the Prologue and Tale texts are flaunted as the authorization for the 
Pardoner’s speech. He opens his address to the pilgrims by conspicuously exposing the 
Scriptural text upon which his regular preaching is based. "My theme is alwey oon, 
and evere was," he proclaims, "Radix malorum est Cupiditas" (V I.333-4). This Latin 
text then becomes the foundation of his performance in a new context, his address to 
the pilgrims. He repeats this Scriptural foundation further on in the opening of the 
Prologue, saying, "Therefore my theme is yet, and evere w as,/ Radix malorum est 
Cupiditas" (VI.425-6). The Latin of this repeated quotation heightens its conspicuous 
textuality. Furthermore, the Pardoner’s Prologue is given an epigraph, probably scribal 
in origin, which states, "Radix malorum est Cupiditas." This epigraph then directs the 
reader’s attention to the textual source: "Ad Thimotheum. 6 ." which suggests that the 
epigraphic addition was made by a copyist/commentator who understood the 
significance of "textual underwriting" in the Pardoner’s performance. The epigraph 
draws attention to the fact that the Pardoner’s performance is an exhibition o f texts.
Not far into the introduction to the Tale the Pardoner explains: "The hooly writ 
take I to my witness" (VI.483-4); and, a few lines later he directs his listeners to texts 
again, telling them to remember what "Senec saith" (VI.492). The Pardoner then turns 
to the Old Testament text which tells of "Adam oure fader" (V I.505); and, then shifts 
his listeners attention to the text of Paul in the New Testament. The Pardoner 
emphasizes his textual sources though reiteration, as we see in his repetition of Paul’s
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name (in both English and Latin, a conspicuously literate move) in the following 
passage: "O Paul, wel kanstow trete:/ ’Mete unto wombe, and wombe eek unto mete,/ 
Shal God destroyen bothe,’ as Paulus seith" (V I.520-22). The Pardoner then shifts his 
audience’s attention back to the Old Testament with the story of "Sampsoun," and 
closes this passage by directing them to the texts, telling them: "Looketh the Bible, and 
ther ye may it leere" (VI.578). A few lines later, he repeats this sentiment, saying: 
"Redeth the Bible, and fynde it expresly" (VI.586). About fifty lines later the Pardoner 
reminds the pilgrims that "olde bookes treete" of false oaths (VI.630), orders them to 
"Witnesse on Mathew," and then quotes directly from "hooly Jeremye" (V I.634-5). 
The actual Tale is concluded with the Pardoner’s notation, "that Avycen/ Wroot nevere 
in no canon, ne in no fen,/ Mo wonder signes of empoisonyng" (V I.889-91). The 
Pardoner not only emphasizes texts over and over again, he also emphasizes the 
supposed literacy of the pilgrims as contrasted to the "lewedness" o f his usual listeners. 
The Pardoner appeals to the pilgrims’ own desire for a relationship with the power of 
textuality.
Not surprisingly, after all his references to texts, at the conclusion of his 
performance a text is held up as the ultimate source o f power for the Pardoner, and for 
the other pilgrims as well. "Myn hooly pardoun may yow alle warice," (V I.906) he 
proclaims, exposing his potent charter once again. "Boweth youre heed under this 
hooly bulle!" (VI.909) he orders them. Then the Pardoner offers to textualize the 
pilgrims themselves, telling them if, "Youre names I entre heer in my rolle anon;/ Into 
the blisse of hevene shul ye gon" (VI.911-2). In this statement the Pardoner assumes
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for himself the role o f author of the final judgem ent in the pilgrims’ cases, a reference 
both to the writing o f names in the "book of life" (Revelation 3.5, 13.8, 17.8, 21.27, 
22.19), and in a secular sense, to a recording o f a legal judgement. By offerring to 
write them into a text, the Pardoner emphasizes to the other pilgrims that his apparent 
potency is connected to texts and the ability to write.
We could say that Pardoner’s oral performance has more to do with writing than 
with rhetoric. The Pardoner offers the pilgrims a written "guarantee," or personal 
contract o f salvation. He claims that by writing them into a text he will create himself 
as a potent pardoner and as a writer on a level with the author of the "book o f life." 
However, this affirmation of his potent status as potential author, a potential which is 
never carried any further, is made in the context o f the Pardoner’s defensive and 
contradictory acts of exhibition.
The perversity of the Pardoner’s anti-rhetorical technique is expressed in his 
charters and other texts, which are exhibited on his body and in the context o f his 
rhetoric. While it appears to many that the W ife o f Bath is "a voice o f the body," text 
and voice are not nearly so divorced in her as in  the Pardoner. Perhaps this is why the 
two of them are juxtaposed by the Pardoner’s interruption of her speech~to later reveal 
how, by contrast, the Wife has interiorized writing as perhaps only a non-literate can, 
while the Pardoner has exteriorized it, as only a literate can. While the Wife recites 
texts from memory (i.e. by heart), the Pardoner points his listeners to exteriorized 
writing, telling them to go find things in texts. While the Wife of Bath absorbs texts
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into her voice, the Pardoner’s voice points outwardly to them. They become fetishized
objects o f displacement within his speech.
The exhibitionistic act can be defined as "an expression of defiance" (Altrocchi
491). J.F . Rhodes explains:
Like the Wife of Bath, the Pardoner courts the pilgrims by inviting them 
to identify with his life o f adventure and to admire him for his 
individuality and superiority, his scorn for conventional morality, and his 
contempt for established authority. (43)
In his exhibitionistic confessions about his professional practices, the Pardoner defies 
the spiritual content and "auctoritee" o f the "bulles." Yet, in his typically paradoxical 
fashion, he also upholds and exhibits these documents to establish his own "auctoritee." 
Thus, the Pardoner’s exhibitionism, like his rhetorical strategy, works at cross­
purposes.
J.M . Russell describes the exhibitionist as one who makes a marked division
between containers and their contents. He notes:
the masculine perversions, epitomized by the exhibitionist, the flasher, 
take some aspect of oneself that the pervert himself regards as liable to 
be found repellent, as repulsive, and flaunts this as if daring the other 
person, the container, to accept that repelled part o f oneself. The male 
pervert has found means to externalize his internal contents, and then 
dares the other to accept (or reject) this. (102)
In the Pardoner’s case, the flaunted documents are stand-ins for something in himself
he finds repellent. This "something" is possibly his sexuality or his spirituality, or
both. The situation is complicated by the fact that the "bulles" are themselves
containers and have their own "internal contents." Thus, there is a doubling of
exhibitionistic displacement; the Pardoner projects his own repelled interiority onto the
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texts, but the texts have an interiority which he also finds repellent. The Pardoner, in 
a perversely masculine way, tempts the pilgrims to reject both the "bulles" as fleshly 
and carnal containers for his repelled sexuality, and also to reject the "bulles" 
themselves for their contents, the offer of a spiritual pardon. This suggests that what 
the Pardoner considers repellant about himself is both his carnality and his spirituality, 
confirming Kittredge’s belief that the Pardoner truly is "a lost soul" (123).
The dissonance between oral context and written texts in the Pardoner’s 
performance is a paradigm of the dissonance between interior and exterior language, 
or between orality as represented by the Wife o f Bath, and textuality as represented by 
the Pardoner and the male "auctores" both characters make reference to. Aptly, in 
terms o f the Pardoner’s alienating performance, his voice and the body which contains 
it are in apparent conflict. The General Prologue says o f the Pardoner:
A voys he hadde as smal as hath a goot.
No berd hadde he, ne nevere sholde have;
So smooth it was as it were late shave.
I trowe he were a gelding or a mare. (V I.688-91)
While the goat-ishness o f the Pardoner’s voice suggests Pan-like male sexuality, he is 
paradoxically a goat without a beard. His body, rather than matching his voice, is like 
that o f a "geldyng or a mare." Thus the goat’s voice is contained in a horse’s body. 
While his body and his voice are displaced, his texts are also displaced in his horse-like 
body and his goat-like voice. To speak like a goat about texts is surely an act of 
dissonance. A goat would rather, we assume, devour the texts than speak of them, and 
this is perhaps what the Pardoner is doing in his performance. The animal in the 
Pardoner is feeding off o f texts, so to speak.
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The Pardoner exposes the dissonance between his exterior voice and his interior 
desire through the displacement o f his exhibited documents. The Pardoner’s exhibition 
o f the texts seems to expose their lack of interiority; furthermore, the Pardoner’s 
apparent lack o f potency appears also to be the texts’ lack. The exteriority o f  the 
"pardouns" (emphasized by their placement on the Pardoner’s body) point to their 
apparent lack o f spiritual potency, as they are, like the Pardoner, a "voice" which is 
divorced from its proper context, the interior "will" of both their author and the 
speaker. However, the very exteriority of the texts to the Pardoner’s use of them play 
up their potency as symbols of authority. The context the Pardoner creates cannot 
undermine the legal potency of the "patente" as proof o f his spiritual authority to 
pardon sin. Similarly, nothing that the Wife o f Bath says about marriage and the texts 
which underwrite the practice of it can alter the exteriorized, written laws of marriage, 
nor the texts she quotes from. For this reason, exteriorized language is more legally 
potent than interiorized language. The Pardoner’s use of displacement thus essentially 
points to and emphasizes the potency of texts.
As W alter Ong has noted, "there is no way directly to refute a text. After 
absolutely total and devastating refutation, it says exactly the same thing as before" 
(Qralitv 79). What you say about a document or agreement after the fact o f its creation 
does not change or affect it. That is why texts are more potent than voice, which can 
only "speak" and be "heard" in a context. Texts, on the other hand, speak both in and 
out of context. In the Pardoner’s performance the documents have an existence which 
is beyond, and outside of, their context. The Host’s response to the Pardoner is,
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accordingly, not directed towards the "pardouns" themselves (which are untouchable), 
but towards the Pardoner’s genitals (which presumable are). The violence which the 
Host threatens against the Pardoner’s sexual symbols is a displaced aggression which 
should be directed towards the texts of the "bulles." What the Host really wants to cut 
off is what stands in the place o f the Pardoner’s genitals, the written charters. He 
really desires to emasculate not the Pardoner (for whom the operation may well be 
redundant) but the "bulles,” which represent the peculiar, uncontextualized potency of 
texts and legal documents.
The threat of the Host is an extrememly important moment in the Pardoner’s 
Prologue and Tale as it confirms the Pardoner’s displacement o f his own fear of lack 
onto the reassuring objects of the texts. The Host threatens the Pardoner with a real 
lack, suggesting that on an unconscious level he has understood the exhibitionistic 
displacement going on in the Pardoner’s performance. This reading challenges Paul 
Taylor’s position that the Host’s attack on the Pardoner, "only confirms the Pardoner’s 
implication that the pilgrims cannot read the truth behind either his posture, his tale, 
or their holiday excursion to Canterbury" (127). I suggest that, on the other hand, the 
Pardoner, like sexual exhibitionists in general, may be no more consciously aware o f 
his displacement process than the Host or the other pilgrims are. The Pardoner, Harry, 
and the other pilgrims may merely apprehend at the conclusion of the Pardoner’s 
performance that their perception o f the relationship o f texts to contexts, containers to 
contents, is a highly problematic one. In the Pardoner’s performance, texts themselves 
tempt or create displacement.
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The aggression of the Pardoner’s oral use of texts provokes the H ost’s 
aggression. Harry Bailly responds with a threat instigated by the aggression o f the 
Pardoner’s rhetorical affirmation that a written text supercedes its oral context. While 
Derrida proclaims, "we, like Levi-Strauss, conclude that violence is writing" (135), the 
Host responds not to the violence of writing, but to the orally exhibitionistic aggression 
of the Pardoner.
The Pardoner appreciates and attempts to exploit what the other pilgrims realize 
at the end of his performance, namely that his religious potency as a pardoner rests on 
legal documents which are entirely divorced from his and their author’s voice and 
desire. The Pardoner’s performance exposes the fiction of the documents he carries. 
By exposing himself, the Pardoner also exposes the "pardouns," and "bulles," 
revealing their fiction of a sublime marriage between spiritual Will (a desire) and legal 
will (a charter). Furthermore, he exhibits this dissonance in the context of a defiant 
and defensively masculine exteriorization of texts and writing.
W ith the exception of Harry Bailly, the pilgrims remain silent at the end o f the 
Pardoner’s Tale. By exposing his textual potency (in his "pardouns") the Pardoner 
strips the oral potency from the other pilgrims. The inability of interiorized language 
(speech) to alter or affect exteriorized language (text) in any effective way has been 
adequately demonstrated to the pilgrims. The divorce between spirit and text cannot 
be made any more complete than in the Pardoner’s performance. However, the H ost’s 
response only further affirms the exhibitionistic fiction the Pardoner has created. Harry 
Bailly verbally attacks the Pardoner instead of his "pardouns," which are the real source
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of fraud. The Pardoner himself has "spoken true" to the pilgrims in the sense that he 
has not masked his vice; it is the texts which do not speak true in their context.
The Pardoner demonstrates in his exhibitionistic acts o f exposing texts and oral 
boasting that displaced texts are the foundation o f his fraud. The Host threatens the 
Pardoner with castration, or a removal of what the "bulles" signify. However, it is the 
documents which are the symbols of potency, not the Pardoner’s "lacking" genitals. 
This transference occurs, in Glenn Burger’s analysis, because "the more the Pardoner 
can be maintained as an absence of potency, the more the Host can assert his own 
masculine and moral authority and establish that he is no false copy but the real thing" 
(1146). But, the threat of castration seems to make the Pardoner more potent than he 
has previously appeared to be in the description o f him as "a geldying or a m are." The 
question then is whether the "false copy" is the Pardoner or his documents. If the 
documents are genuine, as their "bulles" testify, then the Pardoner himself is the 
forgery. I suggest that the H ost’s threat is directed towards the person of the Pardoner, 
and not his "pardouns," because only he, and not the texts, can be and is silenced by 
a refutation. The Pardoner is an unauthentic document when contrasted with his texts, 
which are continually affirmed as legally potent.
We can question whether the Pardoner is really lacking in his masculinity, as 
the narrator of the General Proloeue leads us to believe, or whether he only appears to 
be. If his lack is only an apparent one, then his texts signify not lack, but the anxiety 
about it. The very fact of an exterior sign, either sexual or textual, creates an anxiety 
of loss. The anxiety over textual lack may then also be a displacement o f other fears.
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When we consider the perversion possible in the oral realm—the reduction of the oath 
to a commodity, the rhetorical misuse o f texts—texts themselves seem relatively benign. 
The oral context surrounding a text can easily be perverted or altered, while the text 
itself remains static or "valid." It may be feared that the legal system, like the 
Pardoner, has an interior lack, in the sense of "Will" as desire, not an exterior lack, 
in the sense of "will" as document. In the workings of the medieval legal system there 
may exist a fear, like the exhibitionist’s castration anxiety, that a sense of validity is 
lost in the increasing dependency upon documents as a means of expressing will or 
desire. It may be feared that the divorce created between texts and contexts is a split 
between containers and contents, between written signs and spoken desires.
The anxiety about writing may be a displacement onto something physical and
exterior (a text) o f an interior conflict which can be expressed in the question, "does
the text lack in the way that I fear I lack?" If we all, male and female, fear a lack,
texts can become a locus of displacement for this anxiety about potency and the ability
to express desire (what the Wife o f Bath has triumphed at). As Derek Pearsall notes
of the contrast between the Pardoner and the Wife:
The Pardoner . . . has no thoughts or feelings . . .  no hopes or regrets. 
He never talks about his motives, except to reiterate monotonously that 
his purpose is ever one. He never once says "I think" or "I feel," but 
only describes what he has done or what he will do. Without soul, 
feeling, or inner being, he is a creature of naked will, unaware o f its 
existence but in the act o f will. ("Chaucer’s Pardoner" 361)
As I see it, the Pardoner does not discuss his desires and motivations because his will
and desire have been displaced onto texts. Just as documents have displaced the oral
context o f will-making in the legal system, conversely documents and texts are a locus
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of displacement for the oral expression of desire and will in the Pardoner’s 
performance. There is nothing left for the Pardoner to "desire" once he has displaced 
and then expelled both the physical texts and their spiritual contents.
The Pardoner uses texts and writing to get a hold over others, and this may be 
the only form of desire available to him. The aggression of the Pardoner’s speech may 
result from his misunderstanding about what is, and is not, truly seductive. The offer 
o f pardon which he presents to the pilgrims in his conclusion is, in essence, an attempt 
to humiliate the pilgrims. His command to "kiss the bulles" involves the exposure of 
a weapon he holds over them and a threat which orders them to debase themselves 
before it and him. His own alarming "lack" of potency and normal sensibility is 
compensated for by displacing himself onto the texts which he waves over the pilgrims’ 
heads. As Burger posits, "the Pardoner’s exhortation to kiss his relics suddenly pushes 
his quotation of authority, which is powerfully present in his tale, to an absurd 
extreme" (1145). The pilgrims are silent in response to this threat and menace; only 
the Host responds with a threat that was commonly directed towards rapists. Burger 
aptly refers to this threat as one of "the H ost’s extreme assertions o f ’authority’ and 
’normality’" (1146). The Pardoner’s combined "lacks," (spritual, physical, cognitive, 
and rhetorical) may make him truly dangerous, as the compensation for them must be 
the constant menacement and humiliation o f others.
While Paul proclaims: "the letter killeth but the spirit giveth life," the Pardoner 
proclaims that his spirit can be as killing as his letter. He exposes the possibility that 
his texts are more potent, affirming, and life-giving than he is, just as legally the letter
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is more potent or life-giving to the agreement than speech, the oral act which no longer 
creates a valid contract. The displacement of spirit and letter, contents and container, 
is the basis for perversion and for the Pardoner’s attempt to "disgust" the pilgrims. In 
an attempt to define the "disgusting," Russell explains that, "we don’t want things that 
are supposed to be inside to get outside the skin. That is my clue to the disgusting: it 
pertains to circumstances where that which is supposedly inside the skin is not in the 
container" (99). If the parchment o f texts is "skin," then the disgust which the 
Pardoner tempts the pilgrims to feel is a disgust over something which seems to have 
escaped out o f the skin. The Pardoner tempts the pilgrims to believe that "what is 
supposedly in the skin," the genuine spiritual pardon, "is not in the container." By 
attempting to separate the container o f  the text away from the spiritual contents, within 
an exhibitionistic context, the Pardoner tries to disgust the pilgrims.
Discussing the literary legal debates contained in the works of Robert 
Grosseteste and St. Anslem, J.A. Alford remarks: "the Devil always comes o ff as a 
pretty poor lawyer" ("Literature and Law" 944). The Pardoner is also comes off as "a 
pretty poor lawyer" because he makes the split between text and context, between the 
legality of his documents and their purported spirituality, so obvious that he provokes 
disgust. He is un-lawyerly as he fails either to subsume texts into his rhetoric as the 
W ife of Bath does, or covertly hide them like the Man of Law. The Pardoner makes 
a point of showing the pilgrims how displaced his texts are in the context he creates for 
them. This displacement is highlighted in The Pardoner’s Prologue and Tale to 
demonstrate how texts can supercede the idea of context. The oral context in which
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covenants were originally created is now superceded by the texts, whose dangling seals 
make the documents themselves into convenants. However, the documents are 
covenants in the legal, but not necessarily the the spiritual, sense of the word. The 
sealed charters which the Pardoner conspicuously displays represent what Jesse Gellrich 
refers to as "the theft of spoken promise" (161), when "the source disappear[s] into the 
copy" (xi). While the pardons are legally valid, the context the Pardoner creates for 
them invites the pilgrims to question whether they are still spiritually valid. The loss 
created by the theft of a validating context from the documents is what the Pardoner’s 
displacement exposes.
ENDNOTES
‘O f the function of the seals F .G . Kempin explains: "By 1284 (the Statue of 
Wales) it was clear that covenants could be used to bind one to any promise except a 
debt . . . .  By the end of the thirteenth century it was required that the writing must 
have the seal of the promisor affixed to it. The seal previously had been used in the 
action o f  debt to prove the validity of the document. If it was sealed, it was genuine, 
but if it was not sealed, the defendant was free to prove it fraudulent" (Legal History 
78).
2"Covenant" is "the medieval lawyers’ word for agreement" (Simpson, Law of 
Contract 16). The three actions of covenant, debt, and detinue, "formed the backbone 
of the medieval law 6f contract . . . .  Covenant, which was normally an action for 
unliquidated damages, lay to provide a remedy for tort or wrong of breaking an 
agreement to do something other than pay a debt; it could only however, be used in the 
case o f formal agreements under seal" (Simpson, Law of Contract 6). In the thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries, F.G. Kempin summarizes, "covenant was the common law’s 
closest approximation to the concept o f a contractual duty" (Legal History 78).
3While Larry Benson, et al. define "lappe" as a "large pocket (in a fold o f his 
clothing)" (34), it seems just as reasonable to accept the definition that the word retains 
in m odem  English, "a person’s lap" (M .E .D .. V ol.5, PT.2, 651-3). Another
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interesting meaning for "lappe" in the context o f the Pardoner’s portrait is, "the female 
pudendum" (M .E .D .. Vol.5, PT .2, 651-3).
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CHAPTER FOUR
Representing (Re)production: The Canon’s Yeoman’s 
Revelations Of Textual Impotence
In his Prologue and Tale the Canon’s Yeoman gives an account to the other 
pilgrims of his endless labours to "multiplie" matter alchemically. O f this project he 
explains to the Canterbury group: "We blondren evere and pouren in the fir ,/ And for 
al that we faille o f our desir,/ For evere we lakken oure conclusion" (VIII, 670-2). In 
this passage, whose theme he often repeats, the Yeoman describes the frustration o f his 
and the Canon’s attempts to consumate the "alchemical marriage" which the texts of 
alchemy alluringly speak of. The whole purpose of the Yeoman’s work has been to 
realize the potential o f this marriage. However, the Yeoman must reveal the shameful 
secret of alchemy: that alchemists and alchemical philosophy are impotent and the 
sought-after marriage can never be consumated. The Yeoman strives to explain to the 
pilgrims that there has been no potential for material (re)production in his work. While 
Britton Harwood has argued that the Canon’s Yeoman’s Prologue and Tale involves "a 
mystification of work" ("Chaucer and the Silence" 342), I argue, rather, that the 
Yeoman presents a rhetorical de-mystification of alchemy’s textual mystification of 
work and material production.
In the Prologue and Tale the impotence of alchemy as a process which attempts 
to (re)produce precious metals is paralleled to the allegorical impotence o f alchemical 
"auctores" and their texts. Ultimately, the Yeoman produces and multiplies nothing but 
the representation of an elusive potential in his spoken words, just as alchemical texts,
78
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in the Yeoman’s view o f them, are endlessly self-replicating, (re)producing only more 
and more texts which seduce readers with a held-out potential meaning. The Yeoman’s 
attitude toward texts aligns with an  ideological (if not practical) resistance to 
textualization in the English common law.
The legal concepts o f counterfeiting and forgery are related to the alchemical 
project in both its metalurgical and philosophical aspects. Chaucer appears in the 
Canon’s Yeoman’s Prologue and Tale to see practical alchemy as a counterfeiting 
operation which merely pretends to (re)produce precious metals, and alchemical texts 
as embodying a forged and counterfeit philosophy which only appears to contain 
meaning. Ultimately, the Yeoman accuses alchemy of using language in a counterfeit 
manner. In both its physical and textual aspects alchemy is represented in the Canon’s 
Yeoman’s Prologue and Tale as a textualization of physical, moral, and rhetorical 
impotence.
The fear of counterfeiting and forgery informs a number of pieces o f legislation 
passed in the late Middle Ages. This may be connected with a fear o f what R. A. Shoaf 
calls "the irrationality and the mystery of money" (Dante 7). In Shoaf s conception, 
"the problem of meaning in money is analagous to the problem of meaning in language" 
(Dante 8). Statutes were passed in the thirteen and fourteenth centuries in the first 
English attempts to legislate standards for coins and precious metals. Like the language 
a nation uses, its coinage must be created out of meaningful and trustworthy signifiers. 
The King’s image on a coin, like the Leopard’s Head on an ingot, is a symbol which 
is supposed to guarantee fullness, plenitude, and worth—high value as opposed to empty
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value. But, counterfeiters use the same encoded symbols to pass empty value off as 
high value. When coinage and precious metals are threatened by counterfeiting, not 
only the economy of the nation, but the ideological system that establishes worth and 
value is called into question. Forgery threatens the very idea of "value": of trust in 
signs and signifiers (which include numerical symbols and written words). The 
"exposure" o f the Yeoman reveals that the practice of (re)productive fakery comes forth 
from, and also leads into, a void.
The impotence o f the Canon and the Yeoman can be connected with the concept 
of "counterfeiting," which is the art of false representation. I will argue, based on the 
evidence o f an early Greek manuscripts, that practical alchemy attempted to produce 
metals which seemed like gold and silver; thus, on this level alchemy was a 
counterfeiting operation. While Harwood has argued that in the Canon’s Yeoman’s 
Prologue and Tale alchemy "is not an allegory of production. It is an exotic instance 
of it. The Yeoman is apparently the only wage laborer anywhere in Chaucer--the only 
person hired to make a commodity" ("Chaucer and the Silence" 343), it seems, on the 
other hand, that the Yeoman presents alchemy as an allegory of non-(re)production. 
The very point the Yeoman repeatedly states is that there has been no production; rather 
than making a commodity, both the Canon and the Yeoman failed to (re)produce 
anything.
Based on a textual foundation of false representation, the Yeoman’s alchemical 
quest fails to produce material of value; all is loss and reduction rather than increase 
and endless reproduction. In the Yeoman’s alchemical enterprise, the potential for
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(re)production cannot be realized. Alchemy is fascinated with the potential for material 
production, but the fluidity of base metals exists only on the level o f language. 
Alchemy was far more (re)productive as a literary project than as an industrial or 
scientific one.
Just as the statutes address the problem of nothing (counterfeit and foreign coins) 
masquerading a something (legal tender), the Yeoman closes his performance by 
addressing this problem in texts. The Yeoman exposes the forged and counterfeit value 
of alchemical texts; this is why his Tale closes with an exposure o f the texts. In 
contrast with the often noted veneration of texts in medieval culture, the Yeoman points 
to the possiblity o f textual impotence. The English common law ’s resistance to 
codification mirrors this attitude. The common law uses experience and custom to 
negotiate the void left by legal codes and the written language o f the lex scripta.
During the late Middle Ages England was affected by the debasement o f coinage 
occurring on the Continent. Low denomination "deniers" made o f heavily alloyed 
silver were making their way (illicitly) from Italy and France into the British economy, 
probably because inflation in England created an increased demand for coinage. These 
very small denomination coins were needed for use in retail trade. Robert S. Lopez 
estimates that the cost o f living in England quadrupled between 1150 and 1325 (71). 
A sense of anxiety over the diminishment and reduction of coinage is evident in 
legislation passed in England during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.
The first statutes dealing with the abuse o f coinage were created during the reign 
of Edward I. The Statutum De Moneta was enacted in 1292. Its purpose is:
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To counteract the damage and dangers which have happened to the 
Sterling money of England. Orders are issued by the King that it be 
forbidden throughout the land, in all the market towns, for any man on 
pain o f grave punishment to be bold enough to spend or handle any 
money or coin other than that of the Kingdom of England, Ireland and 
Scotland. (20 Edw. I, 4)
The Statute warns that only coins issued by British governments are legal tender. It
specifies that people bringing coins known as "deniers" into the country are to be
reported to the authorities, and the coins confiscated by the King.
The Articuli De Moneta (1292) give explicit details about thirteenth century
counterfeiting practices. Its stated purpose is to place a strict ban on the use of
continental deniers as "This is money which is made abroad and does great harm to our
King, to our people and to the English coin" (20 Edw I, 6). Also banned by the
Articuli De Moneta is:
a type o f coin made in Avignon under the name of Edward King of 
England and which can only be detected by its weight. Coins are made 
by melting down pewter and lead and putting this metal between two 
leaves o f silver and then making this into a coin. This malpractice 
causes great damage to the community. (20 Edw. I, 6)
As we see from this statute, not only were small denomination, debased deniers seeping
into the English economy to fill a void the pure silver English Sterling created for petty
change, but counterfeit coins were invading from the Continent. The Avignon coin is
a clear symbol of false representation: its worthlessness (the leaden core) is masked
under a thin veneer (of gold) which "represents" great value.
The first pieces o f legislation regarding precious metals also appear in the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Statutes created in 1238 (22 Hen. Ill) and 1300 (28 
Edw. I, stat.3, ch.20) create quality standards for gold and silver. The statute o f 1300
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stipulates that goods made o f precious metal must be stamped with a m ark indicating
the metal’s quality, and that gold and silver must be "wrought of one uniform
standard." The statute also stipulates that gold and silver, "shall not be offered for sale
until assayed by the wardens o f the craft and further that it be marked with the
Leopard’s Head" (28 Edw.I, stat.3, ch.20). The Statute of Purveyors, passed in 1350,
contains the Treason Act which makes counterfeiting of the King’s seals and coinage
one of the most serious offences in the realm. The Act states that it shall be treason:
If a man counterfeits the King’s Great o f Privy Seal, or his money, and 
if a man brings false money into this realm counterfeit to the money of 
England, knowing the money to be false, to merchandise and make 
payment in deceit o f our said Lord the King and of his people. (25 Edw 
III, stat. 5, ch. 2)
The punishments stipulated for these trespasses were severe; men were to be drawn, 
hanged, disembowelled alive, beheaded, and then quartered; women were to be burned 
alive. The abuse o f coinage was considered to be an attack upon the King and the 
realm itself, for it attacks the proper representation o f the King and his worth.
The statutes related to counterfeiting are significant for a reading o f the Canon’s 
Yeoman’s Prologue and Tale because the alchemical project, not just of the Canon and 
his Yeoman, but o f practicing alchemists in general, bears a resemblance to 
counterfeiting operations. One of the most ancient alchemical texts known to us is a 
Greek papyrus, Leyden Papyrus X ,1 written near the end of the third century A .D, but 
probably copied from earlier sources (Caley 1149-50). The work offers practical 
recipes for making gold, silver, and "asem," for purifying and testing metals, and for 
changing the color of other metals so they will look like gold (referred to as
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
84
"colouring"). Out of 111 recipes, 75 deal with methods for purifying metals, making 
alloys, testing metals for purity, imitating precious metals, and colouring the surface 
of metals. It is quite obvious from a reading o f the recipes that "manufacturing," 
"colouring" and "purifying" gold, silver and "asem," are attempts to counterfeit 
precious metals. While Gareth Roberts suggests that "increasing" precious metals likely 
meant, "increasing its weight but decreasing its purity in alloys with other metals" (23), 
he adds the caution that, "early metallurgists might have thought that they were simply 
producing more gold, since they had no fixed ideas about what constituted ’gold’" (23- 
6). However, I argue that Leyden Papyrus X refutes the notion of the "naive 
metalurgist" as there is clear evidence of deceitful intentions.
For instance, the sequence of recipes from 15 to 17 shows an increasing
clarification o f the author’s intent. Recipe 15 is for "The Coloration o f Gold;" it
vaguely describes its purpose as, "To color gold to render it fit for usage." Why gold
needs another color than its own is not made clear. Recipe 16 is for "Augmentation
of Gold," and this appears to be a fragment, so it is not clear from the directions
exactly what "augmentation" means. However, recipe 17 is boldly entitled
"Falsification o f Gold;" its directions state:
Misy [probably iron or copper pyrites or sulfates] and Sinopian Red 
[possibly iron ochre or red lead], equal to one part of gold. After the 
gold has been thrown in the furnace and it has become of good color, 
throw upon it these two ingredients, and removing let it cool and the 
gold is doubled. (Caley’s trans.)
Berthelot suggests that recipe 17 is the continuation o f recipe 16 and the title
"Falsification o f Gold" is a comment or gloss erroneously copied into the papyrus by
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a scribe. The scribe would then have "erroneously" given the true intent o f the recipe 
in the word "falsification" (which does not occur again in the papyrus).
While the wording of the recipes is veiled, their intent is fairly obvious. Recipe
26 for "Purification o f Silver" reads:
How silver is purified and made brilliant. Take a pait of silver and an 
equal weight o f lead; place in a furnace, and keep up the melting until 
the lead has just been consumed; repeat the operation several times until 
it becomes brilliant. (Caley’s trans.)
Here the words "purification" and "brilliant" seem to be code-words to cover the fact
that a silver alloy is being produced. Roland Rowell notes that "caches of Roman coins
buried for years and disenterred by ploughshares have frequently been found upon assay
to be seriously debased" (5), and it is doubtful that classical alchemists could have been
naive enough to believe that "cutting" silver with lead made it more "brilliant." Other
recipes in the papyrus for "Coloring in Silver," that is, "for silvering objects o f copper"
(Recipe 27); for "Manufacture of Copper Similar to Gold" (Recipe 28); for "Whitening
of Copper . . .  in order to mix it with equal parts of asem, so that no one can recognize
it" (Recipe 23); and for "Coating o f Copper" so that, "the copper shall have the
appearance of silver" (Recipe 42) give evidence of the intent to produce counterfeit
representations of precious metals.
In all, 22 recipes deal with the doubling o f "asem" (2 recipes) and the 
manufacture of "asem" (20 recipes). Some recipes included in this count have no titles 
or are called "Another;" however, their placement and directions make them almost 
certainly recipes for "asem." According to Caley, the names "asem" and "asemon" 
refer to "alloys intended to imitate gold or silver, most generally the latter" (1151).
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According to this interpretation of the word, most of the papyrus is given over to
recipes for the production of imitation gold and silver. Glossing the word asemon,
Berthelot explains:
Le mot asemon etait regarde au XVIF siecle comme representant l’argent 
sans marque, c ’est-a-dire plus au moins impur, renfermant du plomb, du 
cuivre ou de I’etain; en un mot tel qu’il se produit d ’ordinaire a i’etat 
brut dans la fonte des minerais. (Les Origins 89-90).
Berthelot also notes that the word has, "plus de vraisemblance du mot egyptien asem.
qui exprime felectrum , alliage d’or et d ’argent" (Les Origins 90). If the word asemon
was used in seventeenth-century France to refer to unhallmarked silver (which had been
cut with lead, copper, or tin), the original alchemical project of manufacturing "alloys
to imitate pure silver" had an influence well into the heyday of alchemy.
The statutes reveal that by Chaucer’s time there were fixed ideas about what 
constituted "gold" and "silver," and, furthermore, the making of alloys was well 
understood. The statutes relating to currency and precious metals were created to 
counter a perceived threat to the coinage of the realm: an awareness o f a threatened 
impotence in currency. Fears about a shortage o f precious metals for minting were 
caused by increased demand in a country that resisted the debasement of its silver 
coinage. This fear and the threat caused by the illicit introduction of foreign currency 
and counterfeit coins, swirl around the edges of alchemy. As John Day notes, 
historians accept as a truism that "money was chronically short" in the late Middle 
Ages (55). The fear of an increasing impotence in coins was perhaps the impetus 
behind the alchemical belief that coinage could be endlessly "multiplied." The need for
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more currency may have led to the hope that the "seed" from which it is made could 
be endlessly replenished.
Alchemical writers rendered the process of increasing and producing precious 
metals in terms of a marital and sexual allegory. Late medieval and Renaissance 
alchemical works regularly "compare the alchemical process to the gestation, birth and 
nutrition of a child" (Roberts 22). Joseph E. Grennen notes that the idea o f  the 
chemical wedding "was based on the very ancient analogy between the alchemical opus 
and human generation, which gave rise to the theory that masculine and feminine 
principles were needed to begin the Work" (469). In later alchemy, all metals were 
believed to be generated out of mercury and sulpher, and the chemical wedding o f male 
sulphur and female mercury was consummated in the alchemical vessel, which many 
texts describe as a marriage bed (Roberts 84-86).
The Yeoman opens the Tale with a long passage describing his and the Canon’s
attempts to officiate at an alchemical wedding. As in the Prologue, the Yeoman
laments the futility and sterility o f their efforts. He bemoans of his quest for "The
philosophres toon,/Elixer clept" (VIII 862-3):
And al oure sleighte, he wol nat come us to.
He hath ymaad us spenden muchel good,
For sorwe of which almoost we wexen wood,
But that good hope crepeth in oure herte,
Supposynge evere, though we sore smerte.
To be releeved by hym afterward. (VIII 867-872)
In trying to produce the Elexir o f Life the Canon and Yeoman reduce themselves to
wasting "muchel good." The Elixir, symbol o f vitality and potency, will not come to
them, the Yeoman laments. They spend and waste their "good" trying to produce the
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seed of life; ever seeking relief, they get nothing but a enticing promise of delayed 
gratification. "Supposynge evere . . .  To be releeved" by the Elixir, they are never 
brought to any "conclusion."
Like the Canon of the Tale, the two partners have stooped to borrowing their 
"seed" silver from other men. They themselves produce nothing, and have lost what 
they did have. In the Prima pars o f the Tale the Yeoman gives a vivid description of 
waste and loss, the only products o f their attempts to "multiplie." Waste is most 
vivivdly portrayed in the description o f the explosions which rock the workroom. The 
Yeoman tells us:
Ful ofte it happeth so 
The pot tobreketh, and farewl, al is go!
Thise metals been o f so greet violence 
Oure walles mowe not make hem resistence,
But if they weren wroght of lym and stoon 
They percen so, and thurgh the wal they goon.
And somme of hem synken into the ground—
Thus han we lost by tymes many a pound—
And somme are scatered al the floor aboute;
Somme lepe into the roof. (VIII, 906-15)
The seed, which must by now be borrowed, is then lost by being spilled on the ground,
scattered on the floor, and blasted through the walls and roof. "Violent reactions will
occur" when mercury comes into contact with a variety o f other substances, a modem
chemist explains (Sittig 1045), and in their blind experimentations, alchemists must
have frequently created explosive combinations in which "much good" was lost. This
waste of the seed results in an increased (re)productive sterility for the Canon and the
Yeoman.
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The Tale’s wily Canon can manage to fool the priest into believing that 
impregnation has occurred in the alchemical vessel and something has been produced. 
However, this production is faked. The silver has been hidden previously in a 
hollowed out "cole" (VIII, 1177) and the end of "an holwe stikke" (VUI, 1265). What 
orgasmically comes forth has not been produced by the Canon at all, but borrowed 
from another man. The Tale, like the Prologue is then another revelation of the 
shameful secret o f alchemical impotence. Faking it is the best performance that the 
Fictional Canon can manage. While the silver is real, the process o f producion is faked.
Alchemy is like counterfeiting and forgery as the practicioner is producing 
something whose value or origin is concealed and falsified. By concealing the true 
origin o f his silver ingot, and thus "representing" sterling silver as alchemical silver, 
the Fictional Canon Fits the definition of a forger. The Canon is creating forgeries 
because, "the essence of forgery is that it is an instrument which tells a lie about itself 
in the sense that it purports to be made by a person who did not make it" (Rowell 69). 
This definition also virtually defines the entire canon of alchemical literature. As 
Roberts notes:
alchemists claimed a host of venerable authorities who practiced alchemy 
or wrote alchemical works . . . .  Just as alchemists claimed distinguished 
ancient figures as legitimising predecessors, so alchemical works 
apocryphally fathered themselves upon venerable ancestors . . . .  most 
o f the distinguished authors claimed by alchemical treatises had nothing 
to do with those works going under their names. (13-17)
In Roberts opinion, "Chaucer’s ’Arnold of the Newe Toun’ and Lull were two o f the
most respected medieval authorities, but Lull probably wrote none of the alchemical
treatises that gave him this reputation and Arnold hardly any, if any at all, of those
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ascribed to him" (18). The desperation o f their quest for authoritative sources and 
authors is revealed when later alchemical writers quoted Chaucer’s Yeoman as a source 
o f alchemical knowledge in their treatises. While S.F. Damon uses this as evidence 
that Chaucer was "not only in sympathy with [alchemy], but possibly knew (and if so, 
respected) the famous secret" (782), it seems, rather, to reveal a desperate paucity of 
material. Alchemical authors stoop to borrowing their "seed" of ideas from anyone 
they can pull into their canon.
As Chaucer must have been aware, alchemical writers had a compulsive desire 
to establish a sense of authority for their art by giving it origins in antiquity. This 
origin is extremely vague. The early Greek texts are "pseudonymous, apocryphal and 
dubious" (Roberts 19). Texts are often attributed to dieties and Biblical figures. 
Allison Coudert notes that "Alchemists attributed works by the score to Adam, Moses, 
his sister Mary (Miriam), to Cleopatra, Hermes Trismegistus, Thomas Aquinas, Roger 
Bacon, Albertus Magnus, even to Pope John XXII, who had issued an edict against the 
practice o f alchemy" (105).
Considering the dubious nature o f  the alchemical canon it is ironic that the 
Yeoman’s Canon has a particular distrust o f spoken language. He ironically believes 
this to be the vehicle o f language which will lead to his downfall. The narrator tells 
us:
Whil this Yeman was thus in talkyng,
This Chanoun drough hym neer and herde al thyng
Which this Yeman spak, for suspecioun
O f mennes speche evere hadde this Chanoun. (VIII, 684-87)
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The Canon’s suspicion o f speech leads him to order the Yeoman: "Hoold thou thy pees
and spek no wordes mo" (VIII, 693). The Yeoman, he claims, is about to, "discoverest
that thou sholdest hyde" (VIII, 696), that is, the secrets of their trade. However, after
the Canon disappears, the Yeoman defiantly declares: "Al that I kan anon now wol I
telle" (VIII, 704). This statement of the Yeoman is defiantly opposed to the use of
language by the Canon and in alchemical texts (another misleading "canon"?).
Alchemical authors are often metaphorical to the point o f incomprehesibility. For
instance, Zosimos o f Panopolis (c. A.D. 300) describes mercury as:
the hermaphrodite, which is always escaping, pressing on into its own 
nature, the divine water of which all have been ignorant, whose nature 
is hard to contemplate for it is neither metal nor water which is always 
moving, nor a body, for it is not dominated, (original in Berthelot, 
Collection. Vol. 2, 143-4, Roberts’ translation)
The enigmatic and elusive quality of quicksilver characterizes the use o f language in
general by alchemical writers. Mercury can be fragmented and then turned whole
again, fragmented and recombined endlessly. Like the silver beads of metal, the
language of the alchemical texts is almost impossible to hold onto or grasp.
Both rhetorical emptiness and physical impotence can be related to mercury.
Mercury’s toxic effects upon the human nervous system correspond with the Yeoman’s
behavior and the style of his rhetorical performance. As J.C . Campbell notes: "The
Yeoman has sometimes been accused of being confused . . . .  His emotions fluctuate
widely during his performance, from anger to awe to sarcastic humor to credulousness"
(174). Judith Herz has also commented on the Yeoman’s mercurial qualities:
the Canon and his Yeoman enter with one attitude only to change it in 
the next moment. These two move into the Canterbury world actively.
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energetically; they burst into it. The narrator refers to sweat five times 
in twenty lines of the Canon’s description. And, once arrived they do 
not stay still. The shifting process continues as the Yeoman gradually 
reveals the extent of his scorn for the Canon. (232)
Commentator’s on the Yeoman’s performance in the Prologue and Tale have
overlooked the fact that according to descriptions of their practices, alchemists, like
hatters in later centuries, would have commonly suffered from nervous disorders caused
by mercury poisoning. Mercury was an essential element in alchemical work for more
than purely metaphorical reasons. It was used because "it is a good solvent for other
metals, forming some compounds but usually giving alloys which are known as
amalgams," and mercury will easily amalgamate with siver and gold (Hopkins 720).
However, at room temperature mercury "vaporizes slightly, a fact o f importance
because its colorless and odorless vapor is extremely toxic, with cumulative effects"
(Hopkins 719-20). By the Yeoman’s account, he works continuously to "multiplie,"
thus his exposure to mercury vapour must be high. He also seems to understand the
process o f vapourization, as he complains to the pilgrims that, "fumes diverse/ O f
metals, whiche ye han herd me reherce,/ Consumed and wasted han my reednesse"
(VIII, 1098-1100).2
M ercury’s toxic effects are a result of its "predilection for the central nervous 
system" (Amdur 647). Mercury "accumulates in the brain quickly during exposure but 
is released from the brain very slowly" (Sittig 1045). The effects of chronic exposure 
to mercury vapour can result in, "changes in personality and behavior, with loss of 
memory, increased excitability (erethism), severe depression, and even delirium and 
hallucination" (Amdur 648). The long-term effects of mercury exposure would account
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for the Yeoman’s excited speech, his mercurial entry into the entourage, and his 
revelations o f increasing despair, and impotence.
The Yeoman is not only affected by mercury, he appears to mimic the metal’s 
most noticeable characteristics. The Yeoman’s much-emphasized sweating is like the 
sweating o f the metal itself, its vaporization. The Yeoman’s paleness reflects the 
paleness o f mercury’s silver colouring. The metal was held to be the female partner 
in the alchemical marriage, as its cool, moist paleness contrasted with the warm, dry 
"reedness" o f the masculine partner, sulphur. If the Yeoman is losing his "reedness," 
and becoming moist and pale, alchemically this implies that he is losing his masculinity. 
If he is being overtaken by mercurial characteristics then he is being feminized. The 
alternating expressions o f excitement and despair caused by mercury’s cerebral toxicity 
combine with the metal’s other toxic effects—the Yeoman’s sense that he is an impotent 
man, an empty vessel.
Just as the origins of the texts leads onto false trails and pathways, the language 
of the texts misleads the reader by hiding, rather than revealing, or perhaps even 
containing, meaning. The problem of clarity stems from the fact that, like the Canon’s 
and Yeoman’s hidden enterprise in the "hemes" and "lanes blynde," alchemy was a 
secret art which used language in a manner which was intentionally obscure. As the 
Yeoman himself remarks, "Philosophres speken so mystily/ In this craft that men kan 
nat come thereby,/For any wit that men han now-a-dayes" (VIII, 1394-96). Directly 
following this statement, the Yeoman makes two more rather cryptic comments on the 
use of language in alchemical texts. He says:
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They mowe wel chiteren as doon jayes,
And in hir termes sette hir lust and peyne,
But to hir purpos shal they nevere atteyne.
A m an may lightly leme, if he have aught,
To multiplie, and brynge his good to naught! (VIII, 1397-1401)
One is led to question whether the pronouns "they" and "hir" in the first three lines
refer to the philosophers or to their followers. I would translate the lines: "they (i.e.
the men who read the texts) may as well chatter (i.e. speak orally) as jays do, and put
all their lust and pain into words (i.e. spoken ones), for their (alchemical) goal shall
never be attained." I f  the Yeoman is speaking of himself here, he is then differentiating
his spoken words (which are an expression of his desires and sorrows) from the written
words o f the philosophers. To "chiteren as doon jayes" is an ambiguous simile which
could illustrate both the meaningless enigmas of the philosophers, or the Yeoman’s oral
expression of his emotional truths. The placement o f these lines after the preceding
ones (VIII 1294-96) in which "Philosophres" is the obvious subject, leads the reader
to assume that "they" and "hir" refer to the texts o f the philosophers, and not to men
like the Yeoman. However, ambiguity is created here because this sentence is
sandwiched between one whose subject is the "Philosophres" and one whose subject is
"A man." The Yeoman obliquely moves from discussing the texts of the philosophers
to vague pronouns which may refer to the philosophers or to their followers, and then
moves to speaking about himself (although somewhat obliquely in the words "A man").
The question created by this use of pronouns is whether the chattering of jays (referred
to in VTII, 1397) is meaningless written language, or meaningful oral revelation. The
conclusion of the Yeoman in this passage is that even though the texts o f alchemy are
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difficult to understand, through experience one can easily discover the real secret of 
alchemy: how to turn something ("aught") into nothing ("naught"). Here the Yeoman 
holds up experience as his real source o f learning. While texts have been meaningless, 
experience has conveyed the truth to the Yeoman.
Just as the Prologue closes with declarations of defiant speech by the Yeoman 
in the lines: ”A1 that I kan anon now wol I telle" (VIII, 704), and, "I wol nat spare;/ 
Swich thyng as that I knowe, I wol declare" (VIII, 718-19), the Tale closes with defiant 
declaration of the intent to reveal. "And right as swithe I wol yow tellen heere/ What 
philosophres seyn in this mateere" (VIII, 1426-7), the Yeoman declares. The secret of 
Hermes is that a man who "Of philosophres understonde kan;/ . . .  he is a lewed man" 
(VIII, 1444-45). The "lewed" (those without full literacy) and the "learned" (those with 
literacy) are reduced to the same level in the Yeoman’s performance. This leveling is 
a part o f the Yeoman’s process of revealing that the source of his frustration is textual. 
I, thus, disagree with the position that at the end of the Tale Chaucer proceeds to 
defend "true" alchemy (Haynes 17, Damon 783).
The quotation of Senior’s words reveals the emptiness of alchemy’s textuality. 
W hen Plato is asked to "name the privee stone" (VIII, 1452), he answers that it is 
"Titanos" (a cover name, a signifier which does not signify); and, when asked to clarify 
this cipher he calls it "Magnasia" (giving another cipher). Senior then accuses Plato 
o f explaining the "ignotum per ienocius" (VUI 1467) that is, using language as a 
meaningless enterprise. When asked again to define "Magnasia" Plato responds with
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another enigmatic statement: it is a water made of four elements. Then, when asked 
to give the "roote" (root meaning) of the water, Plato responds:
"Nay, nay . . . certein, that I nil.
The philosophres sworn were everychoon 
That they sholden discovere it unto noon,
Ne in no book it write in no manere. (VIII, 1462-6)
Plato reveals that the endlessly fathered texts of alchemy are counterfeit because the
authors were sworn before they began not to reveal the secret. Thus, the texts which
(re)produce themselves into a vast alchemical canon are worthless signifiers of meaning.
Like the counterfeit coins from Avignon, they are lumps of lead pretending to a value
and meaning they do not possess. The real "secree of the secretes" is that alchemy is
the art o f counterfeiting and forgery. Like these covert operations, alchemy attempts
to make nothing look like something.
The Canon’s suspicion of the Yeoman’s oral revelations contrasts with the 
credulity he displays in devotedly following the doctrines o f forged and meaningless 
texts. The only things in the Canon’s Yeoman’s Prologue and Tale which are not 
empty, forged, counterfeit, or impotent are the Yeoman’s spoken words. In his 
confession of the emptiness he has discovered in himself and his work, the Yeoman 
uses language to convey meaning, in contrast the philosophical texts, which use 
language in the most perverse way possible, not to convey meaning. The emptiness of 
textuality is thus held up against the fullness of speaking. The chattering of jays is, 
after all, a description of textual emptiness.
The rhetorical performance of the Canon’s Yeoman Prologue and Tale 
represents attempts at coming to a "conclusion" which end at "naught." This may
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justify this work’s inclusion near the end of a large and unfinished work of literature. 
James Dean notes that "The Yeoman and the Canon, who link up with the other thirty 
pilgrims at Baoughton, in effect rescue the Canterbury Tales book from its own 
framework and structure, which while not rigid and uncompromising, could not easily 
have led to closure without some external event" (752). The only real closure or 
conclusion attained in the Prologue and Tale is found in the speech of the Yeoman 
when he states, "And there a poynt, for ended is my tale" (VIII, 1480). The Yeoman’s 
rhetorical performance has revealed that there has been no end reached in any o f his 
other endeavours. The work never came to anything; instead, what he had of value was 
reduced to nothing.
Anxieties about the reduction of value in texts underlie the Canon’s Yeoman’s 
Prologue and Tale. While the Pardoner upholds texts as more powerful than contexts, 
the Yeoman undermines the value of texts. His context (his story) debases the value 
o f the texts he quotes from. He reveals that language about emptiness (his ‘o ra l’ 
performance) is not at all the same thing as the empty language of alchemical texts. 
Thus, the Canon’s Yeoman’s Prologue and Tale expresses a fear of emptiness not only 
economically, but textually. The texts o f alchemy are similar to the paradox that, "The 
zero is something that must be there in order to say that nothing is there" (Menninger 
400); in other words, language is needed in order to represent the potential for 
meaningless expression in writing.
In light o f the Canon’s Yeoman’s Prologue and Tale we can consider again 
Bracton’s statement: "Though in almost all lands use is made of the leges and the jus
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scriptum. England alone uses unwritten law and custom. There law derives from 
nothing written [but] from what usage has approved" (Thome’s trans. 19). As a 
statement o f fact, Bracton’s insistence on the unwrittenness of the common law is not 
completely accurate. As Henry Sumner Maine has pointed out, the purported descent 
of Roman law from a code, and English law from "immemorial unwritten tradition" is 
mainly a theoretical distinction (7). M aine’s thesis about the origins of the common 
law is that, "As soon as the Courts at Westminster Hall began to base their judgements 
on cases recorded, whether in the year books or elsewhere, the law which they 
administered became written law" (13). To Maine in the ninteenth century, written 
case-law is "only different from code-law because it is written in a different way" (13); 
however, to Bracton in the thirteenth century, there is an important distinction between 
the lex scripta and the lex non scripta. one which he insists upon at the opening of his 
treatise. Bracton’s statement suggests that the unwrittenness of the common law is a 
defensive gesture against codes and codification (i.e. Roman and French law). Perhaps 
the subtext o f his statement is really the belief that nothing can be contained in, or 
represented by, writing.
Maine and Bracton’s difference o f opinion focuses on what Goodrich calls a 
"fiction o f origins" in the law. Goodrich posits that "the law depends upon a 
geography of mental spaces, which cannot be reduced to its physical presences, its texts 
(lex scripta). or its apparent rules. The appearance of law is only ever an index or 
sign, a vestige or relic of anterior or hidden causes" (9-10). For Goodrich, law 
requires hidden or disguised origins.3 He notes:
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A structural principle is operative in legal dogmatics, which attributes 
causes strictly to an invisible or unconscious order, or to the imagination 
of the senses fformae imaeinariae) and in doctrinal terms to the spirit of 
the law . . . .  A canonic geography or mapping of law institutes a 
cartography of those structures, those forms o f terror or manipulation 
that bind invisibly and from within, for they are the measure o f that 
most complex and mixed o f spiritual and temporal constructions, namely 
the presence of an "unwritten law." (9-10)
W hen a society moves from oral law to written law a profound transformation results
as the law becomes "fixed" in codes which require an identifiable origin, that is, they
require an "auctor" to give them "auctoritee."
Maine holds that "when primitive law has once been embodied in a Code, there
is an end to what may be called its spontaneous development. Henceforward the
changes effected in it, if effected at all, are effected deliberately and from without"
(17). Thus, codified law has a tendency to become dead or static, removed from the
culture. As Jack Goody has noted, in oral societies there is:
an imperceptible process o f adjustment of norms . . . .  in response to 
external pressures or internal forces. The process is imperceptible 
because norms have only a verbal, an oral existence, so that rules that 
are no longer applicable tend to slip out of the memory store. But write 
down the norms in the form of a code or statute and you then have to 
make deliberate and conscious efforts to effect any alteration. (139)
Codes get left behind when a society changes, and tend to become devoid of meaning.
I would argue that Bracton’s insistence on the unwrittenness o f English law reflects an
attitude strongly held by his culture, that is, an insistence on the common law’s "living"
potency. Bracton wishes to portray the common law not as an empty vessel or dead
recepticle, but as a living entity which cannot be reduced to, or contained within, a
text. The common law must have no origin or author except for England herself. The
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very essence of the common law is its Englishness, and this sense of identity is tied to 
the common law’s mystical origins within the alchemical vessel of the motherland.
What Bracton reveals in his defiant stance against written law is English 
culture’s resistance to the reduction of the common law to a set o f w ritten codes. 
Bracton, The Wife o f Bath, and the Canon’s Yeoman assert that it is only through 
"experience" that meaning can be found. The lex non scripta. based as it is on 
"experience," is thus a living entity, a metaphor o f life itself. The potency of the lex 
non scripta stems from the fact that it is "alive." In contrast, the lex scripta has a 
tendency to degenerate into impotence. It becomes dead for having been set down and 
enclosed on the parchment.
Goodrich describes the common law as informed by a sense o f loss. This loss, 
he claims:
would undoubtedly include the loss o f its authentic sources, the pristine 
immemorial law which preceded the inventions of statute, the native 
common law in the Celtic and later Anglo-Saxon tongues that existed 
prior to the Danish, Roman, and Norman invasions, the true unwritten 
constitution which represented an "honest" England that preexisted 
Europe and its increasingly vocal call to a written law. (7)
Canon law and Roman law (based on Codes) seem to the English as embodiments o f
verbal and legal impotence. The Continental codes represent an imported language
which is potentially empty o f meaning and lacking an authentic source. All codes are
potentially forms of false representation. What the Yeoman expresses in his Prologue
and Tale is his experience o f the emptiness of textual representation. The fear of false
representation on the inscribed page informs Bracton’s treatise and the Canon’s
Yeoman’s Prologue and Tale.
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‘A translation of Leyden Papyrus X into English can be found in E.R. Caley’s 
"Leyden Papyrus X." The original Greek version is included in M. Berthelot’s 
Collection des anciens alchimistes grecs. vol. 1, 28-51. I have used Caley’s translation 
throughout.
2When mercury is stored in vessels stopped with corks, its vaporisation will 
inevitably be observed, as the metal works its way into the pores o f the cork and beads 
of the metal drop out when the cork is tapped. It is thus not unlikely that the Yeoman 
(and Chaucer) would know of this characertistic of the metal.
3The true origins of Bracton’s treatise are also disguised and hidden. Much of 
it was copied directly from Roman legal texts during a time when the study of Roman 
law was proscribed in England (see: Maine 79). He, thus, disguises not only the 
Roman origins o f his own text, but essentially passes off codified Roman law as the 
pure unwritten English law.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Sir Gavvain And The Green Knight And The 
(In)determinacy Of The Oral Oath
An oral nostalgia prevails in our thoughts about writing—in the idea that spoken 
discourse is somehow more determinate than written discourse. In the view of Hannah 
Arendt the movement from a legal system based on sovereignty (oaths) to one based 
on written bonds (contracts) is one toward a destabilization of legal certainty. She 
writes, "the danger and advantage inherent in all bodies politic that rely on contracts 
and treaties is that they, unlike those that rely on rule and sovereignty leave the 
unpredictability o f human affairs and the unreliability o f men as they are" (244). 
Implied in Arendt’s statement is the assumption that written bonds are unpredictable, 
while oral oaths are certain. From this point o f view, legal anxieties result when a 
society shifts from an oral legal system to a written one, since written bonds are open 
to interpretation in a way that spoken oaths are not in an oral culture.
The social world depicted in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight1 is based upon 
the rule and sovereignty of oaths; however, human affairs still remain quite 
unpredictable and humans rather unreliable. I propose that Sir Gawain challenges the 
thesis of the certainty of the oral oath by deprivileging the determinacy o f oral 
communication. At the opening of the poem Gawain makes an oral contract face to 
face with the other party, an agreement based on formulaic and customary usage; yet, 
he still has no idea what he has agreed to do, or more siginificantly, whom he has 
agreed to do it with, as Bertilak is not identifiable either through his use of language
102
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or his signs. Neither the Green Knight nor the oaths entered into with Lord and Lady 
de Hautdesert can be translated or fully understood by Gawain. Furthermore, the 
identity of Gawain himself is repeatedly called into question throughout the poem, 
suggesting that the characters are uncertain of their ability to identify one another. I 
suggest that the poem raises significant questions about the use of the oral oath in the 
late fourteenth century, as the poem denies that the oath is a more determinate method 
of binding parties to an agreement than the written contract.
In his opening address the narrator says of his tale-telling:
I schal telle hit astit, as I in toun herde,
With tonge.
As hit is stad and stoken 
In story stif and stronge,
With lei letteres loken,
In londe so hatz been longe. (30-36)
In these lines the narrator makes two rather contradictory statements about his source
material. He begins by saying that he will tell the story as he heard it, but he modifies
this by saying in the next lines that he will tell it as it has been "stad and stoken . . .
with Iel letteres." These two statements create a question about what form o f language,
oral or written, sets down and fixes language, and locks it in true letters. As I translate
them, the lines suggest the paradox that the story has been set down and fixed, locked
with true "letters," for a long time, in an oral tale.
The diction of "stad and stoken" and "loken" imply the fixity o f  writing, rather
than oral tale-telling, and suggest that the narrator will tell it as he read it, not as he
heard it. This is confirmed at lines 689-90 when the narrator states, "Mony wylsum 
way he rode,/ The bok as I herde say." In this later passage hearing is related to
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books, not to tongues. The narrator creates in the ambiguous diction of lines 30-36 an
oral myth o f  the certainty o f tongues which lock in ”Iel letteres,” only to deflate this
myth later in lines 689-90 when we learn that it is a book which has locked the tale in
true letters. Turville-Petre notes o f these lines:
Gawain is set in an entirely oral context. The narrator is portrayed as 
an entertainer who has heard the story and, even though (as he goes on 
to say, 11 33-6) the story exists in written form also, he is merely 
transmitting it as he heard i t . . .  . The author of the poem—the man who 
moulded the basic plot-elements into this brilliantly organized structure, 
and who wrote it down so that scribes could make copies o f it—is 
obviously not giving a portrait of himself. (37)
However, I disagree that lines 33-6 state that the story exists in written form; they seem
to state the opposite, or at least leave open the question of whether the story has been
locked in true letters in an oral or a written form. J. Gellrich also notes the ambiguity
o f lines 30-36. He interprets the lines as follows:
"Now" (as-tit) he will begin the public recitation o f his script just as it 
has been told "with tonge," and thus he will avoid the hesitation or 
interruption always possible in silent reading. Yet his delivery will not 
be impromptu . . . .  "Locked" in alliteration, the narrator’s words will 
also be the oral pronunciation o f letters linked in cursive script; the 
spoken will have the quality o f words "set down and fastened" in the text 
"firm and strong." That book is none other than the poem in front of 
us, the written object presenting itself as the voice of the narrator. So 
powerful is the narrator’s fiction o f his speaking that it once led critics 
to opine that his is a poem "for the ear rather than for the eye." (201-2)
The question of what locks and fastens firmly and strongly, the oral or the written,
seems to pervade the narrator’s opening address to his readers. This question becomes
"a crisis o f interpretation" in Sir Gawain. to borrow R. A . Shoaf s term ("Syngne" 154).
While Sir Gawain appears to embody a late medieval nostalgia for the oral, 
oath-tied past, the poem actually illuminates the indeterminacy of that past, and the
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uncertainty of the ties which bind it. This sense of ambiguity is compressed at the 
conclusion of the poem into the symbol o f the lace, a tie which represents an ambiguous 
set o f oaths, and which quickly becomes divested of any meaningful relationship to 
them. The lace is virtually indecipherable by the conclusion of the poem; it has 
become an enigma only surpassed by M organ herself and her sub-entities the Lord and 
Lady de Hautdesert. In effect, the lace has so many meanings it has no meaning; it is 
a code with too many possible translations. Like the key players in this drama of 
signification, the lace is a sign whose multiplicity allows it to ellude definition.
The lace which accompanies the third covenant can easily be untied, as is 
demonstrated by Lady de Hautdesert’s quick removal of it from her body. For this 
reason I argue that the lace is symbolic o f the oral bonds which Gawain enters into. 
The poet entices us to believe at the opening of the poem that "tonges" have locked the 
story in "lei letteres." Similary, the whole poem entices us to believe that the oral 
oaths Gawain enters into are serious and binding covenants which must be upheld for 
the sake of honour. For this to be the case, we must see the oaths as "true" bonds; but 
the poem unlocks the oaths and reveals them as part of a treacherous game. If critics 
have failed in any aspect of their interpretation of this poem I believe it is in under- 
appreciating the essential treachery and legal insubstantiality of the oral oaths which 
Gawain enters into and attempts to maintain.2
The poem’s characterization of oath-making is, I believe, set up in the fourth 
line where the "tulk" who wrought the plots of treason at Troy is described. The 
narrator says that he, "Watz tried for his tricherie, [)e trewest on erthe" (4). In this line
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there is a play on the word "tricherie" as meaning both "treachery" and also "trickery" 
(Stratman 620). This word is disjunctively modified by "trewest," so that the "tulk’s" 
is the most true, faithful, vertuous, or trustworthy (Andrew and Waldron 353) of 
treacheries/trickeries. This sense of trustworthy treachery can be related to Bertilak’s 
apparent virtuousness (his generosity as a host and his reprieve of Gawain) which is 
actually subordinate to his treachery and trickery towards Gawain in setting up 
situations o f entrappment by oath under Morgan’s direction. Bertilak and the Lady may 
also be tried, by the poet, for "tricherie," for the "treasonous" plot of the poem 
revolves around the ensnaring quality of the oaths they dictate to Gawain. Thus, while 
the reader can easily assume that it is Gawain who is on trial in the poem, also 
implicated in trustworthy treachery are the oath-weilding Lord and Lady de Hautdesert. 
Hautdesert is a placename which ambiguously signifies, among other possibilities, a 
superior emptiness or desert, a haughty desertion, or possibly high treason. The key 
resident of Hautdesert, and the key party in the entire plot, Morgan la Fee, herself is 
an inexplicable, mythic embodiment of contradictions between "trustworthiness" and 
"treachery."3
The oral agreements and the lace require an interpretive subtlety which neither 
Gawain, A rthur’s court, nor the reader is completely able to master. Sir Gawain does 
not privilege oral discourse, nor idealize the legal certainty of an oath-tied past. 
Rather, the poem expresses an anxiety about the relative uncertainty o f traditional ties 
and bonds. The ultimate message of Sir Gawain. one which the poet’s contemporaries
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
107
may have been reluctant to hear, is that there is no ideal, mythic, legal past to which 
society can strive to return.
According to Peter Goodrich the common law itself embodies a nostalgia for the
oral past. Goodrich eloquently writes of the common law’s pervasive nostalgia for the
"loss o f its authentic sources, the pristine immemorial law which preceded the
inventions o f statute, the native common law in the Celtic and later Anglo-Saxon
tongues" (7). This nostalgia, he claims, is for the loss o f orality. Goodrich posits that
the common law, "was a tradition that existed to protect those things that the English
value and had always valued. Its constitution was domestic, its law unwritten, its creed
a matter of good manners and o f doing things as they had always been done" (6).
Encroaching radically upon this conception o f the common law was the actual situation
in the fourteenth century. The law was, in fact, bound up in an overly-complex system
of documentation known as the writs. The writ system of pleading made direct access
to the courts difficult or impossible for the untrained person. As Norman Doe explains:
in the formative period of the common law (although there were 
procedures without writ) substantive rules existed only latently within 
claims that a litigant could put (in his count) before a court, within the 
writs (those instruments initiating suits in the royal courts) which 
facilitated these claims, and within the remedies which the writs 
embodied. The settlement of individual disputes was based not upon the 
application of rules but upon making an acceptable claim by means of 
the correct wr i t . . . .  As the earliest tracts on the common law indicate, 
it was the writ system itself which operated as the focal point o f legal 
practice and study. Legal literature expressed and accommodated a law 
of writs rather than a law of property or a law of contract. The early 
medieval legal practicioner found the law not in an explicity stated body 
of rules, based on legislation and judicial decision, but in the Register 
of W rits. (1-2)
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As Doe suggests, contracts were formed according to what the writ system allowed 
them to be made upon, and the language of the writ then determined what could be 
agreed upon. The writ virtually dictated the contract, not the parties entering into it. 
Law was no longer founded upon customary rules and common sense, but upon the 
procedural compexities embodied in the Register of Writs.4 This system was not how 
the English ideally wanted to see their common law as deriving or functioning. There 
was reason in the fourteenth century for a nostalgic view of an oral legal past, one 
whose sense of "covenant" derived from words spoken in the common tongue by one 
party to another, rather than from the inscribed Latin of the Register o f W rits. As 
Goodrich claims, "the geneology of common law may well reflect a sense o f mourning 
for . . . the loss o f the unwritten" (28).
The form of the oral agreements entered into in Sir Gawain is based on 
formulaic expressions necessary in an oral legal system. But, even though the 
agreements between Gawain and the Green Knight/Bertilak are traditional and formulaic 
in character, they contain elements of the unexpected and the ambiguous which are 
characteristic of oral communication. As Havelock describes the problem: "in primary 
orality, relationships between human beings are governed exclusively by acoustics 
(supplemented by visual perception o f bodily behavior) . . . .  A communication system 
of this sort is an echo system, light as air and as fleeting" (65). The contrast between 
the supposed fixity of the ritualized utterance of the forumulaic oath and the acoustic 
situation in which words are as "light as air and as fleeting" underlies the treatment of 
oath-making in Sir Gawain.
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One problematic aspect of the oaths in the poem is the difficulty of identifying 
the Green Knight through visual perception. As Robert Blanch notes, the Green Knight 
is "a totally ambiguous character" ("Imagery" 53). Furthermore, it appears that the 
Green Knight may be as ambiguous to Gawain as to the reader. John Plummer argues 
that "the essential point o f the Green Knight’s ambiguous appearance is the ambiguity 
itself" (199) which presents Camelot "with a challenge in beheading and in the correct 
use o f signs, the latter being the more difficult" (198). Neither the complex signs of 
the Green Knight nor his "unhuman" character can be adequately comprehended by 
Gawain at the moment he enters into his agreement with him. One necessary element 
for a valid contract is that the parties must know the correct identity o f the party they 
are contracting with. According to St. Germain, a valid contract "must be clear and 
certain" (Dial.II, c.24). It is, therefore, significant that the Green Knight/Bertilak 
refuses to divulge his identity to Gawain before the oaths are taken, and that even by 
their final parting at the Green Chapel Bertilak’s explanation o f his identity is 
ambiguous and incomplete. With the identity of the Green Knight far from clear and 
certain, the agreements Gawain enters into with him become so as well.
Later on Gawain discovers that Morgan la Fee has created the oaths and 
apparently devised and controlled the entire plot. Thus, Gawain has unwittingly entered 
into bargains with M organ, not the Green Knight or Bertilak and the Lady. As the plot 
revolves around a set o f interlocking "deals," the language o f the business world can 
best describe the situation. Morgan apparently owns a controlling interest in Bertilak 
(who may not be an autonomous entity, but a sort of "shadow company"); therefore,
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Gawain is unwittingly agreeing to enter into bargains with a hidden party who is even 
more ambiguous than the party he thinks he is contracting with.
Added to the question of "mistaken identity" is the problem of whether, 
considering the dramatic nature o f the Green Knight’s challenge in A rthur’s court, 
Gawain’s participation in their first agreement is completely voluntary. Simpson notes 
that, "duress had been accepted in medieval law as invalidating acts in the law, and 
there was in principle no reason why cases of assumpsit [i.e. contract] involving duress 
or menace should not have arisen" (Contract 537). The fact that the other members of 
Arthur’s court refrain from taking up the Knight’s challenge reveals the unwillingness 
o f the court to enter into this exchange. Another hurdle in taking the agreement 
between Gawain and the Green Knight seriously is that it involves an illegal act, namely 
murder. Simpson notes that, "in the medieval law of formal contracts it was recognized 
that illegality in the contract was a ground for holding the contract void" (Contract 
507). Illegal condiditions in an agreement rendered "not only the condition, but also 
the bond itself void" (Simpson, Contract 507). While Blanch and W asserman’s assert 
that, "the medieval contractual tradition shapes the narrative and delineates the specific 
rules or promises Gawain violates in the course o f his adventure" ("Medieval 
Contracts" 599), I argue that the agreement the Knight asks the court to enter into is 
a wager (i.e. a betting transaction) not a formal contract or convenant. For this reason 
the agreement escapes the necessary requirements for contract formation. Added to the 
necessity of clarity and certainty are the stipulations that "the thing promised or 
undertaken must be lawful," "must be possible to be done," "must be co-hering, and
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agreeing in itself, and with the consideration," and, "must be serious and weighty" (St. 
Germain, Dial.II, ch .24).s
The challenge the Green Knight offers borders on what Simpson calls a "joke
contract." As an example he cites a medieval case in which the facts included "a
promise in consideration of 12d. to pay £5 to the defendant if the plaintiff does not have
him whipped at the cross at Gloucester, and this was held not actionable" (Contract
534). About this judgement Simpson explains:
The case seems close to a wager, but wagers, perhaps the most obvious 
type of contract which the courts might have refused to recognize on the 
ground of frivolity, were regarded as actionable at common law. Indeed 
it is in connection with wagers that the common law first recognized the 
doctrine that a promise was good consideration for a promise, so that 
wagering contracts so far from being anomalous have in fact been the 
source of an important contractual doctrine . . . .  It never seems to have 
been argued during our period that wagering contracts were bad at 
common law either on the ground of mere frivolity o r on the ground that 
their enforcement was contrary to public policy. (Contract 534)
The Green Knight’s challenge escapes the problem of a lack of consideration (necessary
for a binding agreement), as it offers a promise in return for a promise, and thus
follows the form o f a wager (i.e. what we would call a bet). The form o f the wager
is that the Green Knight promises to receive a blow from Gawain if Gawain will
promise to receive one from him. While it appears that medieval courts were in favour
of upholding wagers, this agreement technically stands somewhere on the border
between a formal covenant and a joke contract.
There is apparently dissension in A rthur’s court over whether the agreement 
between Gawain and the Green Knight is a serious and binding covenant. The 
somewhat cryptic question that "al same segges" ask at Gawain’s departure for the
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Chapel: "Who knew euer any kyng such counsel to take/ As knOtez in cauelaciounz 
on Crystmasse gomnez?" (682-83) reveals that arguments and objections 
("cauelaciounz") have been made over the Christmas games. The implication is that 
there has been something o f a "court case" made over the games, likely an  attempt to 
determine whether the wager Gawain entered into with the Green Knight constituted a 
serious and binding covenant.
While Blanch and Wasserman’s interpret the exchange game as "a formal
contract with well-defined perimeters o f responsibility" ("Medieval Contracts" 603-4),
it seems, on the contrary, that Gawain has considerable difficulty determining what his
actual "perimeters of responsibility" are. Blanch and Wasserman themselves recognize
that the "perimeters" of Gawain’s second wager are not very well-defined. They
explain Gawain’s complex set of reciprocal responsibilities as follows:
In yielding himself contentedly to the lady’s will, Gawain creates a 
network of conflicting obligations; while both he and Lady Bercilak are 
bound as guest and as wife, respectively, to Bercilak, Gawain has 
already pledged himself through a formal, publicly sworn ceremony to 
the will o f the host . . . .  Thus having placed himself at Bercilak’s 
disposal, Gawain may not satisfy the contradictory impulses o f the lady. 
Furthermore, the convenant framed between Gawain and the Knight at 
Camelot precludes any promise to remain at Hautdesert until Gawain is 
assured that his stay at Bercilak’s castle will not violate his pledged 
appearance at the Green Chapel. ("To ’Ouertake Your W ylie’" 123)
It seems, then, that Gawain is not very certain about the perimeters o f the agreements
he has entered into, for his reciprocal responsibilities are virtually undefinable. In his
castle the Green Knight/Bertilak for a second time tricks Gawain into entering into a
loosely-defined verbal wager with reciprocal obligations that are nearly impossible for
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Gawain to comprehend or uphold. The essential part o f the contracts which Gawain 
fails to understand are the obligations created for him by the oaths.
In a society which diligently upholds and maintains hierarchies, the oral oath 
would, in effect, probably mean what the most powerful person says it means. In 
Gawain’s case, the agreements he enters into with the Green Knight/Bertilak mean what 
Bertilak says they mean because Bertilak outranks Gawain on a number o f levels: 
socially, metaphysically and psychologically. Bertilak has a psychological advantage 
in the first situation in Arthur’s court as menacing and unnatural intruder, later in his 
own castle as welcoming and generous host, and finally at the Green Chapel as wielder 
o f life or death judgment over Gawain. In both wagers Bertilak dictates the terms of 
the agreement to Gawain, thereby controlling the "perimeters" o f the oaths. Because 
o f the many advantages of rank Bertilak holds over Gawain’s head, he dictates the rules 
of the wagers, and later interprets the meaning of them for Gawain. The Green 
Knight/Bertilak is "bigger" than Gawain in more than just a literal sense; thus he and 
not Gawain apparently interprets the meaning of the wagers. In this regard, the world 
of the poem is feudal. But, this world and the certainty of its ties are undermined by 
the poet’s treatment of oath-making.
Shoaf has argued that "it is clearly more than just a convenience to speak of a 
crisis o f interpretation in Sir Gawain: indeed, one can argue that the whole plot o f the 
poem follows a succession of such crises" ("Syngne" 154). As one instance of crisis, 
Shoaf refers to the first wager offered by the Green Knight. He explains that Arthur 
and Gawain "can only interpret the Green Knight’s challenge as implying that he.
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Arthur or Gawain, is to strike the blow with the ax, whereas, in fact, the challenge is 
sufficiently ambiguous to leave open the possibility of Arthur or Gawain critically 
choosing the ’holyn bobbe’ as the weapon to use" ("The ’Syngne of Surfet’" 158-9). 
I suggest that the case for choosing the "bobbe" is even stronger than Shoaf describes 
it. The Green Knight makes a point o f signifying to the court that he comes in peace, 
and that the holly bob is the signifier of this intent. As he says to them: "Oe may be 
seker bi J>is braunch J3at I bere here/ {Dat I passe as in pes and no plyOt seche” (265-6). 
The Green Knight clearly signifies by his words (and his other signs) that what he seeks 
in not "batyle bare," as Arthur interprets his intent, but a "Crystemas gomen" in which 
one man will "strike a stroke for anojser" (282-7). The Green Knight tells Gawain he 
will "bede jae {)is buffet" (381), and "fange at {)y fust {Dat I haf frayst here" (391). Two 
key words in these phrases, "buffet" and "fust" have double meanings which make the 
Knight’s offer ambiguous. While "buffet" most commonly means, "To beat, strike .
. . with the hand; to thump, cuff, knock about" (O .E.D.. II, 2nd ed., 625), the M .E .D . 
offers as an alternative, "a blow struck with a weapon" (V o l.l, 1212). In order to 
make Gawain’s choice o f a blow with a weapon the more reasonable, editors of the 
poem note that "fust" can mean either "hand" or "fist" (Andrew and W aldron 320), 
thus offering the translation that the Knight wagers to receive at Gawain’s "hand" what 
he has asked for at the court. However, head-chopping would not be the obvious 
interpretation of a blow for a blow wager of this sort, as both "buffet" and "fust" have 
far less violent denotations. From this perspective, Arthur’s seizure o f the axe is a 
somewhat pathological interpretation of the bargain, as is his belief that the Green
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Knight seeks "batayle bare" after he has announced that he comes in peace. Shoaf 
suggests that it is the "influence" of the Green Knight which makes Arthur and Gawain 
feel "compelled" to interpret the game in a way which does not take either the issues 
o f criminality or reciprocal obligation into consideration. However, it may be, as well, 
that Gawain and Arthur are influenced by excessive self-interest to make this 
interpretation of the Knight’s words.
Arthur and Gawain’s seizure o f the axe is highly self-defeating, but it also 
reveals their willingness to enter into a one-sided bargain. Gawain believes that he will 
not have to receive in return what he has given, because the decapitation o f the Knight 
should ensure that Gawain will escape from any reciprocal obligation. By interpreting 
the bargain in a self-interested way, Gawain seeks to escape from reciprocity. The 
Green Knight says that he comes in peace to strike a bargain, but allows the court to 
interpret the terms o f the bargain as they wish. They choose to interpret it in a way 
which is as disadvantageous to the other party, and as advantageous to themselves, as 
is possible in the situation. Arthur and Gawain understand the bargain to mean that 
they will not have to deliver the "consideration" offered to the Green Knight. Morgan 
and Bertilak win the Christmas game because Arthur and Gawain agree to make a 
bargain that is unconscionable. Morgan apparently foresaw Arthur and Gawain’s 
interpretive stance, predicated upon their eagerness to enter into an unfair bargain. In 
this way, oath-making is the real and hidden "weppen" Morgan wields over Gawain, 
and A rthur’s court.
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Morgan and Bertilak use the interlocking oral oaths to manipulate and ensnare 
Gawain. In this light, the chivalric oath is, to use Blanch’s terms, an "insignia of 
entanglement" in the poem rather than an "enclosing refuge and comfort" ("Imagery" 
54-55). While I agree with Goodlad that "Sir Gawain is essentially about a man (gome) 
and games (gomnez)" (46), the problem is that these "games" are formulated by 
chivalric oaths which Gawain and feudal society take very seriously. The "gomnez" 
play with the crucial links of the feudal social system and cross the line between 
frivolity and legality. The jokes involve formulaic oaths of a socially sacred nature.
The paradox of "oath" as "game" can be contrasted to Clanchy’s comments on 
the medieval attitude towards documents. Clanchy notes that: "Both to ignorant
illiterates and to sophisticated Platonists written record was a dubious gift, because it 
seemed to kill living eloquence and trust and substitute for them a mummified 
semblance in the form o f a piece of parchment" (From Memory 296-97). The tricky 
nature of the oaths in Sir Gawain calls into question whether medievalists themselves 
are sometimes overly influenced by nostalgia for an oral past, as the Gawain-poet 
appears to be suspicious o f the "living eloquence and trust" supposedly found in speech, 
something Havelock describes as "light as air and as fleeting" (65). I would agree that 
Sir Gawain and the Green Knight is a work that points to "the potential division within 
both speech and writing between what is uttered and what is meant" (Gellrich 33).
Shoaf explains that "both Dante and the Gawain-poet depend on a very ancient 
tradition in which the knot is frequently a figure connected in some way or another with 
textuality" ("Syngne" 160); however, the knots which Gawain gets himself tied into are
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related to orality, not textuality. The "knots" which bind Gawain are the oaths he 
enters into. M organ and Bertilak tie Gawain into knots orally by wielding oaths over 
him. The spoken word in Sir Gawain is the tricky part o f the knotting games which 
entrap Gawain. In both wagers Gawain is forced to make acts of interpretation in a 
context which does not allow him sufficient freedom of choice or foreknowledge of 
consequences.
As Shoaf has pointed out, Gawain had a choice of two weapons in the hall in 
Camelot. However, the most powerful weapon M organ and the Green Knight weilded 
in the hall was the oath. Thus, there are three weapons offered in Arthur’s hall, and 
Gawain accepts two of them, the axe and the oath. Similarly, there are a number of 
ambiguous "gifts" offered by Lady de Hautdesert in the exchange game, and Gawain 
accepts some of them (the kisses and the lace) while presumably rejecting others. The 
gift of the lace is accompanied by an oath of secrecy which entraps Gawain in an 
impossible tangle of reciprocal obligations. Thus, the choice o f the lace over the ring 
is parallel to the choice of the axe over the "bobbe," and the highly problematic oath 
which accompanies the acceptance of the lace duplicates the original entrapment of 
Gawain by oath in Arthur’s court. Like the Green Knight’s oath, which is more 
dangerous than his other weapons, Lady de Haudesert’s oath of secrecy is more 
dangerous than her other implicit offers. The real dangers in the poem are not offered 
by physical weapons such as the axe or the female body, but are contained in the knotty 
word-games of the oral oaths. These oaths entrap the acceptor of them into a self-
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defeating web of obligations to the oath-weilders, the key one o f whom remains a 
hidden party.
In all three instances the terms of the oaths, as dictated by Bertilak and the 
Lady, create bargains whose terms appear to be one-sidedly in Gawain’s favour; 
however, entering into these one-sided bargains is actually self-defeating for Gawain. 
In none of the situations does Gawain appear to pay attention to the apparent lack of 
reciprocity (i.e. "consideration") in the agreement. At the making o f the first oath 
Gawain ignores the signification by statement, gesture, and symbolism of the Green 
Knight’s peaceable intent, in order to make a deal that he believes will not require him 
to carry through with the consideration. The actual terms of the oath make the Green 
Knight promise to do something which is humanly impossible, a clear warning sign that 
Gawain ignores. The second bargain is also one-sided. Bertilak states: "Quatsoeuer 
I wynne in £e wod hi worjjez to yourez/ And quat chek so 3e  acheue chauge me 
jDerfome" (1105-6). While "chek" can be glossed as "bad luck" (Andrew and Waldron 
248), it has more ominous meanings such as "doom," "onslaught," and "attack." 
Bertilak thus offers his winnings in exchange for Gawain’s bad luck or doom; and again 
Gawain seeks to take advantage o f someone’s else apparent willingness to enter into an 
unequal bargain. While Gawain should be forewarned by Bertilak’s use o f the word 
"chek," he again makes a bargain which is seemingly one-sided. Gawain, like those 
who presented "cauelaciounz" at A rthur’s court, knows that these are shady bargains 
from the outset. While Bertilak and Morgan know that ample consideration will be 
extracted in return from Gawain, in Gawain’s own original understanding of them,
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these were inequitable agreements which he should have declined for that reason. 
Derek Pearsall has refered to Chaucer’s Pardoner as "A Salesman" ("Chaucer’s 
Pardoner"), and so, too, is Bertilak. His offers tempt Gawain to doom himself by his 
own greed. To accept these bargains is shameful, because they tempt the promisee to 
profit at someone else’s expense or misfortune.
The secrecy oath is another offer which is too good to be refused, and again a 
problem of reciprocal obligation is clear from the outset. Symbolic objects often 
accompanied the formation of covenants in the Middle Ages, so the lace can be seen 
as an accompaniment to the covenant of secrecy, the actual "gift" Lady Hautdesert 
offers Gawain. The acceptance of the oath o f secrecy with its accompanying lace (a 
kind of "seal" for the agreement) is thus a third wager/game that Gawain blindly enters 
into.6 By agreeing to accept the secrecy oath and the lace, a covenant is created 
between Gawain and the Lady. But when he is forced to reveal the lace to Bertilak, 
Gawain finds that Lady de Hautdesert has perpetrated the "trewest" "tricherie," by 
enticing him into another self-defeating bargain. This realization precipitates Gawain’s 
"anti-feminist rant," as the triply-wounded Gawain realizes that the Lady’s seduction 
o f him was a cold-hearted trick. Gawain’s rant against "other" women is a deflected 
tirade against the true object o f his anger; what he really wants to say he refrains from 
in front o f the Lady’s husband. In Bertilak’s interpretation o f the Lady’s actions and 
words to Gawain, she has perpetrated the most virtuous of treacheries by only 
pretending to want to seduce Gawain, and even worse, apparently doing so at her 
husband’s request.7
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As Gawain discovers by this point in the poem, nothing is really locked in true 
letters orally. The poet undermines the fixity o f the oral world he creates within the 
poem. Sir Gawain suggests that a world based on chivalric oaths is a world o f shape- 
shifting, ambiguity, and verbal entrapment; it is also the world of the travelling 
salesman’s quick and easy, shady bargain. Like the lace which "forms a knot easy to 
untie" (Shoaf, "Syngne" 160), the oral agreement does not lock, set down, or fix with 
any certainty; it is the apparent certainty o f the oaths which forms the essential element 
in their "tricherie." In contrast, the writing o f the poem locks in "lei Ietteres" the oral 
treachery of the oaths Lord and Lady de Hautdesert dictate to Gawain. In this way the 
poem functions to undermine the fiction o f oral certainty. The oaths created by Morgan 
pull Gawain into an ambiguous and self-defeating network of relationships and 
reciprocal obligations with "middlemen" whose identity he does not comprehend, and 
whose existence turns out to be only a false front to hide the party with whom he is 
really contracting.
The social world of the chivalric oath, tied by the bond of the spoken word, is 
untied by the written word of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight. As Palm er notes of 
the period after the Black Death, "In England written contractual arrangements allowed 
confidence in a broad array o f economic and social activities" (62). The confidence 
given by the written contract now supercedes the uncertainty and ambiguity o f the 
spoken agreement. If oral communication is as "light as air and as fleeting," who can 
say what was spoken in an oral contract, and if this is determined, who can then 
interpret the meaning of what was spoken and not spoken, but gestured? The apparent
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confidence Gawain has in spoken oaths is unravelled over the course o f the poem. In 
the end, there is very little certainty about what any of the spoken discourse between 
characters has meant. What has transpired between people is supposedly clearly 
interpreted by Bertilak, yet his interpretation only reveals an interlocking network of 
"tricherie." The apparent simplicity and certainty o f the oaths is an integral part of 
their effectiveness as weapons; they seem straightforward at the moment they are made. 
But, like the Lord and Lady de Hautdesert themselves, the oaths’ simplicity is a false 
front. When the front is stripped away, the treachery of the tongue, embodied in 
spoken words, is revealed.
The final denouement o f the poem is the revelation by Bertilak that Morgan la 
Fee has really controlled the action o f the plot. From this revelation it appears that 
Lord and Lady de Hautdesert have not been in control of their gestures or language; 
thus, by the conclusion of the poem, their words and actions over the course o f the plot 
are impossible to interpret. Jeanne Mathewson has asked about Lady de Hautdesert, 
"Who knows what the lady really wants?" (215) But the question should really be 
reflected back to Morgan, for who knows what she really wants? By the conclusion 
of the poem the gestures, gifts, and words involved in the making of the three oaths are 
more enigmatic than could possibly have been foreseen. Thus, the reader is entrapped 
in the same situation as Gawain, of having been unable to predict the meaning of 
apparently straitforward agreements. Only Morgan apparently has the power to 
interpret the oaths because she "outranks" everyone else in the poem. As she declines
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to speak, the reader and Gawain are left only with Bertilak’s explanation of the oaths, 
and the sense that Bertilak may not understand their true significance.
As Dennis Moore points out:
Morgan’s unforeseen emergence as prime mover of the story suffuses the 
romance with an ambiguity and indefiniteness because o f the wide gap 
between her sudden crucial importance and our scant knowledge of her 
nature, her motives, and her relationship to other characters. As the 
reader reconsiders the events o f the poem, fitting the memory of their 
original appearance into a new framework of understanding, new doubts 
arise. What exactly has been Morgan’s role? (226)
While Geraldine Heng asserts that "Morgan’s signature in the drama is deciphered by
the Green Knight, who unravels it backward to the beginning of the poem’s action"
(501), this seems a gross overstatement of the actual effect of Bertilak’s briefly-stated
revelation o f Morgan’s role. Bertilak "deciphers" almost nothing in his revelation to
Gawain. Instead, he creates ciphers where none had seemed to exist before. Bertilak
does not himself "unravel" Morgan’s "signature in the drama;" rather, he presents
surprising revelations which Gawain (and the reader) must attempt to interpret.
Morgan, an enigmatic symbol herself, becomes an enigma in the poem, and turns the
plot into something of an enigma.
Because Bertilak reveals himself to be a false front for a covert operation by 
Morgan, his own credibility is seriously undermined. Nothing he has said or done now 
appears to be an honest expression of his will and desire. As Marie Borroff asks: "It 
is all very well to accept the Green Knight’s judgements at the end o f the poem, but for 
those of us who do so, a further, and formidable, question must be faced. Why should 
we accept his views? . . . what kind of authority does he represent?" (107) Bertilak’s
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interpretation o f Morgan’s motivation for instigating the beheading game is not very 
convincing, and it does not help to expiain subsequent plot developments. Heng refers 
to Bertilak’s explanation as "reasons so apparently tenuous that they require continual 
scholarly rehearsal" (501). But, rather than arguing, like Heng, against the tenuousness 
o f M organ’s motives as stated by Bertilak, I suggest that the Gawain-poet presents the 
possibility that Bertilak does not understand what Morgan or the Lady de Hautdesert 
really want. From this perspective, the poem then revolves around a similar plot as 
The Wife of Bath’s Tale, in which a Knight is set the task o f discovering what it is that 
women desire. This intertextual reference makes the connection between the "old hag" 
(Morgan) and the "young damsel" (the Lady de Hautdesert) in the castle more 
suspicious, and adds ammunition to Carson’s thesis that they are both Morgan;8 for, in 
The Wife o f Bath’s Tale the hag is a shapeshifter who is both young and beautiful, old 
and "loothly." The answer to the Knight’s quest is "sovereignty," something which 
M organ apparently weilds in an enigmatic fashion.
If Sir Gawain is an exercise in reading women’s motives, this reading has to be 
done literally backwards through the poem from the ending to the beginning. Thus, the 
work provides a true exercise in "opposite readings." Reading back through the 
"female p lo t," whose motivations cannot be adequately explained by Bertilak, the reader 
is given the task of deciphering the encoded words and gestures in the oath-making 
situations; yet, the reader cannot be certain of the key to the code. The code to the 
covert female plot, in contrast to the male plot the poem has apparently been centered 
around, is not, and cannot be, adequately expressed by Bertilak. The female code
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remains a feminine enigma; it cannot be satisfactorily deciphered from the information 
given.
Despite Sheila Fisher’s thesis that Morgan is "on the periphery . . .  in this 
poem" (131), "displaced from the center" and "marginalized" (144), and the poem itself 
"cleansed of female signification" (144), I would argue that Morgan is dead centre in 
this work, an enigma so powerful that critics once argued that she effectively "ruined" 
it.9 Morgan certainly ruins any chance of a "straight-forward" reading of the poem, 
because she symbolizes the treachery o f signification. Used as her tool, spoken oaths, 
with their accompanying gestures and symbolic objects, are weapons o f trustworthy 
treachery within the oral fiction of S ir Gawain and the Green Knight. The author of 
the work apparently has no nostalgic desire for the "certainty,” "purity,” and 
"innocence" o f an unwritten legal past (cf. Goodrich).
The Gawain-poet’s response to oral contracts may be related to a revolutionary 
legal situation created by the attempts to enforce the Statues o f Labourers (A.D. 1351). 
For the first time in English history peasants took their lords to court and asked the 
justices to uphold oral contracts regarding wages and other issues related to their terms 
of employment. Stephen Justice has interpreted the use of parole (i.e. oral) contracts 
by the courts in the enforcement o f the Statutes as an attempt to maintain the feudal 
status quo. He summarizes his source (Putnam) as follows: "parole contracts between 
lords and their laborers were taken as binding . . . .  This decision made oral 
agreements as binding as written contracts, but o f course left laborers without appeal 
to the documentary evidence that the written contract would offer" (37). Justice’s
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summary o f the courts’ attitude toward contracts is that, "the content of a parole
contract was in effect what the lord said it was" (37). However, Justice gives a rather
perverse reading o f his stated source material, Bertha Putnam’s well-documented study
The Enforcem ent o f the Statutes of Labourers. What Putnam’s work reveals is quite
the opposite o f Justice’s thesis. While referring to one particular case, Putnam does
state that it was found relevant in making the judgement that "the statute had been made
for the advantage o f the lords" (200); but, overall her research reveals no particular
bias by the courts in favour o f "masters" over "servants." In Putnam’s own words:
The result of these figures is to prove that the courts were perfectly 
ready to allow to servants or to masters offending against the labour 
legislation the full advantage o f any legal technicalities; but that the 
juries almost never gave verdicts in favor o f servants or even of 
employers who were charged with infringement of the law. It has 
already been shown what kind o f questions o f fact arose in actions for 
breach of contract; but it has also been admitted that no information has 
come to my notice as to the necessity o f any formality, such as the 
presence of witnesses, for the validity o f the parol agreement between 
master and servant. If a servant said in court that no such agreement 
existed, or if a second master claimed a previous contract with the 
servant, it must have been difficult to establish either the truth or the 
falsity o f the statement. In the existing conditions o f the labour market 
the sympathy o f witnesses called in to testify and also of the jurors was 
likely to be on the side o f the plaintiff, while the presumption of guilt 
was certainly on the side o f the defendant. (213)
In the enforcem ent of the Statutes the justices made the unusual decision to uphold
parole agreements, something the common law had traditionally held a very restrictive
attitude towards. However, the reliance on oral contracts was not used to uphold feudal
power structures, as Justice claims, but helped to defy them.10 This can be related to
an overall trend in the courts’ attitude toward contracts after the Black Death. Contract
enforcement worked both ways socially, for as Robert Palmer notes, "Just as the
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government worried that such high mortality would diminish laborers’ desire to work, 
so they worried that the wealthy would shirk their debts . . . .  Preservation of 
traditional society meant that even the upper orders had to live up to their obligations" 
(59).
Putnam summarizes the evidence of the enforcement of the Statutes of Labourers 
as follows:
The fact that villeins were being tried and convicted by the justices of 
labourers exactly like free men, and that they were themselves bringing 
audacious suits in quarter sessions against their own masters; the fact 
that these masters evidently preferred to leave to the crown-appointed 
officials the brunt o f the work of enforcing these measures against their 
tenants whether free or bond, while they themselves merely received the 
fiscal profits resulting from convictions; these facts, as well as many 
others, all point in the same direction. The cataclysm of the Black 
Death had hastened the break-down of the old system and had 
accelerated changes in economic and social relations throughout the 
community; the statutes of labourers must be regarded not as having 
created a new system or a new set of economic relations, but as 
affording proof that radical changes had occurred, ushering in a new era. 
(223)
W hile, as Putnam notes, the nature of the actual parole agreements were virtually 
impossible to determine, the validation of them by the courts reveal a breakdown in the 
social hierarchy. Thus, the ambivalence o f the Gawain-poet’s attitude toward parole 
agreements may be related to the paradox that while oral contracts created the bonds 
which tied together the feudal world in which his poem is set, the use of oral contracts 
in the enforcement of the Statutes o f Labourers revealed the demise o f feudalism in the 
world in which he lived.
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‘The edition of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight referred to is Andrew and 
W aldron’s. Further references will appear as line citations within the body o f the text.
2Discussions o f legal, especially contractual, elements in Sir Gawain and the 
Green Knight include: Kathleen M . Ashley, "Bonding and Signification in Sir Gawain 
and the Green Knight. " and "’Traw th’ and Temporality: The Violation of Contracts and 
Conventions in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight": Robert J. Blanch, "Religion and 
Law in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight. " "The Legal Framework of ’a Twelmonyth 
and a Day" in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight," and "Imagery of Binding in Fits One 
and Two of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight": Robert J. Blanch and Julian N. 
Wasserman, "To ’ouertake Your W ylie’: Volition and Obligation in Sir Gawain and the 
Green Knight." and "Medieval Contracts and Covenants: The Legal Coloring of Sir 
Gawain and the Green Knight. "
3For a discussion of M organ as a complex and ambiguous folklore m otif see: 
Edith Whitehurst Williams, "Morgan La Fee as Trickster in Sir Gawain and the Green 
Knight."
4As Robert Palmer notes, "Almost all litigation in the common law courts (the 
court o f common pleas, the court o f king’s bench, and the exchequer of pleas) began 
with a writ" (62-30. Much of Bracton’s (thirteenth century) treatise On the Laws and 
Customs o f England is given over to describing the proper writs to use in each 
circumstance.
sThe legal meaning of "consideration" is remuneration, a necessary element for 
the formation of a contract.
‘’The seals which legally validated charters were attached to them by laces or 
strips o f parchment. For a discussion of this practice see: M .T. Clanchy, From 
Memory to Written Record, pp. 308-317.
7O r so Bertilak says. For, as Jeanne Mathewson asks, "Who knows what the 
lady really wants? . . .  the Green Knight tells Gawain that he has put his wife up to her 
tricks, but are we to ignore what the narrator tells us at the time the lady is pursuing 
Gawain: ’Bot the lady for luf let not to slepe’? (215).
8See: Mother Angela Carson, O .S .U ., "Morgain la Fee as the Principle of 
Unity in ’Gawain and the Green Knight’".
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9Authors who have argued that Morgan is a weak spot or fault in the poem 
include: J.R . Hulbert, "Syr Gawayn and the Grene K nySt,"; G .L . Kittredge, A Study 
of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight; Albert B. Friedman, "Morgan le Fay in Sir 
Gawain and the Green Knight": and Larry D. Benson, Art and Tradition in Sir Gawain 
and the Green Knight. Dennis Moore in "Making Sense o f an Ending: M organ Le Fay 
in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight" gives an excellent overview of the reaction of 
earlier critics to Bertilak’s revelation o f  M organ’s influence on the plot.
l0I believe that Britton Harwood also misinterprets the results of the enforcement 
of the Statutes when he writes: "Feudalism for our present purpose may be defined as 
the use o f centralized state power to extract the surplus product from the direct 
producers. (An example of such a use would be the enforcement of the Statutes of 
Labourers by royally appointed justice of the peace, one of whom was Chaucer)" 
("Chaucer and the Silence of History" 340).
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Ian Ward notes in Law and Literature: Possibilities and Perspectives that there
are two trends in the field he labels "law and literature studies." One trend examines
"law in literature" and the other views "law as literature." He explains:
Essentially, "law in literature" examines the possible relevance of 
literary texts, particularly those which present themselves as telling a 
legal story, as texts appropriate for study by legal scholars. In other 
words, can Kafka’s The Trial, or Camus’s The Fall, tell us anything 
about law? "Law as literature," on the other hand, seeks to apply the 
techniques o f literary criticism to legal texts. (3)
In his own work Ward proposes to erase this distinction; however, his delineation of
the distinction is limited by his assumption that "law and literature studies" is carried
out only by legal scholars. In fact, literary critics have for well over a century delved
into the realm of legal research in order to interpret literary works. An early work of
this type is C.K. Davis’ The Law in Shakespeare, published in 1884, which provides
a reference guide to the use of legal terms in Shakespeare’s plays. From the nineteenth
century onwards the study of "law in literature" has included works which provide an
explanation of legal terms and issues in order to illuminate the meaning o f literary
works.
My own view of the distinctive trends in this field is to differentiate between 
literary scholars, who tend to use the law to interpret literature, and legal scholars who 
use literary works in order to explain legal points and issues. One of the best examples 
of work done by a literary scholar is R. Howard Bloch’s Medieval French Literature 
and Law which illuminates our understanding o f French romances by exploring how
129
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
130
they reflect legal issues and tensions within French feudalism. What makes this work 
so effective is that it manages to be equally informative about French literature as it is 
about feudal law. At their worst, works by literary scholars adopt a rather simplistic 
attitude toward legal studies and manage not to be very informative about either law or 
literature. J. A. Hornsby’s Chaucer and the Law stands out as an example o f this rather 
hollow cross-referencing between law and literature.
On the other hand, legal scholars can be highly simplistic in their approach not 
only to literary works, but towards the discipline o f literary studies. Richard Posner’s 
Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation offers rather facile interpretations of 
literary works ranging from the Iliad to Bleak House, and his approach to the study of 
"law and literature" is marked by oversimplified definitions of "literature" and "literary 
interpretation." For Posner, "the problems of literary and legal interpretation have little 
in common except the word ‘interpretation’" (17). His central claim is that "it is as 
important a task of law and literature scholarship to point out the differences between 
the fields as it is to identify similarities," (17) and he proceeds to do so. After 
digesting his work, the reader is left to ponder just how meaningful or necessary this 
gesture is.
On the other hand, the best works by legal scholars provide an equally 
illuminating discussion o f both legal issues and literary works. For instance, Theodor 
Meron’s Henry’s Wars and Shakespeare’s Laws provides an engaging examination of 
medieval laws o f war and also offers an explanation of how and why Shakespeare 
altered the facts o f history in Henry V . A scholar of international law, M eron’s
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primary focus is the laws of war; therefore, Shakespeare’s drama serves as more of an 
exemplum than as a main focal point o f the work. Nevertheless, M eron’s study is 
equally useful for literary as for legal scholars.
In the preceding chapters my approach to the subject o f law and literature has 
been to depart from the compartmentalization o f legal scholarship and literary criticism. 
I have chosen to focus on the parallel responses of poets and the legal system to the rise 
o f  literacy and the increasing use o f texts. For instance, while I wished to present a 
departure in literary criticism by arguing that the Wife of Bath’s rhetoric is as legal as 
it is clerical, the overall goal in the first chapter is to demonstrate how "the power of 
interpretation" over texts is equally relevant to historical analysis, literary criticism, 
legal debate and courtroom strategies o f pleading. My aim has been to demonstrate that 
"buried texts" are a parallel source o f concern for both poet, legal practitioner, common 
citizen, and king in the fourteenth century.
While chapter two contains a lengthy exploration o f a specific legal issue 
embedded in a few lines of text, my overall intention is to show how the feudal ideal 
o f the oral oath was being undermined by a profession whose power and status now 
largely rested in its assumption o f "the power of interpretation" over texts. In each 
chapter it is the concern of the poet with the distinction between lex scripta and lex non 
scripta, however covertly expressed, which is the focus of my primary interest.
Medieval anxieties about texts and writing informs my discussion of the 
Pardoner’s performance in chapter three. The question is whether legal documents 
contain a validity on their own, outside o f an oral context in which they are created.
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The Pardoner’s attempt to affirm the power o f the text outside of any oral context 
aligns with legal anxieties about the use o f written contracts and agreements. The 
performance of the Pardoner is disturbing and relevant because his fetishization o f texts 
(an obsessive interest in and submission to their power) reflects the attitude toward the 
text in medieval Christianity—the cult o f the book which arises from the use of the Bible 
as a sacred icon. In the Pardoner’s performance legal anxieties about "the letter o f the 
law" are aligned with theological anxieties about "the letter of the spirit." At the 
culmination o f the Pardoner’s Tale the pilgrims and the reader are left with the uneasy 
sense that the text is more potent than the spirit, and thus come to an understanding of 
why writing is a source of destabilization in the legal as well as the eccesiastical sphere.
In chapter four I argue that the Canon’s Yeoman’s Prologue and Tale serves as 
a counterbalance to the anxieties about textual power left unresolved at the end o f the 
Pardoner’s Prologue and Tale. The Yeoman presents a de-mystification of texts which 
exposes their emptiness and impotence. The Yeoman claims that the impotence of 
alchemy, a science based on a long tradition o f codification, is the result o f textual 
impotence. The "false and empty code" o f alchemy is aligned with the resistance to the 
idea of legal codification in England. By questioning whether written texts have or can 
have any authentic source, the Yeoman aligns himself with the English stance that the 
true law rests not in texts but in experience.
Over the course of the four chapters on The Canterbury Tales the idea o f "the 
power o f interpretation" over texts becomes an increasingly complex problem. Chaucer 
insistently questions whether texts themselves have power, meaning, and authentic
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sources. Aside from the Pardoner’s "alienating" performance, the overall thrust o f the 
Tales is that meaning does not come from, nor is contained in, texts. Only through 
"experience," to use the Wife of Bath’s term, is meaning to be found; and, as the Wife 
demonstrates, experience is gained by a negotiation of texts, customs, and personal 
experimentation. Chaucer aligns himself on the side o f the lex non scripta: for him the 
true law is a living, breathing entity which cannot be enclosed in a written page. A 
truly potent law for Chaucer is one that is alive in speech and action, not enscribed on 
parchment. For Chaucer, the letter is always a form of "fale representation."
The departure taken in chapter five is away from the Chaucerian questioning of 
and suspicion about texts and into the Gawain-poet’s anti-nostalgic romance where 
masculine oath-making turns into feminine web-spinning. The entrapment o f Gawain 
in a web of indeterminate oral and social constructions reveals a counter-movement to 
the nostalgia for a world devoid o f "textual deceptions." In Sir Gawain and the Green 
Knight assuming "the power of interpretation" over the spoken word becomes even 
more problematic than assuming interpretive power over texts, as the fleeting quality 
o f the speech act allows for indeterminacy about what has been transacted. The real 
meaning of the oaths in this poem, like the motivations of Morgan, remain indelibly 
mysterious, for in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight nothing is "with lei letteres loken" 
orally.
There are few scholarly studies which parallel the form of approach I have 
attempted in this dissertation. One notable work is Peter Goodrich’s Oedipus Lex 
which presents a psychoanalytical approach to the study of the common law in the post-
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Reformation period. His examination o f the forces of desire and repression at work in 
the common law offers extraordinary insights into the cultural entity we call "the law." 
Not bound by Posner’s dictum: "the problems of literary and legal interpretation have 
little in common except the word ‘interpretation’" (17), Goodrich applies the same 
analytical approach to the law as a literary critic would to a text. The result is, I 
believe, a groundbreaking work o f cultural and historical analysis which examines the 
common law as, in Foucault’s term, a "monument."
Like Goodrich I have attempted not to be bound by categorizations of what 
constitutes legal and literary analysis and have sought to reveal how limited that form 
of either/or categorization is. The forces at work creating the medieval common law 
are the forces at work stimulating the production of poetic works. To distiguish 
between what is literary and what is legal in the works of Chaucer and the Gawain-poet 
is futile; their poetry is informed by the same forces which create and interpret laws. 
What Chaucer and the Gawain-poet say about poetry and literary interpretation in their 
work is what they also say about law and legal interpretation. It has been my intent in 
the preceding pages to erase the dichotomy in "law and literature studies" and to 
demonstrate how meaningless that distinction is. I propose that "the power of 
interpretation" is the same and is exercised in the same way in all realms of culture.
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